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
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


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
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**'Dr. Smith's Translation of Thucydides is a work of
standard merit and excellence.'—BIBLIOGRAPHICAL MISCELI-
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ARGUMENTS.

BOOK VI.—[CONTINUED.]

THE Athenian commanders make a farther review of the armament, and divide the forces into three parts ; after which they send forward three ships to bring them intelligence ; the fleet then proceeds to Sicily ; its amount, &c. ; not being received by any of the cities of Italy, they go and encamp at Rhegium, there waiting for the return of the ships sent forward—The Syracusans receiving undoubted intelligence of their coming, prepare for defence—The three ships return, but bringing bad news as to the money at Egesta, and the Regines refusing to join them, a consultation is held by the Athenian commanders ; their several opinions—Alcibiades endeavors to bring Messene over to their alliance, but without success—The Athenians then proceed with part of their fleet to Naxus, which agrees to receive them, and thence to Catana ; the latter, however, refuses to admit them ; but by means of a surprise they bring the city over to their alliance, and transport thither all their forces from Rhegium ; they then go to Camarina, which refuses to receive them—Alcibiades summoned home, to answer the charges brought against him—Strict inquisition being made respecting the violation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the statues, general suspicion now prevailed at Athens ; so that the guilty and the innocent were alike apprehended ; the people recalling to mind the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ, the deliverance from which they owed to the Lacedæmonians, unable to effect it themselves ; account of that affair ; at length one of those who were imprisoned, to procure a pardon for himself, and restore quiet to the city, turns informer ; and those whom he impeaches suffer punishment ; suspicions with respect to Alcibiades ; he is therefore summoned home, together with certain others implicated ; but escapes, and the rest with him ; the other commanders in Sicily now divide the armament into two

parts ; they go to Selinus and Egesta, and take Hyccara—Thirty talents paid by Egesta—They attempt to take Hybla Galeatis, but fail—Preparations for battle made by the Athenians and Syracusans ; stratagem of the Athenians ; deceived by which the Syracusan commanders lead their whole army towards Catana ; the Athenians meanwhile proceed to Syracuse, and encamp at a convenient spot, which they fortify, before the Syracusans return ; disposition of either army ; oration of Nicias to his army—The engagement in which the Athenians conquer ; number of the dead on both sides—The Athenians send to Athens for cavalry and money—Encouragement and counsel of Hermocrates to the Syracusans—Hermocrates chosen commander, with two others—The Syracusans send to Corinth and Lacedæmon for assistance—The Athenians make an attempt on Messene, but fail, from the scheme being divulged by Alcibiades—The Syracusans enlarge the compass of their walls, fix palisades at the sea, at every place fit for disembarkation, ravage the territory of the Catanaeans, and send ambassadors to Camarina, to thwart their designs—Oration of Hermocrates to the Camarinæans—Oration of Euphemus to the same—The Camarinæans return an equal answer to both parties—The Athenians and Syracusans then prepare for the war, and endeavor to add to their party, the former, the Siculi, Carthaginians, and Etruscans ; the latter, the Italian states, the Peloponnesians, and especially the Lacedæmonians—Oration of Alcibiades, in which he exasperates the Lacedæmonians against his country, and urges them to send succors to the Syracusans—The Lacedæmonians appoint Gylippus as commander-in-chief over the Syracusans—The Athenians decree to send to the army in Sicily the supplies and horsemen.

YEAR XVIII. The Athenians lay waste the lands of the Megareans, then cultivated by the Syracusans ; they then reduce Centoripa ; receive, on their return to Catana, the money and horsemen from Athens—Expedition of the Lacedæmonians against the Argives stopped by an earthquake—The Argives make an irruption into Thyreatis, and take a great spoil—Attempt of the popular party at Thespiae against the Optimates defeated—The Syracusans resolve to guard the ascent to Epipolæ, a steep and rocky tract ; and

making a review in the meadow near the Anapus, select six hundred heavy infantry for that purpose ; but the Athenians anticipate them, and anchoring at Thapsus, occupy Epipolæ, from which the Syracusans attempting to drive them down, are defeated, and retreat to the city ; the Athenians erect a fort on the summit of the rocky eminence of Epipolæ ; they raise the wall of circumvallation round one part of the city, Syca—The Syracusans carry a transverse wall below it ; on finishing which the Athenians, making an assault, demolish it—The Athenians carry forward their wall of circumvallation to the rocky ground towards the great harbor—The Syracusans again raise a palisade, and dig a ditch ; both which the Athenians take, and a battle ensuing, are again victorious ; with the loss, however, of Lamachus—The wall of circumvallation at Epipolæ saved by the prudence of Nicias—The Syracusans change their commanders—Arrival of Gylippus—The Lacedæmonians make an irruption into Argos.

BOOK VII.

YEAR XVIII. Gylippus proceeds from Taras to Locri Epizephyrii, and from thence to Himera, that he may with the greater safety, aided by the Himeræans, Selinuntians, and others, pass across the territory of the Siculi to Syracuse ; meanwhile the rest of the Corinthian ships leave Leucas ; and Gongylus, one of their commanders, arriving first at Syracuse, emboldens the Syracusans with the intelligence that Gylippus and the Corinthians are coming up—Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse—Offer of Gylippus to the Athenians, which is not accepted ; he takes Labdalum—The Syracusans set about building a wall in opposition to that of the Athenians—Nicias fortifies Plemmyrium, and removes his fleet thither—The sailors, in fetching water and collecting fuel, grievously molested by the Syracusans—Nicias sends twenty ships to lie in wait for the rest of the Corinthian fleet now approaching—The Syracusans proceed in the building of their wall ; engage twice with the Athenians, and have the advantage in the latter battle ; they get before the Athenians in their counter-wall, and thus utterly exclude the farther progress of the wall of the Athenians ;

the rest of the ships from Peloponnesus arrive unobserved by the Athenian guard force—Gylippus traverses Sicily, and sends into Peloponnesus for more aid—Nicias sends messengers to Athens, with an epistolary dispatch—The Athenians invade Amphipolis, but without success—The messengers from Nicias arrive at Athens—Epistle of Nicias—The Athenians choose two of the officers that were now in Sicily as his colleagues *pro tempore*, until Demosthenes and Eurymedon, whom they had appointed as successors to his former colleagues, should arrive thither; they determine to send over another army; they send Eurymedon forward with ten ships and twenty talents of silver; while Demosthenes remains behind, till the ensuing spring, to superintend the preparations for the voyage—The Athenians send twenty ships to cruise round Peloponnesus, for the purpose of hindering reinforcements from crossing over from Corinth or other towns of Peloponnesus to Sicily—The Corinthians send twenty-five ships to oppose them—The Lacedæmonians prepare to invade Attica, being more than ever emboldened, and no longer hindered by any scruple, as the Athenians had manifestly acted contrary to the conditions of the treaty.

YEAR XIX. The Peloponnesians invade Attica, and fortify Decelea; they send some heavy infantry to Sicily—The Athenians despatch Demosthenes thither—Gylippus, supported by Hermocrates, persuades the Syracusans to venture on a sea-fight; they accordingly come to an engagement with the Athenian fleet; and while the enemy is intent on the sea-fight, Gylippus with the land forces makes an attack on the forts at Plemmyrium, and carries them—The Athenians, however, get the victory by sea—Demosthenes, in his way to Sicily, fortifies a peninsular spot of sea-coast in Laconia—The Thracians who were to have been sent with Demosthenes into Sicily arriving too late, the Athenians, on account of the lowness of their finances, send them home again; these in their way sack the city of Mycalessus, and massacre the inhabitants—The Thebans, advancing to give succor, chase them down to their ships—Eurymedon comes to Demosthenes from Sicily, and tells him of the taking of Plemmyrium—They both levy forces to send into Sicily—Nicias, by means of the Siculi, his allies, kills a considera-

ble number of the troops going as reinforcements to Syracuse from the neighboring cities—Sea-fight on the coast of Achaea, between the Corinthians and Athenians—Demosthenes and Eurymedon coast along the shore of Italy, till they reach Petra, in the territory of Rhegium—The Syracusans hearing of their approach, put their ships in readiness to engage with the Athenians before the reinforcement arrives; their manner of strengthening their ships; the Athenians and Syracusans engage, but nothing worthy of mention being the first day achieved by either party, they separate; next day they renew the engagement, in which, by the stratagem of Ariston, the Syracusans come off conquerors—Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrive at Syracuse with the reinforcements from Athens—Unsuccessful attempt of Demosthenes to gain the cross wall of the Syracusans by which they had hindered the Athenians from circumvaliating them—The Syracusans send for farther supplies—The Athenian commanders deliberate on the present posture of affairs—The opinion of Demosthenes—The opinion of Nicias—Gylippus returns with another army—The Athenians intending to depart, are detained by an eclipse of the moon; having intelligence of which, the Syracusans make an attack on the Athenians first by land, then by land and sea, and again have the advantage—Eurymedon slain—The Athenians, dejected, repent of the expedition—The Syracusans meditate blocking up the mouth of the harbor, to prevent the Athenians getting away—A detail of the nations assembled at the war of Syracuse on either side—The Syracusans commence blocking up the mouth of the harbor; seeing which, the Athenian commanders resolve to evacuate the upper fortifications, and to erect a small fortification near the dock for the reception of their baggage and the sick, then to put all their forces on board their ships, and try another sea-fight—Harangue of Nicias—Harangue of Gylippus and the Syracusan commanders—Nicias again encourages his soldiers; then prepares for battle—The Athenians and Syracusans engage—The Athenians utterly defeated—Stratagem of Hermocrates to hinder the escape of the Athenians—Gylippus goes forth with the land forces, blocks up the roads, and places guards at the crossings of the brooks and rivers—The Syracusans haul off the Athe-

nian ships, without molestation, to their own station—The Athenians take their departure—Address of Nicias to his dejected army—The Athenians pursue their march, assaulted continually by the Syracusans—The Athenians continue their march in the night, by a contrary way to what they had first intended, the division of Nicias keeping close together, but that of Demosthenes separating and marching in disorder—Demosthenes being overtaken by the enemy, surrenders after a long resistance—Nicias overtaken by the Syracusans, makes proposals to the enemy, which are not accepted; at length surrenders unconditionally to Gylippus—The Syracusans return to the city with their captives, whom they thrust into the Latomiae—Nicias and Demosthenes are put to death—Sufferings of the captives confined in the Latomiae.

BOOK VIII.

YEAR XIX. When the news of the defeat in Sicily reaches Athens, all at first disbelieve it; but when there was no longer any room for doubt, the people are exasperated against those who had promoted the expedition; and general fear and consternation prevail; nevertheless they diligently set about what was proper to be done at the present conjuncture—The rest of the Grecian states, who had hitherto been neuter, are now more disposed to go to war against the Athenians; as are also the allies of the Lacedæmonians; and the allies of the Athenians themselves are eager to fight and recover their liberty—The winter subsequent to the defeat in Sicily, Agis, proceeding from Decelea, collects money for the building of a fleet; and the Lacedæmonians, on their part, issue requisitions to their allies for the building of one hundred ships, towards which they themselves undertake to furnish twenty-five—The Athenians, too, in the course of the winter, build ships, fortify Sunium, make retrenchments in the public expenditure, that they may have more to spare for the war; meanwhile the allies of the Athenians are every where inclined to revolt to Agis—The Chians and Erythreans, likewise, resort for the same purpose to the Lacedæmonians themselves, accompanied by an ambassador of Tissaphernes,

whose aim it was to bring the Peloponnesians over to the king of the Persians, that he might, with their assistance, deprive the Athenians of the Ionian cities; for which very purpose Pharnabazus, too, governor of the provinces lying at the Hellespont and the Euxine sea, had sent ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians at the same time; so that there is a great debate among the Lacedæmonians as to what quarter the aid should first be sent; at length Alcibiades prevails, by means of Endius the ephorus, that the Lacedæmonians should first send assistance to the Chians and Tissaphernes, and immediately admit both parties as allies.

YEAR XX. All these things are transacted without the knowledge of the Athenians—The Chians are urgent with the Lacedæmonians to send the promised assistance—The Lacedæmonians accordingly use all dispatch to have the fleet transported thither from Corinth; but while the Corinthians are delaying to depart, on account of the Isthmian feestivals being now at hand, the Athenians suspect the plot, and expostulate with the Chians; being confirmed in their suspicion from participating in the Isthmia at Corinth, the Athenians, when the Peloponnesian ships had put to sea, meet with and drive them into Piræus, a port situated in the confines of the Corinthian and Epidaurian territory; and having vanquished them, blockade them in the port—The Lacedæmonians are much discouraged by this defeat—Alcibiades nevertheless persuades Endius and the other ephori to send him forward with Chalcideus and the five ships to Chios—Sixteen Peloponnesian ships, in their return from Sicily, are intercepted and damaged by some Attic ones; they however escape, and reach Corinth—Chios and Erythræ revolt, as also does Clazomenæ—The Athenians abrogate the law respecting the one thousand talents reserved for an emergency, and fit out a fleet with the money; they also decree to send, for the present, eight ships under the command of Strombichides, and shortly twelve others, against Chios—Strombichides arrives at Samos, and from thence proceeds to Teios—Chalcideus advancing thither with twenty-three ships, Strombichides sheers off to Samos; and the Teians, receiving the Lacedæmonians, demolish the wall which the Athenians had built facing the continent—Revolt of Miletus—First alliance of

the Lacedæmonians with the king of Persia and Tissaphernes—Revolt of Lebedos and Eræ—Meanwhile the Peloponnesian ships detained at Piræus by the Athenians, having made a sally, break forth, and reach Cenchreæ; there they again prepare for the expedition into Ionia, under the command of Astyochus, to whom the supreme naval authority was committed—Insurrection at Samos—Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos, in which they bring Methymne over to revolt—Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian commander, follows them with four ships, on perceiving the Athenians going thither; for the latter, unexpectedly standing into the port of Mitylene, had overpowered the ships of the Chians; and then landing, conquered in battle those that resisted, and seized the city; hearing of which, he at first determines to proceed to Antissa and Methymne, for the purpose of encouraging them; but afterwards, not being able to do any good, he returns to Chios—The Athenians re-establish things on their former footing in Lesbos, and also recover Clazomenæ—Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian governor, is conquered in battle, and slain by those Athenians who occupied a station at the island of Lade—The Athenians make war on Chios, and reduce it to great straits—Expedition of the Athenians against Miletus, in which having conquered the Milesians, &c., they prepare to circumvallate the place, when intelligence is brought of the arrival of the Peloponnesian and Sicilian ships—in consequence of which the Athenians, by the advice of Phryni-chus, speedily retire to Samos—The Peloponnesians take Iasus, which had been occupied by Amorges, a rebel to the king, whom they deliver up prisoner to Tissaphernes—The Athenians at Samos, receiving the addition of thirty-five more ships from Athens, commanded by Charminus, di-vide their forces, part proceeding against Chios, and part remaining at Samos—Unsuccessful expedition of Astyochus against Pteleus and Clazomenæ; is summoned by certain Lesbians who meditate revolt; but the allies refusing to co-operate with him, he returns to Chios; again receives applications from the Lesbians; but Pædaritus, com-mander of the Lacedæmonian fleet at Chios, and the Chians refusing their assistance, he with his ships sails for Mile-tus to join the fleet which had lately been brought him by

Theramenes ; in his way he narrowly escapes the ships of the Athenians, which were proceeding from Samos to Chios, and being tossed about by a violent storm, most of them make their way to Lesbos—This same winter Hippocrates arrives with twelve ships from Peloponnesus at Cnidus, which had revolted from the Athenians, but was near being recovered by them—Meanwhile Astyochus had joined the fleet at Miletus—Second treaty of alliance between the Lacedæmonians and the king of Persia—The Athenians, departing from Lesbos, cross over to Chios, and there fortify Delphinium ; receiving no opposition from the Chians, they being embroiled with domestic factions, and having in vain applied for aid to Astyochus ; in consequence of which refusal to assist them, Pædaritus sends a representation to the Lacedæmonians—The Lacedæmonians accordingly send to Miletus, together with those twenty-seven ships which they had provided for the service of Pharnabazus, eleven persons of the Spartans as counsellors to Astyochus, to inquire into the matter—While these are coming to land at Caunus, Astyochus is preparing to give assistance to the Chians ; but receiving intelligence of their arrival, he alters his purpose, and goes with a fleet to meet them and convoy them to Miletus—In his passage he makes a descent on Cos Meropis—At the persuasion of the Cnidiots, he plans an attack on Charminus, an Athenian, who was watching about Rhodes for the approach of the ships in question, which were now arrived at Caunus—In consequence of rain and foggy weather his ships are driven out of their course and scattered ; so that Charminus, attacking, overcomes a part ; but the remaining and greater number afterwards coming up, he takes to flight, and loses six of his ships—The whole fleet of the Peloponnesians, now assembled, takes its station at Cnidus—There, holding conferences with Tissaphernes respecting the conditions of the alliance, a disagreement arises thereon, in consequence of which Tissaphernes withdraws in a rage—Rhodes revolts to the Peloponnesians—Alcibiades becomes an object of suspicion to the Lacedæmonians, insomuch that they order Astyochus to put him to death ; he withdraws himself to Tissaphernes, whom he by degrees alienates from the Peloponnesians, and does them all the harm in his power—Thus he advises


Tissaphernes to curtail their pay, and to corrupt their commanders; answers in his name to the states that call on him for money, and puts them off; counsels Tissaphernes to prolong the war, and wear out both parties one against the other; he counsels him of the two parties to favor rather the Athenians, as more enabled to help him in subduing the Grecian states, and less inclined to oppose the dominion of the king; since they aimed only at naval power; while the Lacedæmonians, it is plain, after having now liberated Greeks from Greeks, would exert themselves afterwards to liberate them from barbarians—Influenced by those suggestions, Tissaphernes thwarts the Peloponnesians in various ways—Alcibiades aims at returning to Athens, by making show of his influence with Tissaphernes—Motion for the recall of Alcibiades, and the abolition of democracy—Conspiracy in the army at Samos against the Athenian democracy—Phrynicus opposes the recalling of Alcibiades; his treason against the state—Astyochus impeaches him to Alcibiades—Phrynicus sends to Astyochus again, and offers to put the whole army into his hands; which Astyochus also communicates to Alcibiades—Device of Phrynicus to avoid the danger—Alcibiades endeavors to persuade Tissaphernes to enter into an alliance with the Athenians—Pisander prevails on the Athenians to consent to an oligarchy, and to give him and others a commission to treat with Alcibiades—Phrynicus accused by Pisander, and removed from his command, as also his colleague Skironidas; and Diomedon and Leon appointed in their place; who, having arrived at the Athenian fleet, make a descent on Rhodes, and, having conquered the Rhodians in battle, remove to the island of Chalce—The Chians, making an attack on the wall of the Athenians, under Pædaritus, are routed, and Pædaritus slain—Distress of Chios in consequence—Alcibiades not being able to perform his promise, in bringing Tissaphernes to a treaty with the Athenians, so exaggerates the demands that the Athenians retire in disgust—Tissaphernes gives the Peloponnesians their pay, and concludes a third treaty with them—Oropus taken by treachery.

YEAR xxi. The Chians engage in a sea-fight with the Athenians—Abydos and Lampsacus revolt; but the former is

recovered by Strombichides—The democracy at Athens put down by Pisander and his associates—The authors of the oligarchy resolve to leave out Alcibiades—The Athenians having established oligarchy in Thasus, it presently revolts from them—Proceedings in establishing the oligarchy—Form of the new oligarchy—Authors of the oligarchy—The four hundred are introduced into the council-hall, and every thing necessary being provided for the occasion, they dismiss the senate of five hundred, called the counsellors by ballot ; they then create prytanes amongst them by lot, and perform the usual sacrifices to the gods—Agis, hoping to find the city in sedition, comes and attacks it, but is repulsed—The four hundred send to Lacedæmon to negotiate a treaty ; they send to Samos to reconcile the army to the change in government, lest the seafaring multitude should violently oppose the oligarchy, and turn them out of their places ; a fear justified by what really comes to pass ; for an attempt having been made by some Samian nobles to introduce oligarchy there, but without success, the popular party gets the better, and kills and banishes the ringleaders—The Samians, then, sending the ship Paralus with an account of their proceedings to Athens, for they knew not as yet of the late change in government there, the four hundred throw part of the Paralians into prison, and send the rest to keep guard about Eubœa—Cheræas, however, who had been charged with the message, on seeing how matters stood, contrives to secrete himself, and returning to Athens, reports all that he had seen, with much exaggeration and falsehood—Exasperated at this, the soldiers are with difficulty restrained from proceeding to acts of violence—Democracy is now re-established in the army, and Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus appointed commanders in the place of the former ones, who are deposed—On hearing of these transactions, the ten ambassadors sent by the four hundred from Athens, being then at Delos, proceed no farther—Murmurs of the Peloponnesians against Astyochus and Tissaphernes—In consequence of which, the former goes to Samos to offer battle to the Athenians ; but they refuse it—Afterwards the Athenians offer battle to the Peloponnesians, but they decline it—Clearchus, being sent with forty ships to Pharnabazus, is driven by a tempest to Delos ;

then returns to Miletus, and from thence goes by land to the Hellespont, whither the rest of his ships had arrived, and had there brought Byzantium over to revolt; being alarmed at this, the Athenians send a garrison to the Hellespont—Alcibiades is recalled, and comes to Samos; is chosen commander of the Athenian army—Murmurs of the Peloponnesians against Tissaphernes and Astyochus—Mutiny against the latter—The Milesians take the fort built at Miletus by Tissaphernes, with the approbation of the Peloponnesians, except Lichas, who on that account incurs the hatred of the Milesians—Mindarus succeeds to Astyochus in the naval command—Important service rendered by Alcibiades to his country—Tissaphernes gets ready to go to Aspendus, to fetch the Phœnician fleet—Various conjectures as to the real purpose of his journey, since he did not bring the ships away after all—Opinion of the historian—Alcibiades sails after him—Sedition at Athens originated by certain of the oligarchy who aim at restoring democracy—Exertions of others most opposed to democracy, to maintain the present system—These send ambassadors to Lacedæmon, to effect a treaty with that power on any terms which should be at all tolerable; they moreover begin to erect a fortress at the mouth of Piræus—Charges thrown out by Theramenes against this last measure, not without foundation—Assassination of Phrynickus, which gives an impulse to the proceedings of Theramenes and his party—Alexicles, a commander under the oligarchy, arrested by Aristocrates, and put in confinement—Tumult in consequence—Demolition of the wall in Eûtioneïa by the soldiers and others—The soldiers appeased by certain persons sent to them by the four hundred; consent that an assembly shall be held on an appointed day, to treat of a reconciliation—Approach of the Peloponnesian fleet—Measures of the Athenians accordingly—Engagement between the Peloponnesians and Athenians at Eretria, in which the latter are defeated—Revolt of Eubœa from the Athenians—Decree of the Athenians to deliver up the government into the hands of the five thousand, as also to recall Alcibiades and the rest with him—Most of the oligarchical party withdraw to the enemy—Oenoë delivered up to the Boeotians, by the deceit of Aristarchus—Mindarus, seeing none of the

ships promised by Tissaphernes forthcoming, and being sent for by Pharnabazus, sets sail from Miletus with the Peloponnesian fleet for the Hellespont ; stops by the way at Chios—Thrasyllus in the mean time, hearing of his departure from Miletus, immediately sets sail from Samos, and employing persons to watch for him at Lesbos and the continent opposite, repairs to Methymne, and thence to Eressus, which had revolted, for the purpose of taking it together with Thrasybulus, who has already arrived there—Meanwhile Mindarus sets sail from Chios, and reaches the Hellespont unseen by those who were watching for him at Lesbos—The Athenians at Sestus with eighteen ships steal out of the Hellespont, but are met by Mindarus, and four of them taken—Sea-fight between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, in which the former get the victory—The Athenians recover Cyzicus, and take eight ships of the Peloponnesians—The Peloponnesians retake some of the ships captured at Eleus, and send to Eubœa for the fleet under Hegesandridas—Alcibiades returns from Caunus to Samos ; exacts a sum of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortifies Cos—Tissaphernes returns to Ionia—The Antandrians expel the garrison of Tissaphernes from their citadel, lest they should experience the same treatment from his deputy Arsaces as the Delians who had dwelt at Adramyttium—Tissaphernes goes to the Hellespont to recover the favor of the Peloponnesians.



PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK VI.—[CONTINUED.]

THE Athenians, with the reinforcements of their allies, were by this time all arrived at Corcyra: and the first thing done by the commanders was to take a review of the whole equipment, and to settle the order in which they were to anchor and form their naval station. They also divided it into three squadrons, and cast lots for the command of each; to the end that, in the course of the voyage, they might be well supplied with water, and harbors, and the proper necessaries, wherever they might chance to put in; that, in other respects, a better discipline might be kept up, and the men be more inured to a ready obedience, as being under the inspection of an able commander in each several division. These points being settled, they despatched three vessels to Italy and Sicily, to pick up information what cities on these coasts would give them a reception. And their orders were, to come back in time and meet them on the voyage, that they might be advertised into what ports they might safely enter.

These previous points being adjusted, the Athenians, with an equipment already swelled to so great a bulk, weighed anchor from Corcyra, and stood across for Sicily. The total of their triremes was a hundred and

thirty-four ; to which were added two Rhodian vessels of fifty oars. One hundred of these were Athenian ; and of this number sixty were tight ships fit for service ; the rest were transports for the soldiery. The remainder of the fleet consisted of Chians and the other allies. The total of the heavy-armed on board was five thousand one hundred men. Of these, fifteen hundred were citizens of Athens inrolled ; seven hundred were Athenians of the lowest class, called Thetes, who served by way of marines. The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of their alliance ; some, of their own dependents ; five hundred belonged to the Argives ; the number of Mantineans and mercenaries were two hundred and fifty ; the archers in the whole amounted to four hundred and eighty ; and of these eighty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and twenty light-armed Megarean exiles : and one horse-transport attended, which carried thirty horsemen.

So great an equipment sailed out at first to begin the war : and, in the train of this equipment, went thirty store-ships laden with corn, and carrying on board the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all things requisite in the works of fortification ; and also a hundred sail of small vessels, which necessity demanded to attend the ships that carried the stores. A large number also of small craft and trading vessels sailed voluntarily in company with the fleet for the sake of traffic : all which now, in one collected body, stood away from Corcyra across the Ionian gulf.

The whole armament being got over to Cape Japygia, or to Tarentum, as they severally could make the passage, sailed along the coast of Italy, where not one city would receive them, would grant them a market, or suffer them to land ; barely permitting them to an-

chor and to water, though at Tarentum and Locri even that was denied them, till they arrived at Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium the whole fleet was now assembled; and without the city, for an admission into it was refused them, they formed an encampment within the verge of Diana's temple, where also they were accommodated by the Rhegians with a market.

Here, having drawn their vessels on shore, they lay some time for refreshment; and had a conference with the Rhegians, in which they pressed them, as they were of Chalcidic descent, to succor the Leontines, who were also Chalcideans. Their answer was, that 'they should side with neither party; but whatever measures were judged expedient by the other Italians, they should conform to those.' The Athenians' councils were now solely bent on the affairs of Sicily, in what manner they might most successfully make their approaches. They also waited for the return of the three vessels from Egesta, which had previously been despatched thither; longing earnestly for a report about the state of their treasure, whether it was really such as their envoys at Athens had represented.

To the Syracusans, in the mean time, undoubted advice was brought from several quarters, and by their own spies, that 'the fleet of the enemy lay at Rhegium.' The truth of this being uncontested, they prepared for their defence with the utmost attention, and were no longer duped by incredulity. They also sent about to the Siculi; to some places, their agents, who were to keep a watchful eye on their conduct; and, to others, ambassadors: and into those towns on the coast which were exposed to a descent they threw a garrison. In Syracuse, they examined if the city was provided with the proper means of a defence, by a careful inspection of the arms and the horses; and all other points were

properly adjusted, as against a war coming swiftly on them, and only not already present.

The three vessels, detached beforehand to Egesta, rejoined the Athenians, yet lying at Rhegium, with a report that the great sums which had been promised them were quite annihilated, since they saw only thirty talents¹ in specie. On this the commanders were instantly seized with a dejection of spirit, because their first hope was thus terribly blasted; and the Reginians had refused to concur with their attempts, on whom they had made their first essay of persuasion, and with whom they had the greatest probability of success, as they were by blood allied to the Leontines, and had ever shown themselves well disposed to the Athenian state. The Egestean affair had indeed taken no other turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the other two commanders were quite amazed and confounded at it.

The trick made use of by the Egesteans, at the time that the first embassy went thither from Athens to take a survey of their treasures, was this:—having conducted them into the temple of Venus at Eryx, they showed them the offerings reposed there, the cups, the flagons, and the censers, and the other furniture of the temple, in quantity by no means small. These, being all of silver, presented to the eye a vast show of wealth, far beyond their intrinsic value. Having also made entertainments in private houses for those who came in the vessels of the embassy, they amassed together all the gold and silver cups of Egesta; they borrowed others from the adjacent cities, as well Phœnician as Grecian; they carried their guests about from one house of feasting to another; and each exhibited

¹ 581*l.*. 10*s.* sterling.

them as his own property. Thus, all of them displaying generally the same vessels, and great abundance appearing at every place, the Athenians who made the voyage were prodigiously surprised at the splendid shows. Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, they enlarged, with a kind of emulation which should magnify it most, on the immensity of wealth they had seen at Egesta. In this manner, being deceived themselves, they obtruded the same fallacy on others; but now, when the true account was spread amongst them, that there was no such wealth at Egesta, they were much censured and reproached by the soldiers.

The generals, however, held a consultation about the methods of proceeding. And here it was the opinion of Nicias, ‘that with their whole armament they should stand immediately against Selinus, the reduction of which was the principal motive of the expedition; and, in case the Egesteans would furnish the whole armament with the proper supplies of money, their councils then might be regulated accordingly: but, otherwise, they should insist on their maintaining their sixty sail of ships, which had been sent expressly at their own request; then, abiding by them, they should reconcile their differences with the Selinuntians, either by force of arms or negotiation: they afterwards might visit other cities, and display before them the mighty power of the Athenian state; and, having given such conspicuous proofs of their alacrity to support their friends and allies, might return to Athens; provided that no sudden and unexpected turn of affairs might give them opportunity to do service to the Leontines, or bring over some other cities to their interest; ever intent not to bring their own state into danger by a needless profusion of blood and treasure.’

Alcibiades declared, ‘ that it could never be justified; if, after putting to sea with so great an armament, they should return with disgrace, and no effectual service done to their country; that, on the contrary, they ought, by heralds despatched expressly, to notify their arrival in these parts to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse; that, farther, they should try what could be done with the Siculi, in order to persuade some of them to revolt from the Syracusans, and to make treaties of alliance and friendship with others, that so they might provide a resource of provisions and reinforcements; that the first trial of this kind should be made on the Messenians, who lay in the finest situation for favoring their passage and descent into Sicily, which must open to them the most convenient harbor and station for their armament: thus, gaining the concurrence of the cities, and certain from whom they might depend on for assistance, the way would then be open for them to make attempts on Syracuse and Selinus, in case the former refused to make up the quarrel with the Egesteans, and the latter to suffer the replantation of the Leontines.’

The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically opposite, since he advised it ‘ to be the most judicious measure to stand at once against Syracuse, and to try their fortune before that city with the utmost expedition, whilst they were yet not competently provided for resistance, and their consternation was still in its height: because every hostile force is always most terrible on its first approach; and, in case it protract the time of encountering the eyes of its foes, they must recover their courage through familiarity with danger, and then the sight of an enemy is more apt to inspire contempt. But, should they assault them on a sudden whilst yet their approach is with terror expected, the victory must

infallibly be their own. In this case, all things would co-operate with them to terrify the foe; such as, the sight of their numbers, which now only could appear in their greatest enlargement; the forebodings of their hearts what miseries were like to ensue; and, above all, the instant necessity they must lie under of hazarding a battle: that, moreover, it was likely that numbers of the enemy might be surprised yet roaming abroad in the adjacent country, as still they were incredulous of the approach of the Athenians: or, even though the Syracusans were safely retired with all their effects into the city, the army must needs become masters of prodigious wealth, if they should besiege the city and awe all around it: that, by taking this step, the other Sicilians would be more discouraged from succoring the Syracusans, and more easily inclined to concur with the Athenians, and all shifts and delays to keep clear of the contest, till one side was manifestly superior, would be precluded.' He added farther, that 'they should take care to possess themselves of Megara, which was now deserted, and not far from Syracuse either by sea or land, as it would afford a fine station for their ships to lie in, would shelter them on a retreat, and give expedition to their approaches.'

But, though Lamachus delivered his sentiments thus, he soon gave up his own opinion, and went over to that of Alcibiades. And, in pursuance of this, Alcibiades with his own single ship passed over to Messene; and, having gained a conference with the Messenians about an alliance offensive and defensive, when no arguments he brought could persuade; when, on the contrary, they returned this answer; that 'into their city they would not receive them, though they were ready to accommodate them with a market without the

walls,' he repassed to Rhegium; and immediately the generals, having manned sixty ships with the choicest hands of the whole fleet, and taken in a requisite stock of subsistence, steered away for Naxus, leaving the rest of the armament at Rhegium under the care of one of those in the commission.

After a reception granted them into their city by the Naxians, they stood away from thence to Catana; and, when the Cataneans refused to receive them, for in that city was a party strongly attached to the Syracusans, they put into the river Terias. After a night's continuance there, the next day they sailed for Syracuse; keeping the rest of the fleet ready ranged in a line of battle a-head. But they had detached ten beforehand, who were ordered to enter the great harbor of Syracuse, and to examine what naval force lay there ready launched for service, and to proclaim from their decks as they passed along the shore—that 'the Athenians are come into those parts to replace the Leontines in their own territory, as they were bound both in point of alliance and consanguinity; that whatever Leontines therefore were now residing at Syracuse should without fear come over to the Athenians, as friends and benefactors.'

When the proclamation had been made, and they had taken a view of the city and its harbors, and of the adjacent ground, what spots were most convenient for a descent and the commencement of the war, they sailed back again to Catana. A council of war had been held in that city, and the Cataneans were come to a resolution, 'not to receive the armament;' but, however, they granted an audience to the generals. At which, whilst Alcibiades harangued, and the inhabitants of Catana were all in the public assembly, the Athenian soldiers, without giving any alarm, pulled

down a little gate of a very sorry structure, and then, entering the city, walked up and down in the market. But such of the Cataneans as were of the Syracusan party no sooner found that the army was got in, than, struck into a sudden consternation, they stole presently out of the city. The number of these was but trifling. The rest of the inhabitants decreed an alliance with the Athenians, and encouraged them to fetch over the remainder of the army from Rhegium.

The point being carried, the Athenians having passed to Rhegium, were soon with the whole of their fleet under sail for Catana, and, on their arrival there, they formed a proper station for their ships and men.

But now intelligence was brought them from Camarina, that ‘if they would come to countenance them, that city would declare on their side;’ and that ‘the Syracusans are busy in manning their fleet.’ With the whole armament therefore they steered along the coast, touching first at Syracuse. And, when they found that no fleet was there in readiness to put to sea, they stood off again for Camarina; and there, approaching the shore, they notified their arrival by the voice of a herald. Admittance was however refused them, the Camarineans alleging that ‘they were bound by solemn oaths to receive only one single ship of the Athenians, unless of their own accord they should require a larger number.’ Thus disappointed, they put out again to sea; and, having made a descent on some part of the Syracusan territory, they picked up a booty, till the Syracusan cavalry making head against them, and cutting off some of their light-armed who had straggled to a distance, they re-embarked, and went again to Catana.

On their return thither they found the Salaminian arrived from Athens, to fetch back Alcibiades, by public

order of the state, to take his trial for the crimes charged against him by his country, and also some others of the soldiery who attended him in the expedition, against whom informations had been given that they were guilty of impiety in the affair of the mysteries, and against some of them in that of the Mercuries: for, the Athenians, after the departure of the fleet, continued to make as strict an inquisition as ever into the crimes committed in regard to the mysteries, and also in regard to the Mercuries. What sort of persons the informers were, was no part of their concern; but, in the height of jealousy giving credit indiscriminately to all, through too great a deference to men of profligate and abandoned lives, they apprehended and threw into prison the most worthy citizens of Athens; esteeming it more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the fact, than that a person of irreproachable character, when once accused through the villany of an informer, should escape without the question: for the people having learned by tradition how grievous the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons became at last; and, what is more, that it was not overthrown by themselves and Harmodius, but by the industry of the Lacedæmonians, lived in a constant dread of such another usurpation, and beheld all these incidents now with most suspicious eyes. But, in fact, the bold attempt of Harmodius and Aristogiton took its rise merely from a competition; the particulars of which I shall here unfold more largely, to convince the world that no other people, no not even the Athenians themselves, have any certain account, either relating to their own tyrants or the transactions of that period.

The truth is, that Pisistratus dying possessed of the tyranny in a good old age, not Hipparchus, as is gene-

tally thought, but Hippias, the eldest of his sons, was his successor in power. Harmodius, who was at this time in the flower of his youth, was in the power of Aristogiton, a citizen of Athens, nay, a citizen of the middle rank, who entertained for him the warmest affection. But, some insults having been offered to Harmodius by Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus, he discovered the affair to Aristogiton. The latter received the account with all that anguish which a warm affection feels; and, alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, lest by force he might seize the youth, he instantly formed a project; a project as notable as his rank in life would permit, to demolish the tyranny. And, in the mean time, Hipparchus, who, after repeating his insults to Harmodius, was equally unsuccessful in his suit, could not prevail on himself to make use of force; but, however, determined on some remote occasion which might cover his real design from detection, and was actually studying an opportunity to accomplish his object: for, the power he had was never exerted in such a manner as to draw on him the popular hatred, and his deportment was neither invidious nor distasteful. Nay, for the most part, this set of tyrants were exact observers of the rules of virtue and discretion. They exacted from the Athenians only a twentieth of their revenue; they beautified and adorned the city; took on themselves the whole conduct of the wars; and presided over the religious sacrifices. In other respects, the state was governed by the laws already established, except that they always exerted their influence to place their own creatures in the first offices of the government. Several of their own family enjoyed the annual office of archon at Athens: and, amongst others, Pisistratus, the son of Hippias the tyrant, who bore the same name

with his grandfather, and, in his archonship, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the public forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of the Pythian. The people of Athens having since made additions to it in order to enlarge the altar in the forum, by that means effaced the inscription : but that in the Pythian is yet legible, though the letters are wearing out apace, and runs thus :

Pisistratus from Hippias born,
 Of Pythian Phœbus, radiant god of day,
Chose thus the temple to adorn,
 And thus record his own superior sway.

But, farther, that Hippias succeeded in the government as the eldest son, I myself can positively aver ; as I know it to be so, and have examined all the accounts of tradition with much greater accuracy than others : but any one may be convinced of the fact by what I am going to subjoin.—Now, we have abundant light to prove that he was the only one of the legitimate brothers who had any sons. So much the altar attests, and the column erected for a perpetual brand of the injustice of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In the latter, the inscription makes no mention of any son, of either Thessalus or Hipparchus ; but names five of Hippias, who were brought him by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias, the son of Hyperochidas. It is certainly most probable that the eldest son was married first ; nay, he is named the first after his father on the upper part of the column. And there were good reasons for this preference ; because his seniority gave him this rank ; and because he succeeded to the tyranny. Nor can it in any light seem probable to me that Hippias, on a sudden and with ease, could have seized the tyranny, had Hipparchus died when invested with it, and he had only one day's time to effect

his own establishment. The reverse is the truth; that, having for a length of time been familiarised to the expectation, having rendered himself awful to the citizens, and being supported by vigilant and trusty guards, he received and enjoyed his power with abundant security. He never had cause, as a younger brother must have had, to work his way through perplexities and dangers, as in that case he could not by practice have been made an adept in the affairs of government; but it was accidental, and owing intirely to subsequent misfortunes, that Hipparchus got the title, and passed in the opinion of succeeding ages for one of the tyrants.

On Harmodius therefore, who was deaf to his solicitations, he executed his resentment in the manner predetermined: for, a summons having been delivered to a sister of his, a young virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some public procession, they afterwards rejected her; alleging, she never had nor could have been summoned, because she was unworthy of the honor. This affront highly provoked Harmodius; but Aristogiton, out of zeal for him, was far more exasperated at it. The points needful to their intended revenge were concerted with the party who concurred in the design; but they waited for the great Panathenæa to strike the blow: on which festival alone, without incurring suspicion, such of the citizens as assisted in the procession might be armed and gathered together in numbers. It was settled that they themselves should begin; and then, the body of their accomplices were to undertake their protection against the guards of the tyrant's family.

The persons made privy to this design were but few, from a view to a more secure execution of it: for they

presumed that even such as were not in the secret, when the attempt was once in whatever manner begun, finding themselves armed, would seize the opportunity, and readily concur to assert their own freedom. When therefore the festival was come, Hippias, repairing without the walls to the place called Ceramicus, and there attended by his guards, was prescribing and adjusting the order of the procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, each armed with a dagger, advanced to execute their parts; but when they saw one of their accomplices in familiar conversation with Hippias, for Hippias was affable and courteous to all men, they were struck with fear; they imagined the whole of their plot had been betrayed, and that already they were only not apprehended. Now therefore, by a sudden resolution, they determined, if possible, to snatch a timely revenge on him, by whom they were aggrieved, and on whose account they had embarked into so dangerous an affair. In this hurry of thought they rushed back into the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium; where, without any regard to their own safety, they made an instant assault on him. And thus, in all the fury of passion, one actuated by jealousy, and the other by resentment, they wounded and killed him. As the people immediately ran together, Aristogiton, by favor of the concourse, escaped for the present, but, being afterwards seized, was unmercifully treated: but Harmodius was instantly slain on the spot.

The news of this assassination being carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus, he moved off immediately; not to the scene of action, but towards the armed accomplices in the procession, before they could be informed of the fact, as they were stationed at a distance. He

artfully suppressed on his countenance all sense of the calamity ; and, pointing to a certain spot, commanded them aloud to throw down their arms and file off thither. This command they obeyed, expecting he had something to communicate to them. But Hippias, addressing himself to his guards, ordered them to take away those arms. He then picked out man by man, from amongst them, such as he designed to put to the question, and all on whom a dagger was found : for, by ancient custom, they were to make the procession with a spear and a shield.

In this manner this conspiracy took its rise,¹ and this desperate attempt was executed by Harmodius and Aristogiton, from the impulse of a sudden consternation. But after this the tyranny became more grievous on the Athenians. Hippias, who was now more than ever alarmed, put many of the citizens to death, and cast his thoughts about towards foreign powers, to secure himself an asylum abroad, in case of a total reverse at home. To Æantidas therefore, the son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus ; to a Lampsacene though he himself was an Athenian, he married his daughter Archedice, knowing that family to have a powerful in-

¹ And yet so violently were tyrants detested at Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was ever after honored there as martyrs for liberty, and first authors of the ruin of tyrants. Their praises were publicly sung at the great Panathenæa. No slave was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was employed to cast their statues, which were afterwards set up in the forum : Xerxes indeed carried them away into Persia, but Alexander afterwards sent them back to Athens. Plutarch has preserved a smart reply of Antipho, the orator, who will appear in this history, to the elder Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. The latter had put the question, which was the finest kind of brass ? ‘ That,’ replied Antipho, ‘ of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made.’

terest with king Darius : and the monument of that lady is now at Lampsacus, and has this inscription :

From Hippias sprung, with regal pow'r array'd,
Within this earth Archedice is laid ;
By father, husband, brothers, sons, allied
To haughty thrones, yet never stain'd with pride.

For the space of three years after this Hippias continued in possession of the tyranny at Athens ; but, being deposed in the fourth by the Lacedæmonians, and the exiled Alcmæonidæ, he retired by agreement to Sigæum ; from thence to Æantidas at Lampsacus ; and from thence to king Darius ; and, with a command under him, he marched twenty years after to Marathon ; and, though much advanced in years, served in that war with the Medes.

The people of Athens, reflecting on these past transactions, and recollecting all the dismal narratives about them, which tradition had handed down, treated with great severity and deep suspicions all such as were informed against, in relation to the mysteries ; and they construed the whole procedure as the dawning of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannic power. And, as their passions were inflamed by such apprehensions, many worthy and valuable citizens were already thrown into prison. Nay, it seemed as if their inquisition was to have no end, since from day to day their indignation gave in to more increasing severity, and numbers were constantly arrested. Here, one of those¹ who had been imprisoned on suspicion,

¹ This person, according to Plutarch in *Alcibiades*, was An-docides, the orator, a man always reckoned of the oligarchical faction : and one Timæus, his intimate friend, who was a man of small consideration at Athens, but remarkable for a penetrating and enterprising genius, was the person who persuaded him to turn informer.

and a suspicion too of being most deeply concerned in the crime, is persuaded, by one of his fellow-prisoners, to turn an evidence, no matter whether of truth or falsehood. Many conjectures have passed on both sides; but no one, neither at that time nor since, has been able to discover the men who were really concerned in the affair. The argument which prevailed on this person was, ‘the necessity for his taking such a step, even though he had no hand in the commission, since by this he would infallibly procure his own safety, and deliver the city from its present confusion: for he must be much more secure of saving his life by such voluntary confession on a promise of indemnity, than he could possibly be should he persist in an avowal of his innocence, and be brought to a trial.’ In short, this man became an evidence, both against himself and against others, in the affair of the Mercuries.

Great was the joy of the Athenian people at this, as it was thought, undoubted discovery: and, as they had been highly chagrined before at their inability to detect the criminals, who had so outrageously insulted the multitude, they immediately discharged this informer, and all other prisoners whom he did not name as accomplices. On such as he expressly named the judicial trials were held. Some of them they put to death, as many as were prevented by timely arrests from flying from justice; but they pronounced the sentence of death against the fugitives, and set a price on their heads. Yet all this while it was by no means clear, that those who suffered were not unjustly condemned. Thus much however is certain, that by such proceedings the public tranquillity was restored.

In regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians were highly incensed against him, since the party which were his

enemies, and had made their attacks on him before his departure, continued still to inflame them. And now, as they presumed the truth had been detected, in relation to the Mercuries, it appeared to them beyond a scruple, that he must also have been guilty of the crimes charged against him about the mysteries, on the same ground of a secret combination against the democracy.

At this critical period of time, when the public confusion was in all its height, it farther happened, that a Lacedæmonian army, though by no means large, advanced as far as the Isthmus, to execute some scheme along with the Boeotians. This was interpreted to the prejudice of Alcibiades, as if they had now taken the field at his instigation, and not on any account of obliging the Boeotians ; and that, ‘had they not happily apprehended in time such as had been informed against, Athens had now been infallibly betrayed.’ Nay, for the space of a night, they kept guard under arms, within the city, in the temple of Theseus.

About the same time, also, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of a design to assault the people : and those hostages of the Argives, who were kept in custody among the islands, the Athenians on this occasion delivered up to the people of Argos, to be put to death on these suspicions.

Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter for suspecting Alcibiades. Desirous therefore to bring him to a trial and to execution, they accordingly despatched the Salaminian to Sicily, and ordered him and such others as they had informations against to repair to Athens. But it had been given them in charge to notify to him, that ‘he should follow them home in order to make his defence,’ and by no means to put him under arrest. This management was owing to a desire of preventing

all stir in the army or in the enemy; and, not least of all, to their willingness that the Mantineans and Argives should continue in the service, whose attendance in the expedition they wholly ascribed to the interest Alcibiades had with them.

In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on board his own ship, and accompanied by all those who were involved in the same accusation, sailed away from Sicily with the Salaminian for Athens; and when they were got to the height of Thuria, they no longer followed; but quitting their ship, were no longer to be seen. Censured as they were, they durst not in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the Salaminian exerted themselves immediately in the search after Alcibiades and his companions: but when they found the search was ineffectual, they gave it up, and steered away for Athens: and Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed over in a vessel soon after from Thuria¹ to Peloponnesus: but the Athenians, on his thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the sentence of death against him and his associates.

After these transactions, the Athenian generals who remained in Sicily, having divided their whole armament into two squadrons, and taken the command of each by lot, set sail with all their united force for Selinus and Egesta. They were desirous to know whether the Egesteans would pay down the money; to discover also the present posture of the Selinuntians,

¹ Somebody at Tharisa, who knew Alcibiades, asked him, why he would not stand a trial, and trust his country? ‘ In other points I would; but, when my life is concerned, I would not trust my mother, lest she should make a mistake, and put in a black bean instead of a white one.’ And, when he was afterwards told that his countrymen had passed the sentence of death against him, he briskly replied, ‘ But I’ll make them know that I am alive.’ Plutarch in Alcibiades.

and to learn the state of their quarrels with the Egeseans. In their course, keeping on the left that part of Sicily which lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in this part of Sicily; and, when denied reception here, they resumed their course. Touching afterwards at Hyccara, a Sicanian fortress, but an annoyance to the Egeseans, they surprised it; for it was situated close on the sea; and having doomed the inhabitants to be slaves, they delivered the place into the hands of the Egeseans, whose cavalry was now attending on the Athenian motions. The land-forces marched away from hence through the territories of the Siculi, till they had again reached Catana; but the vessels, on board of which were the slaves, came back along the coasts.

Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly to Egesta, where, after transacting other points, and receiving thirty talents,¹ he rejoined the grand armament at Catana: and here they set up the slaves to sale,² and raised by the money paid for them one hundred and twenty talents.³

They also sailed about to their Sicilian allies, summoning them to send in their reinforcements. With a division also of their force they appeared before Hybla, a hostile city in the district of Gela, but were not able to take it. And here the summer ended.

Winter now succeeding, the Athenians began immediately to get all things in readiness for an attempt on Syracuse. The Syracusans were equally intent on making an attack on them: for, since the Athenians

¹ 5812*l.*. 10*s.* sterling.

² Among the rest, Nicias sold at this sale Lais, the famous courtesan, at this time a very young girl, whom her purchasers carried to Corinth. Plutarch in Nicias.

³ 23,250*l.* sterling.

had not thought proper, during their first panic and consternation, to fall instantly on them, such a protraction reinspired them day after day with new reviving courage: since, farther, by cruising on the other side of Sicily, they seemed to affect a remoteness from them; and, though showing themselves before Hybla, and attempting the place, they had not been able to carry it, the Syracusans began now to treat them with an open contempt. They even insisted, as might be expected from a populace who are in high spirits, ‘that their generals should lead out towards Catana, since the enemy durst not venture to march against them.’ The Syracusan horsemen also, sent daily out to observe their motions; rode boldly up to the camp of the Athenians, insulting them in other respects, but especially with this sneering demand, ‘Whether they were not rather come to gain a settlement for themselves on a foreign shore, than to replace the Leontines in their old possessions?’

The Athenian generals, informed of these bravados, were desirous to seduce the whole strength of Syracuse to as great a distance as possible from that city, that they might snatch an opportunity of transporting thither their own forces by favor of the night, and seize a proper spot whereon to fix their encampment, without any obstruction from the enemy. They were well convinced, that their point could not be so easily accomplished, should they endeavor to force a descent in the face of the enemy, or by a land-march should give them an early notice of their design: for, in such cases, their own light-armed, and that cumbersome train which must attend, as they had no horse to cover their motions, must suffer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the Syracusans; but, by the other scheme, they might preoccupy a spot of ground where the

cavalry could not give them any considerable annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracusan exiles, who followed their camp, had informed them of a piece of ground, convenient for their purpose, near Olympiæum.

In order therefore to accomplish the point, the generals had recourse to the following artifice. They despatched an emissary, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and who might also pass with the generals of Syracuse as well affected to their cause. The person employed was a Catanean. He told them 'he was sent by their friends in Catana,' with whose names they were acquainted, and knew well to be of that number in Catana, which persisted in steadfast attachment to them : he said farther, that 'the Athenians reposed themselves by night within the city at a distance from their arms ; and that in case they, the Syracusans, on a day prefixed, would with all the forces of their city appear by early dawn before the Athenian camp, the Cataneans would shut up those within the city, and set fire to their shipping, by which means they might force the intrenchments, and render themselves masters of the camp : that, farther, the party of Cataneans that would co-operate with them in this scheme was very large, and already prepared to execute these points he was now sent to propose.'

The Syracusan generals, whose ardor other contingencies had already inflamed, and who had formed a resolution, even previous to such encouragement, to march their forces towards Catana, without the least reserve gave implicit credit to this emissary ; and, having instantly pitched on a day for execution, dismissed him. They also, for by this time the Selinuntian and some other auxiliaries had joined them, issued out their orders for the whole military strength of Sy-

racuse to march out on the day appointed. No sooner therefore were all the needful preparations adjusted, and the time at hand at which they were to make their appearance, than, on the march for Catana, they halted one night on the banks of the Symæthus, in the Leontine district. But the Athenians, when assured they had thus taken the field, decamped instantly with the whole of their force, and with all the Sicilian and other auxiliaries who had joined them, and embarking themselves on board their ships and transports, steered away by night for Syracuse: and, early the next dawn, they landed on the intended spot near Olympiæum, intent on forming and securing their encampment. The cavalry of the Syracusans, in the mean time, came up first to Catana; and discovering that the whole Athenian army had put to sea by night, they returned with this intelligence to their foot. On this, the whole army, soon wheeling about, returned with all speed to the defence of Syracuse.

In the mean time the Athenians, as the enemy had a long way to march, formed an encampment on an advantageous spot without the least obstruction. On it, they were possessed of the advantage of fighting only at their own discretion; and the Syracusan horse could not give them the least annoyance, either during or before an engagement. On one side, they were flanked by walls, houses, trees, and a marsh; and on the other, by precipices. They also felled some trees that grew near; and carrying them down to the shore, they piled them into a barricade for the defence of their ships, and to cover them on the side of Dascon. They also expeditiously threw up a rampart, on the part which seemed most accessible to the enemy, of stones picked out for the purpose, and timber, and broke down the bridge of the Anapus.

Thus busied as they were on fortifying their camp, not so much as one person ventured out of the city to obstruct their proceedings. The first who appeared to make any resistance were the Syracusan cavalry ; and, when once they had shown themselves, the whole body of their infantry was soon in sight. They advanced first of all quite up to the Athenian works ; but, when they perceived that they would not sally out to fight them, they again retreated ; and, having crossed the road to Helorum, reposed themselves for the night.

The succeeding day the Athenians and allies prepared for engagement ; and their order of battle was formed as follows :—The Argives and Mantineans had the right, the Athenians the centre, and the rest of the line was formed by the other confederates. One half of the whole force, which was ranged in the first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The other half, being posted near the tents, formed a hollow square, in which the men were also drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, if any part of the line gave way, to keep a good look out, and advance to their support. And within this hollow square they posted all the train who attended the service of the army.

But the Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed, which body consisted of the whole military strength of Syracuse, and all the confederates who had joined them, in files consisting of sixteen. Those who had joined with auxiliary quotas were chiefly the Selinuntians ; and next, the horse of the Geloans, amounting in the whole to about two hundred : the horse also of the Camarineans, about twenty in number, and about fifty archers. But their horsemen they posted to the right, being not fewer in number than twelve hundred ; and, next to them, the darters.

The Athenians being now intent on advancing to the

charge, Nicias, addressing himself in regular order to the troops of the several states, animated them to the fight by the following harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army :—

“ What need, my fellow-soldiers, of a long exhortation, since we are here, determined, and resolute for action? for this our present arrangement seems to me a stronger confirmation of your courage than any words could be, how eloquently soever delivered, if we were inferior in strength. But when, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the flower of the isles, we are here assembled together, how is it possible, when such brave and numerous allies are to fight in company, that we should not entertain a steadfast, nay, the warmest hope, that the victory will be our own? Nay more, as we have to do with a promiscuous crowd, the mob of a city, not selected for service, as we have had the honor to be; and who, it must be added, are but Sicilians; who, though affecting to despise us, will never sustain our charge, because their skill is far beneath their courage.

“ Let every soldier, farther, recall to his remembrance, that he is now at a vast distance from his native soil, and near no friendly land but what you shall render such by the efforts of your valor. Such things I am bound to suggest to your remembrance; the reverse, I am well convinced, of what our enemies utter for their mutual encouragement. They undoubtedly are roaring aloud, It is for your country you are now to fight. But I tell you, that from your country you are now remote; and, as such, must either conquer, or not without difficulty ever see it again, since the numerous cavalry of the enemy will press hard on our retreat. Call therefore to mind your own dignity and worth; advance with alacrity to assault your foes;

convinced that your present necessities and wants are far more terrible than the enemy you are to engage.'

When Nicias had finished this exhortation he led on his army towards the encounter. But the Syracusans were not yet prepared, as by no means expecting to be charged so soon; and some of the soldiers, as the city lay so near, had straggled thither. These however came running with all eagerness and speed to gain their posts; too late on the whole; but, as each of them met with any number intent on action, he ranged himself in their company. The Syracusans, to do them justice, were not deficient in alacrity or courage, neither in the present battle nor any of the following. They maintained their ground gallantly as long as their competence of skill enabled them; but when that failed them, they were forced, though with reluctance, to slacken in their ardor. However, though far from imagining that the Athenians would presume to begin the attack, and though obliged in a hurry to stand on their defence, they took up their arms, and advanced immediately to meet their foe.

In the first place, therefore, the slingers of stones, with either the hand or the sling, and the archers, on both sides, began the engagement; and alternately chased one another, as is generally the case among the bodies of the light-armed. In the next place, the soothsayers brought forward and immolated the solemn victims; and the trumpets summoned the heavy-armed to close firm together and advance.

All sides now began to face: the Syracusans to fight for their country; each soldier amongst them for his native soil; to earn, for the present his preservation, and for the future his liberty. On their enemies' side: the Athenians, to gain possession of a foreign country,

and not to damage their own by a dastardly behavior ; the Argives, and voluntary part of the confederates, to procure for the Athenians a happy accomplishment of their schemes, and again to visit their own country, to which they were endeared, victorious and triumphant ; and that part of the confederacy which attended in obedience to the orders of their masters were highly animated by the thought, that they must earn their safety now at once, or, if defeated now, must for the future despair ; and then, secretly actuated perhaps by the distant hope that, were others reduced to the Athenian yoke, their own bondage might be rendered more light and easy.

The business being now come to blows, they for a long time maintained the ground on both sides. It happened, farther, that some claps of thunder were heard, attended with lightning and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden consternation in the Syracusans, who now for the first time engaged the Athenians, and had gained very little experience in the affairs of war : but, by the more experienced enemy, these accidents were interpreted as the ordinary effects of the season ; and their concern was rather employed on the enemy, whom they found no easy conquest. But the Argives, having first of all defeated the left wing of the Syracusans, and the Athenians being afterwards successful in their quarter of the battle, the whole Syracusan army was soon thrown into disorder, and began the flight. The Athenians however did not continue the pursuit to any great distance ; for the Syracusan cavalry, as they were numerous and unbroken, put a stop to the chase by assaulting those parties of heavy-armed whom they saw detached for the pursuit, and driving them back into their own line. Having pursued only so far

as they could in an orderly and secure manner, they again retreated and erected a trophy.

But the Syracusans, who had rallied again in the road to Helorum, and were drawn up as well as the present posture of affairs would permit, sent a strong detachment from their body for the guard of Olympiæum ; apprehensive that the Athenians might otherwise seize the treasures that were reposed there. And this being done, with the remainder of their force they retired within the walls of Syracuse.

The Athenians in the mean time made no advances against Olympiæum ; but, after gathering together the bodies of their slain, and laying them on the funeral pyre, they passed the night on the field of battle.

The next day they delivered up their dead under truce to the Syracusans, of whom and their allies there had perished about two hundred and sixty men ; and then gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their allies, about fifty in all were slain : and now, with all the pillage they had made of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

This was owing to the season of the year, now advanced to winter. It was no longer judged possible for them to be able to continue the war in their present post before they had procured a supply of horse from Athens, and had assembled others from their confederates in Sicily, that they might not be intirely exposed to the horse of the enemy. They were also intent on collecting pecuniary aids in those parts, and some were expected from Athens : ‘ They might also obtain the concurrence of some other cities, which they hoped would prove more tractable, since they had gained a battle : they wanted, farther, to furnish themselves with provisions and all necessary stores, which might

enable them early in the spring to make new attempts on Syracuse.' Determined by these considerations, they sailed back to Naxus and Catana, in order to winter there..

The Syracusans, after they had performed the obsequies of their slain, called a general assembly of the people. And on this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a man who was inferior to none in all other branches of human prudence, who for military skill was in high reputation, and renowned for bravery, standing forth among them, endeavored to encourage them, and prevent their being too much dispirited by their late defeat.

He told them, 'that in courage they had not been worsted, but their want of discipline had done them harm: and yet the harm suffered by that was not near so great as they might justly have expected; especially when, no better than a rabble of mechanics, they had been obliged to enter the lists against the most experienced soldiery of Greece: that what hurt them most was too large a number of generals, and the multiplicity of commands which was thence occasioned, for the number of those who commanded was fifteen; whilst the bulk of their army observed no discipline, and obeyed no orders at all; but were only a few skilful generals selected for the trust,—would they only be intent this winter on training their bodies of heavy-armed, and furnish others with arms who had none for themselves, in order to enlarge their number as much as possible, and inure them to settled exercise and use,—he assured them, thus, in all probability, they must on the whole be too hard for their foes, as their natural portion of valor was great, and skill would be attained by practice: that both of these would progressively become more perfect; discipline, by being

exercised through a series of danger and inward bravery, would merely of itself increase in gallant confidence, when assured of the support of skill. As to generals, that few only, and those invested with absolute power, ought to be elected and confirmed by a solemn oath from the people, that they were permitted to lead the army where and how they judged best for the public service: for, by this means, what ought to be concealed would be less liable to detection, and all the schemes of war might be directed with order and a certainty of success.'

The Syracusans, who had listened to this discourse, decreed whatever he proposed. They elected Hermocrates himself to be a general, and Heraclides, the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, the son of Hexecestus; these three. They also appointed ambassadors to go to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to procure the alliance of those states, and to persuade the Lacedæmonians to make hotter war on the Athenians, with an open avowal that they acted in behalf of the Syracusans: that, by this means, they might either be obliged to recall their fleet from Sicily, or might be less able to send any reinforcements to the army already there.

The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana, soon made an excursion from thence to Messene, expecting to have it betrayed into their power. But all the steps taken previously for the purpose were totally disconcerted: for Alcibiades, on his quitting the command when recalled to Athens, being convinced within himself that exile must be his portion, betrayed the whole project, as he had been in the secret, to such persons at Messene as were attached to the Syracusans. The first step this party took was to put to death all the persons against whom he informed; and, at the time of this attempt, being quite in a ferment and under

arms, they carried their point; so that those who wished to give it were obliged to refuse admission to the Athenians. The Athenians therefore, after thirteen days' continuance on the coast, when the weather began to be tempestuous, when their provisions failed, and no hope of success appeared, returned to Naxus, where, having thrown up an intrenchment round their camp, they continued the rest of the winter. They also despatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a supply of money and horsemen to join them without fail by the beginning of the spring.

The Syracusans employed themselves this winter in fortifying their city. They inclosed Temenites within their new works, and carried their wall through all that length of ground which faces Epipoleæ; that, in case they should be unable to keep the field, the enemy might have as little room as possible to raise counter-works of annoyance. They also placed a garrison at Megara, and another in Olympieum; and all along the sea they drove rows of piles, wherever the ground was convenient for descents. Knowing also that the Athenians wintered at Naxus, they marched out with all their force against Catana. They ravaged the territory of the Cataneans; and, after burning the tents and camps of the Athenians, they returned home.

Having also had intelligence that the Athenians had sent an embassy to Camarina, under favor of a treaty made formerly with them by Laches, to try if it were possible to procure their concurrence; they also despatched an embassy thither, to traverse the negotiation: for the Camarineans were suspected by them, as they had not cordially sent in their quota of assistance for the first battle, and lest for the future they might be totally averse from acting in their support, as in that battle they had seen the Athenians victorious;

and so, induced by the former treaty they had made with the latter, might now declare openly on their side.

When therefore Hermocrates and others were arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and from the Athenians, Euphemus and his colleagues in the embassy, an assembly of the Camarineans was held; in which, Hermocrates, desirous to give them a timely distaste against the Athenians, harangued them thus:—

‘ Our embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, has not been occasioned by any fears we were under that you might be too much terrified at the great equipment with which the Athenians have invaded us; but rather by our knowlege with what kind of arguments they would impose on your understanding, by which, before we had an opportunity to remonstrate, they might seduce you into a concurrence. Sicily in fact they have invaded, on such pretext as you have heard them give out; but with such intentions as we have all abundant reason to suspect. And to me it is clear that their schemes have no tendency to replant the Leontines, but rather to supplant us all: for, how is it reconcilable with common sense, that a people who have ever been employed in the ruin of the states which are neighboring to Athens, should be sincere in re-establishing a Sicilian people; or, by the bonds of consanguinity, hold themselves obliged to protect the Leontines, who are of Chalcidic descent, whilst on the Chalcideans of Eubœa, from whom these others are a colony, they hold fast riveted the yoke of slavery? No; it is the same cruel policy that subjugated the Grecians in that part of the world, which now exerts itself to glut their ambition in this.

‘ These are those very Athenians, who formerly having been elected their common leaders by the well-de-

signing Ionians and that confederate body which derived from them their descent, on the glorious pretence of avenging themselves on the Persian monarch, abused their trust by enslaving those who placed confidence in them; charging some with deserting the common cause, others with their mutual embroilments, and all, at length, with different but specious criminations: and, on the whole, these Athenians waged war against the Mede, not in the cause of Grecian liberty, as neither did the other Grecians in the defence of their own: the former fought, not indeed to subject the rest of Greece to the Mede, but to their own selves; the latter, merely to obtain a change of master; a master not inferior in policy, but far more abundant in malice.

‘ But though Athens, on manifold accounts, be obnoxious to universal censure and reproach, yet we are not come hither to prove how justly she deserves it, since your own conviction precludes the long detail: We are much more concerned at present to censure and reproach ourselves, since, with all the examples before our eyes of what the Grecians in those parts have suffered, who, for want of guarding against their encroachments, have fallen victims to their ambition;—since, with the certain knowlege that they are now playing the same sophistries on us,—‘ the replantation of their kindred Leontines,’—‘ the support of the Egestans, their allies,’—we show no inclination to unite together in our common defence, in order to give them most signal proofs, that in Sicily are neither Ionians, nor Hellespontines, nor islanders, who will be slaves, though ever changing their master, one while to the Mede, and soon after to whoever will please to govern; but, on the contrary, that we are Dorians, who from Peloponnesus, that seat of liberty and independence, came to dwell in Sicily. Shall we, therefore, protract

our union till, city after city, we are compelled to a submission!—we, who are convinced that thus only we can be conquered, and when we even behold that thus our foes have dressed up their plan; amongst some of our people scattering dissensions, setting others to war down each other for the mighty recompence of their alliance, cajoling the rest as may best soothe the pride or caprice of each, and availing themselves of these methods to work our ruin? We even indulge the wild imagination that, though a remote inhabitant of Sicily be destroyed, the danger can never come home to ourselves; and that he who precedes us in ruin is unhappy only in and for himself.

‘ Is there now a man amongst you who imagines, that merely a Syracusan, and not himself, is the object of Athenian enmity, and pronounces it hard that he must be exposed to dangers in which I only am concerned? Let such a one with more solidity reflect, that not merely for what is mine, but equally also for what is his own, he should associate with me, though within my precincts; and that this may be done with greater security now, since as yet I am not quite destroyed, since in me he is sure of a steadfast ally, and before he is bereaved of all support may hazard the contention. And let him farther rest assured, that it is not the sole view of the Athenian to bridle enmity in a Syracusan; but, under the color of that pretext, to render himself the more secure, by gaining for a time the friendship of another.

‘ If others, again, entertain any envy or jealousy of Syracuse, (for to each of these great states are generally obnoxious,) and would take delight in seeing us depressed, in order to teach us moderation, though not totally destroyed, from a regard to his own preservation;—these are such sanguine wishes, as, in the course

of human affairs, can never be accomplished ; because it is quite impossible that the same person shall build up airy schemes to soothe his own passions, and then insure their success. And thus, should some sinister event take place, quite sunk under the weight of his own calamity, he would perhaps be soon wishing again that I was so replaced as to excite his envy. Impossible this, for one who abandoned my defence, who refused beforehand to participate my dangers—dangers, though not in name, yet in reality, his own ! for, if names alone be regarded, he acts in the support of my power ; but if realities, of his own preservation.

‘ Long since, ye men of Camarina, it was incumbent on you, who are borderers on us, and must be our seconds in ruin, to have foreseen these things, and not to have abetted our defence with so much remissness as you have hitherto done. You ought to have repaired to our support with free and voluntary aid ; with such as, in case the Athenians had begun first with Camarina, you would have come with earnest prayers to implore from us : so cordial and so alert you should have appeared in our behalf, to avert us from too precipitate submissions. But these things never were : not even you, nor any other people, have showed such affection or alacrity for us.

‘ From timorousness of heart you will study perhaps to manage both with us and the invaders, and allege that there are treaties subsisting between yourselves and the Athenians. Yet these treaties you never made to hurt your friends, but to repel the efforts of your foes, should they dare to attack you. By them you are bound to give defensive aid to the Athenians when attacked by others, and not when they, as is the present case, injuriously fall on your neighbors. Remember that the Rhegians, though even of Chalcidic de-

scent, have refused to concur with them in replanting the Leontines, who are also Chalcideans. Hard indeed is your fate, if they, suspecting some bad design to lie lurking under a fair justification, have recourse to the wary, moderate behavior which appearances will not warrant; whilst you, on the pretended ground of a rational conduct, are eager to serve a people who are by nature your foes, and join with most implacable enemies to destroy your own kindred, to whom nature has so closely attached you!

‘ In such a conduct there is no justice: the justice lies in abetting our cause, and not dastardly shrinking before the terror of their arms. These arms are not terrible, would we only all combine in our mutual defence; they are only so if, on the contrary, we continue disunited,—the point which the Athenians labor with so much assiduity: for even when singly against us they entered the lists and were victorious, yet they were not able to effectuate their designs, but were obliged precipitately to re-embark. If united, therefore, what farther can we have to fear? What hinders us from associating together with instant alacrity and zeal? especially as we soon shall receive an aid from Peloponnesus, who in all the business of war are far superior to Athenians. Reject, I say, the vain presumption, that either it will be equitable in regard to us, or prudential in regard to yourselves, to take part with neither side, on pretence that you have treaties subsisting with both: there is a fallacy in it, which, though veiled under plausible words, the event will soon detect. For if, through your determination to abandon his support, the party already attacked be vanquished, and the assailant be invigorated by success, what can such absenting of yourselves avail, but to help forward the ruin of the one, and afford free

scope to the pernicious schemes of the other? And how glorious would the reverse of this conduct be, would you exert your efforts to redress the injured, who also by the ties of consanguinity have a right to expect it from you; to guard the common welfare of Sicily; and not suffer your friends, your good friends, the Athenians, to run out into a course of outrage!

‘ In a word, we Syracusans have now only this to add, that arguments are superfluous, either for the instruction of you or of others, in points whose tendency you know as clearly as ourselves: but we earnestly conjure you, and, if prayers will not avail, we boldly protest against you, that, as the worst designs are formed against us by our eternal foes, the Ionians, you would act as you ought; if not, that by you we are basely betrayed, Dorians by Dorians. If such must be our fate, if by the Athenians we must be destroyed, they will be indebted for their success to your determinations, but the glory of it will be totally assumed by themselves. Nay, the chief reward they will reap from the victory will be this, to enslave the persons who enabled them to gain it. But then, should the victory rest with us, you are the men from whom we shall exact revenge for all the dangers to which we have been exposed. Examine things, therefore, and declare your resolution, either at once, without embarking into dangers, to put on the Athenian chains; or, with us, to face the storm and earn your preservation; not basely bending to the yoke of foreign tyrants, and preventing an enmity with us which will not quickly be appeased.’

In these words Hermocrates harangued the Camarians: and when he had ended, Euphemus, ambassador of the Athenians, replied as follows:—

‘ Our journey hither was intended for the renewal

of a former alliance ; but as this Syracusans has taken the liberty to be severe on us, we lie under an obligation to show the justice of our title to that share of dominion which we now possess ; and the strongest evidence of this he himself has been pleased to give, by affirming that Ionians have been eternal foes to Dorians. The fact is uncontestedly true ; since we, who are Ionians, have been necessitated to stand ever on our guard against the encroaching designs of the Peloponnesians, who are Dorians, who are our superiors in number, and are seated on our borders. When, therefore, in the close of the Persian invasion, we saw ourselves masters of a navy, we asserted our own independence from the government and guidance of the Lacedæmonians ; since no shadow of reason could be found why we should be obedient to them any more than they to us, save only that in this critical period their strength was greater. We were afterwards appointed, by free election, the leaders of those Ionians who had formerly been subject to the monarch : and the preference awarded to us we continue to support ; assured that only thus we shall escape subjection to the Peloponnesian yoke, by keeping possession of a power which can effectually awe all their encroachments : and, farther, (that we may come to particulars) it was not with injustice that we exacted subjection from those Ionians and inhabitants of the isles, whom the Syracusans say we thought proper to enslave, though connected with us by the ties of blood : for they marched, in company with the Mede, against their mother country ; against us, their founders. They had not the courage to expose their own homes to ruin and devastation by an honest revolt, though we with magnanimity abandoned even Athens itself. They made slavery their choice, and in the same miserable

fate would have been glad to envelope us. Thus solid are the grounds on which we found our title to that extensive rule we now enjoy. We honestly deserve it: since, in the cause of Greece, we equipped the largest fleet, and exerted the greatest ardor, without the least equivocation; and since those others, acting with implicit obedience to the Mede, did all they could to distress us. To which let it be added, that we were at the same time desirous to obtain a strength sufficient to give a check to the ambition of the Peloponnesians. Submissive, therefore, to their dictates, we are not, will not be; because, either in return for the repulse of the barbarian by our single efforts, or in re-quital of the dangers we bravely encountered in defence of the liberty of those Ionians, greater than all the rest of Greece, or even they themselves, durst hazard for their own,—we have an undoubted right to empire.

‘But, farther, to guard its own liberties and rights, is a privilege which, without either murmur or envy, will be allowed to every state; and now, for the security of these important points to ourselves, have we ventured hither to beg your concurrence; conscious, at the same time, ye men of Camarina, that your welfare too coincides with our own. This we can clearly demonstrate, even from those criminations which our adversaries here have lavished on us, and from those so terrible suspicions which you yourselves are inclined to entertain of our proceedings. We are not now to learn, that men, who with some high degrees of horror suspect latent mischief, may for the present be soothed by an insinuating flow of words, but, when summoned to action, will so exert themselves as is expedient for their welfare: and, consonant to this, we have already hinted that through fear alone we seized that power which we now possess in Greece; that

through the same motive we have ventured hither, to establish our own security in concert with that of our friends; so far from the view of enslaving them to ourselves, that we are solely intent on preserving them from being enslaved by others.

‘ Let no man here retort on us, that all our solicitude for you is unmerited and superfluous. Such a one must know, that so long as you are safe, so long as you are able to employ the Syracusans, the less liable they will be to send reinforcements from hence to the Peloponnesians for our annoyance; and, as this is the real state of things, our concern should most largely be bestowed on you. By parity of reason it also highly concerns us to replant the Leontines; not in order to render them vassals to ourselves, as their relations of Eubœa are, but to make them as strong and powerful as we are able; that, seated as they then will be on her confines, they may compensate our remote situation in affording a diversion to Syracuse: for, if the view be carried back to Greece, we ourselves are there a match for our foes. The Chalcidean there, whom, after unjustly enslaving, we are taxed with absurdity for pretending to vindicate here, is highly serviceable to us, because he is disarmed, and because he furnishes us with a tribute: but, here in Sicily, our interest demands that the Leontines, and the whole body of our friends, be restored to the full enjoyment of all their liberty and strength.

‘ Now, to a potentate invested with superior power, or to a state possessed of empire, nothing that is profitable can be deemed absurd; nothing secure that cannot be safely managed. Incidents will arise with which we must temporise, and determine accordingly our enmity or our friendship. But the latter makes most for our interest here, where we ought by no

means to weaken our friends, but, through the strength of our friends, to keep down and disable our enemies. Of this you ought not to rest incredulous, as you know, that over our dependents in Greece we either hold tight or slacken the rein, as squares best with the public service. We permit to the Chians and Methymneans the free use of their liberties and laws for a quota of shipping ; we do the same to many for an annual tribute, exacted perhaps with somewhat of rigor : others amongst them, who fight under our orders, are absolutely free, though seated on islands, and easy to be totally reduced, because they are commodiously situated to annoy the Peloponnesian coast. And hence it may be depended on, that we shall make such dispositions also here as are most expedient for our own interest, and may best lessen the dread, which, as was said before, we entertain of the Syrians.

‘ The point at which they aim is an extent of their rule over you ; and when, by alarming your suspicions of us, they have wrought you to their own purpose, either by open force or taking advantage of your desolate condition, when we are repulsed and obliged to abandon your defence, they intend to subdue all Sicily to their yoke. Such the event will unavoidably prove, if at present you adhere to them : for, never again will it be easy for us to assemble together so large an armament to give a check to ambition ; nor, when we are no longer at hand for your support, will their strength against you be insufficient. It is vain in any man to indulge an opinion that this may not be the case, since the very train of things evinces its truth : for, when first you invited us hither, it was not on the suggestion of any other fear than this ; that, should we suffer you to be subjected by the Syra-

cusans, the danger then would extend itself to us : and highly unjust it would be now, if the argument you successfully enforced with us should lose all its influence on you, or should you ground suspicions on our present appearance against them, with a superior force to theirs, when you ought much more to entertain an endless distrust of them. The truth is this, that without your concurrence we are not able to continue here ; and in case, with perfidy open and avowed, we make seizure of your cities, yet we are unable to retain their possession, remote as they lie from Athens ; as cities so large we never could garrison, and as they are farther provided in all respects as well as any on the continent. But, on the contrary, the Syracusans will not rush on you from a camp on the beach ; but, posted in a city more formidable in strength than the whole of our armament, they are ever meditating your ruin, and, when they have seized a proper opportunity, will strike the blow. They have afforded you instances of this already, and a flagrant one indeed in the case of the Leontines : and yet they have the effrontery now, by words, as if you were so to be deluded, to exasperate you against us, who have hitherto controled their views, and deterred them to this moment from making all Sicily their prey.

‘ Our arguments have a tendency directly opposite. We have nothing in view but your certain and assured preservation, when we earnestly conjure you not wilfully to betray the means which at present will result from our union, which we can mutually exert in one another’s behalf ; and strongly to represent to your own reflections, that, even without the concurrence of allies, a road to your reduction will at any time be open to these Syracusans through their own superior numbers ; but an opportunity exceedingly seldom

afforded you to make head against them with so large an auxiliary body: and if, from groundless suspicions, you suffer now so large a body to depart either unsuccessful or defeated, yet a time will come when you will ardently wish to see them return, though in a much less proportion of strength, and they have it no longer in their power to cross the sea for your support. Take care, therefore, Camarineans, that neither yourselves nor others be deceived by a too credulous belief of the bold calumnies these Syracusans utter. We have now laid before you the true ground of all those sad suspicions which are fomented against us; but shall again recall them to your remembrance by a short recapitulation, that they may have the proper influence on you.

‘We declare, therefore, that we rule in Greece merely to prevent our being enslaved; but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily, to suppress that annoyance which might otherwise be given us from hence: that mere necessity obliges us to embark in many undertakings, because we have many sinister incidents to guard against: that now and formerly we came hither to support those Sicilians who have been unjustly oppressed; not uninvited, but solemnly conjured to take such steps. Attempt not, therefore, to divert our pursuits, either by erecting yourselves into censors of our proceedings, or into correctors of our politics;—a point too difficult for you to manage: but, so much of our activity or conduct as you can mould into a consistency with your own welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your best advantage; and never imagine that our politics are equally prejudicial to all the world besides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of the Grecians: for, through every quarter, even those which we cannot pretend to control, both such as dread

impending mischiefs and such as meditate encroachments, laying hold on both sides of the ready expectation; the former, that redress may be obtained by our interposition; the latter, that, if we think proper to oppose them, their own safety will be greatly endangered; both sides, I say, are hence obliged; the latter, to practise moderation, though with regret; the former, to enjoy tranquillity without previous embroilments of the public peace. The security, therefore, which now offers itself to your acceptance, and is always ready for those who want it, you are conjured by no means to reject; but relying, like other communities, on that quantity of support we are able to afford you, put the change for once on the Syracusans; and, instead of being ever on the watch against them, force them at length to be watchful and alarmed for themselves.'

Such was the reply of Euphemus. In the mean time the real disposition of the Camarineans was this: at bottom they were well affected to the Athenians, save only for the ambition they showed of enslaving Sicily; but had ever been embroiled with the Syracusans, through that jealousy ever to be found in a neighboring state. But, as the dread of victory on the side of the Syracusans, who were close on their borders, if earned without their concurrence, had influenced their measures, they sent a small party of horse to succor them on the former occasion; and looked on themselves as obliged in policy to serve them underhand in future exigences, but with all possible frugality and reserve; and, at the present juncture, that they might not betray any the least partiality against the Athenians, as they were come off victorious from a battle, to return the same impartial reply to both. Determined, therefore, by these considerations, they answered, that,

‘since a war had broken out between two states, each of which was in alliance with themselves; they judged the only method of acting consistently with their oaths would be to observe a strict neutrality.’ On this, the ambassadors of both parties took their leaves and departed; and the Syracusans, within themselves, exerted their utmost applications to get all things in readiness for war.

The Athenians, who were now encamped at Naxus, opened negotiations with the Siculi, to draw over as many of them as was possible into their adherence. Many of those who inhabited the plains, and were most awed by the Syracusans, stood resolutely out; but the generality of those who were seated in the midland parts, as they were now, and had ever kept themselves, uncontroled, sided at once with the Athenians. They furnished them with corn for the service of the army, and there were some who supplied them with money; and then the Athenians, taking the field against such as refused to accede, forced some to a compliance, and prevented others from receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse. During winter also they removed again from Naxus to Catana; and, having repaired their camp, which had been burned by the Syracusans, chose to pass the remainder of the winter there.

They also despatched a trireme to Carthage, to ask their friendship, and whatever assistance could possibly be obtained: they sent also to Tuscany, as some cities on that coast had made them voluntary offers of assistance: and, farther, they circulated their orders among the Siculi, and despatched in particular one to the Egesteans, to send them as large a number of horses as they could possibly procure. They busied themselves in collecting materials for

circumvallation, such as bricks and iron, and all other necessary stores; being determined to carry on the war with vigor on the first approach of spring.

The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, endeavored in their passage to prevail with the Italians not to look with unconcern on the Athenian proceedings, since they also were equally involved in the danger. But, when arrived at Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, in which they insisted on a speedy supply, on the plea of consanguinity; and the Corinthians came at once to a resolution, by way of precedent to others, that with all possible ardor they would join in their defence. They even appointed an embassy of their own to accompany them to Lacedæmon, whose instructions were to second them in soliciting the Lacedæmonians to declare open war at home against the Athenians, and to fit out an aid for the service of Sicily.

At the time that these joint embassies arrived at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there. He had no sooner made his escape, attended by his companions in exile, than in a trading vessel he passed over from Thuria to Cyllene in Elea; and from thence he repaired to Lacedæmon. But, as the Lacedæmonians had pressed to see him, he went thither under the protection of the public faith: for he had with reason dreaded his reception there, since he had acted so large a part in the affair of Mantinea.

It happened farther, that, when a public assembly was convened at Sparta, the Corinthians, and the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, all urged the same request, and were successful: nay, though the college of ephori, and those who presided at the helm of the state, had dressed up a plan, in pursuance of which they were only to send their ambassadors to Syracuse,

to hinder all accommodations with the Athenians, and were quite averse to the supplying them with real succor; yet Alcibiades, standing up, induced the Lacedaemonian fay, and wrought them to his purpose by the following harangue:

‘ I lie under a necessity, in the beginning of my discourse, to vindicate myself from the calumny which has been charged against me, lest a jealousy of me might divert your attention from those points which equally affect the common cause. My ancestors, therefore, having on some reasonable grounds of complaint renounced the privilege of being the public hosts of your embassies at Athens, I am the man who again re-established this hospitable intercourse; who in many other respects endeavored with great assiduity to oblige you, and particularly in the calamity which fell to your share at Pylus. I cheerfully persevered in these my favorable inclinations towards you, till you yourselves, bent on accommodating your differences with the Athenians, employed my adversaries to negotiate your affairs; and as thereby you invested them with authority, you of course reflected disgrace on me. With reason, therefore, after such provocations, you were afterwards thwarted by me, when I supported the interest of the Mantineans and the Argives, and introduced new measures into the state, in opposition to you. Let therefore such of your number as, chagrined at what they suffered then, continue unjustly their resentments against me, weigh now the force of those reasons on which I acted, and return to better temper. If again I suffer in the opinion of any man, because I have ever manifested an attachment to the interest of the people, let him also learn that his enmity to me on that account is not to be defended. We have borne, from time immemorial, a steadfast

unrelenting aversion to tyrants : now, the whole of the opposition to the despotic power of one is expressed by this word, ‘the people ;’ and on this principle alone our firm and constant adherence to the multitude has been hitherto carried on and supported. Besides, as the state of which I was a member was purely democratical, I lay under a necessity, in many respects, of conforming my conduct to the established model ; and yet I endeavored to give the public measures a greater share of moderation than the frantic humor of the Athenians was judged capable of brooking. But incendiaries started up ; such as, not only in earlier times, but even in our own, have driven the people to more furious measures, and have at length effected the exile of Alcibiades. But, so long as the state was in my own management, I thought myself justified, could I preserve it in that height of grandeur and freedom, and on the same model of government, in which I found it. Not but that the judicious part of our community are sensible what sort of a government a democracy is, and I myself no less than others, who have such abundant occasion to reprobate and curse it : but, for madness open and avowed, new terms of abhorrence cannot be invented ; though totally to subvert it we could in nowise deem a measure of security, whilst you had declared yourselves our foes, and were in the field against us : and all those proceedings of mine, which have proved most offensive to you, are to be charged intirely to such principles as these.

‘ And now, in relation to these points, on which you are here assembled to deliberate, and I also with you, and about which, if I am able to give you a greater light, I am bound to do it,—attend to what I am going to declare. Our principal view in the expedition to Sicily was, if possible, to reduce the Sicilians to our

yoke : after them, we intended to do the same by the Italians. We should next have attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians ; nay, Carthage itself. Had these our views been successful, either in the whole or the greater part, we should soon have given the attack to Peloponnesus ; assembling for that purpose the whole Grecian force, which the countries thus subdued must have added to our own ; taking also into our pay large bodies of barbarians and Iberians, and other soldiers of those nations which by general consent are famed for the most warlike of all barbarians. We should have built also great numbers of triremes for the enlargement of our navy, as Italy would plentifully have supplied us with timber ; with which, blocking up Peloponnesus on all sides, and with our land forces at the same time invading it by land (after carrying your cities, some by storm, and some by the regular siege), we hoped without obstruction to have warred you down, and in pursuance of that to have seized the empire of universal Greece. With money and all needful stores adequate to this extensive plan, the cities to be conquered in those remoter parts would with all proper expedition have supplied us, without any demands on our own domestic revenues. Such were to be the achievements of that grand armament which is now abroad ; such, you may rest assured, on the evidence of a person who was privy to every step, was its original plan ; and the generals who are left in command will yet, if they are able, carry it into execution. And I must farther beg leave to tell you, that, if with timely succors you do not interpose, nothing in those parts will be able to stand before them.

‘ The Sicilians are a people inexperienced in war ; and yet, would they unite and combine together in their mutual defence, they might possibly even now be

too hard for the Athenians. But then the Syracusans, abandoned as they are by the rest, and who already have seen their whole force defeated in battle, and who are blocked up in their own harbors by the enemy's fleet, will be unable long to resist the great force of the Athenians which is already there. If therefore Syracuse be taken, all Sicily is vanquished at a stroke, and Italy becomes instantly their prey; and then the storm, which, as I intimated before, was to be directed against you from that quarter, will in a short time gather, and come pouring down on you.

' Let no one therefore imagine that the end of your present deliberation is the safety of Sicily, when Peloponnesus itself will be endangered, unless some measures of prevention be executed with speed; unless you send out a naval force for the preservation of Sicily, so dexterously appointed, that the hands who man the ships and ply the oars may, on the instant of their landing, become a body of heavy-armed; and, what in my judgment is better than an army, a citizen of Sparta to take on him the command, that those who are ready he may discipline to service, and force such to join as on choice would refuse their concurrence: for, by such a step, those who are already your friends will be animated with higher degrees of resolution, and those who fluctuate at present will join you with a smaller sense of fear.

' It behoves you also to make war on the Athenians at home in a more declared and explicit manner; that the Syracusans, convinced that you have their welfare at heart, may make a more obstinate resistance, and the Athenians be rendered less able to send reinforcements to their troops in Sicily.

' It behoves you farther to raise fortifications at Decelea in Attica; a step which the Athenians have ever

most terribly apprehended, and think that in that point alone you have not put their resolution to its utmost trial in the present war ; and that, assuredly, must be pronounced the most effectual way of distressing an enemy, to discover what he dreads most, and then know how to afflict him in his most tender part : for it is a reasonable conclusion, that they will tremble most at incidents which, should they take place, they are inwardly convinced must most sensibly affect them. As to the benefits which you yourselves shall reap by fortifying Decelea, and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass over many, and only concisely point out the most important. By this, all the natural commodities of the country will fall into your hands ; some by way of booty, the rest by voluntary contributions. They will instantly be deprived of the profits of the silver mines at Laurium, as well as of the rents of their estates and the fees of their courts. The tributes from their dependents will also be paid with less punctuality ; since the latter shall no sooner perceive that you are earnestly bent on war, than they will show an open disregard for Athens.

‘ That these or any of these points be executed with dispatch and vigor, depends, ye Lacedæmonians, on yourselves alone. I can confidently aver that all are feasible, and I think I shall not prove mistaken in my sentiments. I ought not to suffer in the opinion of any Lacedæmonian, though, once accounted the warmest of her patriots, I now strenuously join the most inveterate foes of my country ; nor ought my sincerity to be suspected by any, as if I suited my words to the sharp resentments of an exile. I am driven from my country through the malice of men who have prevailed against me ; but not from your service, if you hearken to my counsels. Your enmity is sooner to be

forgiven, who have hurt your enemies alone, than theirs, who by their cruel treatment compel friends to be foes. My patriotism is far from thriving under the injustice I have suffered ; it was merely an effect of gratitude for that protection I once enjoyed from my country. Nor have I reason at present to imagine, that against my country I am now going to march, so much as to recover some country to myself, when at present I have none at all. And I judge the person to be a true lover of his country, not him who, exiled from it, abandons himself without a struggle to its own iniquitous fate ; but who, from a fondness for it, leaves no project unattempted to recover it again.

' As these are my sentiments, I may fairly, ye Lacedæmonians, insist on your acceptance of my service without diffidence or fear, whatever dangers or whatever miseries may hereafter result. You well know the maxim which universal consent will evince to be good ; that if, when an enemy, I hurt you much, when I am now become your friend, I can help you more. Nay, for the latter I am better qualified on this very account, that I am perfectly acquainted with the state of Athens ; whereas I was only able to conjecture at yours : and, as you are now met together to form resolutions on points of the highest importance, I conjure you, without hesitation, to carry your arms at once into Sicily and Attica ; to the end that, in the former, by the presence of a small part of your forces, you may work out signal preservations, and at home pull down the present and even the future growth of the Athenians ; that, for ages to come, yourselves may reap security and peace, and preside at the helm of united Greece, which will cheerfully acquiesce under your guidance, and pay you a free, uncomelled obedience.'

To this purpose Alcibiades spoke : and the Lacedæmonians, who had before some sort of intention to take the field against Athens, though hitherto they protracted its execution, were now more than ever animated to it when Alcibiades had given them such a detail of affairs, whom they judged to have the clearest insight into them. Thereon they turned their attention immediately on fortifying Decelea, and sending out a body of succor for the present service of Sicily. They also appointed Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, to go and take on him the command at Syracuse ; with orders, by concerting measures with the Syracusans and Corinthians, to draw up a plan for the most effectual and most ready conveyance of succors thither.

Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders to the Corinthians to attend him, without loss of time, at Asine, with two ships ; and also to expedite the equipment of the fleet which they designed for this service, and to keep them in readiness to sail when opportunity should require. Having so far concerted measures, the ambassadors departed from Lacedæmon.

The Athenian trireme, also, despatched from Sicily by the generals on that post to demand supplies of money and a body of horse, was by this time arrived at Athens ; and the Athenians, on hearing their demands, drew up a decree, to send away supplies to that armament, and a body of horsemen.

And here the winter ended ; and the seventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history, came also to an end.

YEAR XVIII.—On the earliest approach of the spring which led on the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily, hoisting from Catana, showed themselves on the coast of Megara in Sicily, of which the Syracusans, having dispossessed the inhabitants in the time of Ge-

lon, the tyrant, as I have already related, continued masters of the soil. Having landed here, they ravaged the country ; till, approaching a fortress belonging to the Syracusans, and attempting it without success, they retired, some by land, and the rest on board the fleet, into the river Tereas ; from whence going again on shore, they ravaged the plains, and set fire to the growing corn. They also fell in with a small party of Syracusans, some of whom they slew ; and then, erecting a trophy, went again on board. They next returned to Catana ; and, after victualling there, proceeded from thence, with their whole force, to the attack of Centoripa, a strong fort belonging to the Siculi ; and having made themselves masters of it by a capitulation, they stood away, burning down in their passage the corn of the Inesseans and Hybleans. On returning to Catana, they found there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, though without horses, yet with all the proper furniture, as if they could be better supplied with the former in Sicily ; as also thirty archers, mounted, and three hundred talents in silver.¹

In the same spring the Lacedæmonians also took the field against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonæ ; but the shock of an earthquake being felt there, they again retired : and, after this, the Argives, making an irruption into Thyreatis, which borders on themselves, took a vast booty from the Lacedæmonians, which sold for no less than twenty-five talents.²

And not long after, in the same spring, the popular party at Thespiae assaulted those in power, but without success ; and, though the Athenians marched away to their succor, some of them were apprehended, and others were obliged to take refuge at Athens.

¹ 58,125*l.*

² 484*l.* 15*s.*

In the same summer, the Syracusans had no sooner received intelligence of the arrival of a body of horsemen amongst the Athenians, and the design of advancing immediately to assault them, than it occurred to their reflections, that, in case the Athenians could not possess themselves of Epipolæ (a spot of ground which is only one continued crag, and lies directly above the city of Syracuse), it would be difficult to inclose them completely round with works of circumvallation, even though they should be defeated in open battle. They applied themselves therefore to the guard of all the approaches to Epipolæ, that the enemy might not on a sudden gain the eminence; for by other methods it was impossible for them to carry that post. Excepting those approaches, the rest of the tract is an impracticable steep, inclining gradually quite down to the city, and commanding the view of every thing within it. Hence, therefore, because it rises with a continual ascent, it was called by the Syracusans Epipolæ.

As Hermocrates and his colleagues had now formally taken on them the command, the whole force of Syracuse marched out, by break of day, into a meadow, on the banks of the Anapus, to pass under review; where the first thing they did was to select seven hundred of the choicest men amongst the heavy-armed, to be commanded by Diomilus, an exile from Andros. These were appointed for the guard of Epipolæ, and to be ready for service, as they were always to keep in a body on any sudden emergence. But the Athenians, who had mustered their forces on the preceding day, had stood away from Catana, and were come in the night undiscovered to the spot called Leon, which is distant¹ six or seven stadia from Epipolæ,

¹ Above half a mile.

where they disembarked their land forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the station of Thapsus. Thapsus is a peninsula, joined to the main land by a narrow isthmus, and jutting out into the sea, at no great distance from the city of Syracuse, either by land or water. The naval force of the Athenians, having secured their station by a palisade across the isthmus, lay quiet in their posts; but the land army, without loss of time, made a running march towards Epipolæ; and mounted by the pass of Euryalus, before the Syracusans, who were yet in the meadow busied in their review, discovered or were able to advance to prevent them. And now their whole force was in motion to dislodge them; each man with all possible alacrity, and more particularly the seven hundred commanded by Diomilus; but, from the meadow to the nearest spot where they could come up with the enemy, was a march of no less than twenty-five stadia.¹ To this it was owing that the Syracusans came to the charge in a disorderly manner; and, being plainly repulsed in battle at Epipolæ, were forced to retire within the city. Diomilus also and about three hundred more lost their lives in this engagement.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having erected a trophy, and given up the bodies of the slain under truce to the Syracusans, marched down the next day in order of battle to the very gates of the city: but, as the Syracusans refrained from sallying out against them, they again drew off, and raised a fort at Labdalum, on the very steepest edge of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara, which they intended as a repository for their baggage and money, whilst themselves might be called off, either to fight or to carry on the works of a siege.

¹ Two miles and a half.

Soon after this they were joined by a body of three hundred Egesteans horse, and one hundred more consisting of Siculi and Naxians, and some others in their alliance. The Athenian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty: they had procured some horses from the Egesteans and Cataneans, and had purchased the rest: so that now they had got together a body of horse amounting in all to six hundred and fifty.

A garrison was no sooner settled in the fort of Labdalum than the Athenians approached to Tyche; where taking post, they built a wall in circle with great expedition, and by the rapidity of their work struck consternation into the Syracusans. On this they sallied out with the fixed design of hazarding an engagement, as they saw the danger of dallying any longer. The armies on both sides were now beginning to face each other; but the Syracusan generals, observing that their own army was in disarray, and could not easily be formed into proper order, made them all wheel off again into the city, except a party of their horse: these, keeping the field, prevented the Athenians from carrying stones and straggling to any distance from their posts. But at length, one Athenian band of heavy-armed, supported by the whole body of their cavalry, attacked and put to flight these Syracusan horsemen. They made some slaughter amongst them, and erected a trophy for this piece of success against the enemy's cavalry.

On the day following some of the Athenians began to raise a wall along the northern side of their circle; whilst others were employed in carrying stones and timber, which they laid down in heaps all along the place called Trogilus, near to the line marked out for the circumvallation, which was to reach, by the shortest compass, from the great harbor on one side to the sea on the other. But the Syracusans, who were prin-

cially guided by the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts of sallying out for the future, with the whole strength of the city, to give battle to the Athenians. It was judged more advisable to run along a wall in length, which should cut the line in which the Athenian works were designed to pass, and which, could they effect it in time, must intirely exclude the enemy from perfecting their circumvallation. Nay, farther, in case the enemy should come up in a body to interrupt the work, they might give them full employment with one division of their force, whilst another party might raise palisades to secure the approaches ; at least, as the whole of the Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose them, they would be obliged to discontinue their own works. To raise therefore the projected work, they issued out of the city ; and beginning at the foot of the city wall from below the Athenian circle, they carried on from thence a transverse wall, cutting down the olive trees in the sacred grove, of which they built wooden turrets to cover their work. The Athenian shipping was not yet come round from Thapsus into the great harbor ; but the Syracusans continued masters of all the posts on the sea, and consequently the Athenians were obliged to fetch up all necessary stores from Thapsus across the land.

When it appeared to the Syracusans that all their palisades and the transverse wall were sufficiently completed, in which the Athenians had given them no manner of interruption, as they were under apprehensions that, should they divide their force, they might be exposed to a defeat, and at the same time were ardently intent on perfecting their own circumvallation, the Syracusans drew off again into the city, leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the guard of their counter-wall.

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the pipes,

which by subterraneous ducts conveyed the drinking-water into the city; and, having farther observed that the Syracusans kept within their tents during the heat of the day, but that some had straggled into the town, whilst those posted at the palisades kept but a negligent guard, they picked out three hundred of their heavy-armed, and, strengthening them with a choice party of their light-armed soldiers, ordered them to march with all possible speed and attack the counter-work. The rest of their force was to march another way, since, headed by one of the generals, it advanced towards the city, to employ the Syracusans in case they sallied: whilst the other detachment, headed by the other general, attacked the palisade which covered the sallyport. Accordingly, the three hundred assaulted and carried the palisade, which those who were posted for its guard abandoned, and fled for shelter behind the works which inclosed Temenites. The pursuers however entered with them; but were no sooner got in than they were again forcibly driven out by the Syracusans: and here some of the Argives and a small number of Athenians were slain.

But now the whole army wheeling about, demolished the counter-work, and pulled up the palisade. The piles of which it was composed they carried off in triumph, and erected a trophy.

The next morning the Athenians resumed their work of circumvallation, and continued it across the crag which is above the marsh, and lies on the quarter of Epipolæ that looks towards the great harbor. This was the shortest cut for their circumvallation downwards, across the plain and the marsh, till it reached the harbor. On this, the Syracusans, issuing again, raised another palisade, beginning from the city, and stretching quite across the marsh. They also threw up an intrenchment along the palisade, intirely to prevent the

Athenians from continuing their works quite down to the sea. The latter, when they had perfected their work along the crag, were bent on demolishing the new palisade and intrenchment of the Syracusans. For this purpose they had ordered their shipping to come about from Thapsus into the great harbor of Syracuse. They themselves, at the morning's dawn, marched down from Epipole into the plain ; and then, crossing the marsh, where the mud was hardest and best able to bear, by the help of boards and planks which they laid on the surface, they carried almost the whole length of the palisade and intrenchment early in the morning, and were soon after masters of the whole. This was not effected without a battle, in which the Athenians were again victorious. The routed Syracusans fled different ways ; those who had composed their right, towards the city ; and those who had composed their left, towards the river. But, with a view of intercepting the passage of the latter, the three hundred chosen Athenians marched with all speed to seize the bridge. The Syracusans, alarmed at this step, as this body consisted of the bulk of their horse, faced about on the three hundred, and put them to flight, and then broke in on the right wing of the Athenians. By so unexpected a shock the first band in that wing was thrown into disorder. Lamachus, observing it, advanced to their support from the left, with a small party of archers that happened to be near him, and the whole body of the Argives. Having crossed a ditch that lay between, seconded only by a few, whilst the bulk of his party made a full stop, he was instantly slain ;¹ as were also five or six of those by whom he

¹ Plutarch, in the life of Nicias, circumstantiates the manner in which this old general lost his life in character. Callilates, a good soldier, but of great impetuosity, rode at the head of the Syracusan horse : being challenged out by Calli-

was accompanied. The Syracusans caught up their bodies with all possible expedition, and bore them off to a place of security on the other side of the river. They were in great measure obliged to make a precipitate retreat, since the rest of the Athenian army was now coming up to attack them.

But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled at first towards the city, having gained leisure to observe such turns in their favor, caught fresh courage from the sight; and, forming again into order, stood their ground against that body of Athenians which faced them. They also sent a detachment to attempt the circle on Epipolæ, concluding it to be unmanned for the present, and might at once be taken. This detachment in fact made itself master of the outwork, and demolished it for about ten plethres in length; but the circle itself was defended by Nicias from all their attempts. Nicias, being much out of order, had been left to repose himself within the circle. He therefore issued orders to his servants to set fire to all the machines and the timber which were lying before the wall; for he was convinced that thus alone, in such a total want of hands for their defence, any safety could be earned. The event answered his expectation; for when the flames began to mount the Syracusans durst not any longer come near, but thought proper to desist and march away.

For now the Athenians, who by this time had chased the enemy from off the plain, were remounting the ascent to defend their circle; and, at the same instant of time, their fleet, conformable to the orders

crates, Lamachus alone engaged personally with him. Lamachus received the first wound; he then returned the blow, and dropped. His antagonist fell at the same time, and they both expired together.

they had received, was standing in for the great harbor. The Syracusans on the high ground beheld the sight ; which occasioned them and the whole Syracusan army to retire precipitately into the city ; concluding themselves no longer able, without an augmentation of their present strength, to hinder the completion of the Athenian works quite down to the sea.

After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, and, in pursuance of a truce, delivered up their slain to the Syracusans, and received in exchange the body of Lamachus, and of those who fell with him.

The junction of their whole armament, both of their land and naval force, being now completed, they began again, from Epipolæ and the crag, to invest the Syracusans with a double wall, which they were to continue quite down to the sea. The necessary provisions to supply their army were brought in from all the coasts of Italy. Many also of the Siculi, who had hitherto stood aloof, declared now for the Athenians, and came into their alliance, who were farther soined by three vessels with fifty oars from Hetruria.

All other points equally contributed to elevate their hopes : for the Syracusans had begun to despair of being able to sustain the siege, as they had no glimpse of any approaching succor from Peloponnesus. They were tossing to and fro amongst themselves some proposals for an accommodation, and had even sounded Nicias on that head, who, by the death of Lamachus, was left invested with the sole command. Nothing definitive was however concluded, though, as might reasonably be expected from men in high perplexity, and more straitly besieged than ever, many proposals were made to him, and many more were agitated within the city. The distresses, also, which environed them at present, struck into them mutual suspicions of

one another: nay, they even divested of their charge the generals who were in authority when these distresses came on them, as if all was owing to their misconduct or treachery, and chose in their stead Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

In the mean time, Gylippus, the Lacedæmonian, and the ships from Corinth, were come up to Leucas, designing with the utmost expedition to pass over from thence to Sicily. But terrible accounts came thick on them here, and all agreed in broaching the same untruth, that ‘ Syracuse was completely invested on all sides.’ Gylippus on this gave up all hopes of saving Sicily; but, having the preservation of Italy still at heart, he and Pythen, the Corinthian, with the small squadron at hand, consisting only of two Laconic and two Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian gulf with all possible dispatch to Tarentum. The Corinthians, besides their own ten now fitting out, were to man two belonging to the Leucadians, and three more belonging to the Ambraciots, and follow them as soon as possible.

The first step of Gylippus, now arrived at Tarentum, was to go in quality of ambassador to Thuria, claiming privilege for it, as his father had been a denizen of that state; but, finding himself unable to gain their concurrence, he weighed from thence, and stood along the coast of Italy; but in the Terinean gulf he met with a hard gale of wind, which in this gulf, when in a northerly point, blows generally with great and lasting violence, and now drove him from his course, and blew him out into the open sea, where he stood again the rebuff of another violent storm, but at length reached Tarentum. He there laid his vessels on ground which had been damaged in the foul weather, and refitted them for service.

When Nicias found that he was on his passage, he betrayed an open contempt of so trifling a squadron, as the Thurians had already done before him. It appeared to him that so petty a squadron could only be fitted out for piratical cruises, and therefore he sent out no detachment to hinder his approach.

About the same time this summer the Lacedæmonians, with their own domestic forces, augmented by the junction of their allies, made an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part of that territory. The Athenians put out to sea with thirty sail to succor the Argives; which procedure was, beyond all denial, the clearest violation of the treaties between them and the Lacedæmonians. Hitherto they had only exercised robberies on them from Pylus; and making descents rather on any other coast of Peloponnesus than Laconia itself, and left it to the Argives and Mantineans to make war against them. Nay, though the Argives had frequently pressed them, that with an armed force they would barely land on the Laconic coast, and, after committing never so small ravage in their company, immediately to retire, they had positively refused; but now, under the command of Pythodorus, and Leespodias, and Demaratus, they made a descent at Epidaurus-Limera and Prasia, committed large devastation on the adjacent country, and afforded the Lacedæmonians a most specious and justifiable pretext to act offensively against Athens.

When the Athenian fleet had sailed homewards from Argos, and the Lacedæmonians also had withdrawn, the Argives broke into Phliasia, where they laid waste part of the Lacedæmonian territory, and made some slaughter of the people, and then returned to Argos.

BOOK VII.

YEAR XVIII. B. C. 414.—GYLISSUS and Pythen, when they had refitted their ships, stood along the coast from Tarentum to Locri Epizephyrii. Here they received more certain information that Syracuse was not yet completely invested, and that a succor of force might be thrown into the town by the way of Epipolæ. They went next to consultation, whether, keeping Sicily on the right, they should endeavor at all hazards to enter Syracuse by sea; or, with Sicily on their left, should steer first to Himera; from whence, attended by the forces of that state, and whatever additional strength they could persuade to join them, they should march thither over-land. It was determined to go first to Himera, especially as the four Athenian vessels had not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias at last, on the certain intelligence that they were now at Locri, had detached to observe them. To be beforehand, therefore, with this detachment, they passed through the straits, and, having touched only at Rhegium, and Messene, arrived at Himera; whilst in the latter place, they prevailed on the Himerians to concur with them in the war, and not only to intrust their troops under their command, but even to supply with arms such of the mariners as had navigated the vessels, and were therefore unprovided; for, their shipping they had drawn ashore, and laid up at Himera. The Selinuntians also, by a messenger despatched on purpose, they had summoned to meet them, with all their united strength, at a determined place on their route. The Geloans also, and some of

the Siculi, promised to attend with a party, though by no means considerable. The latter of these were disposed better than ever to the service, since Archonides had lately died, who reigned over some of the Siculi seated in these parts, and having a great influence over them, had declared for the Athenians ; and since Gylippus appeared to them to be sent from Lacedæmon with a full purpose to do them service.

And now Gylippus, having assembled an army, which consisted of about seven hundred of those who navigated or came on board his vessels, and for whom he had provided arms ; of heavy-armed and light-armed Himerians, amounting together to a thousand men and one hundred horsemen ; of some light-armed Selinuntians ; a small party of Gelonian horse ; and a body of Siculi, in all a thousand, began his march for Syracuse.

The Corinthians in the mean time were sending out the other ships as fast as they could equip them for the service, to follow with all possible expedition from Leucas : and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who with a single ship set out last from Leucas, was the first who arrived at Syracuse ; and that but a small space of time before the approach of Gylippus. Finding therefore, on his arrival, that the Syracusans were going forthwith to hold a public assembly, in which the terms of putting an end to the war were designed to be adjusted, he dissuaded them from so precipitate a step, and animated their drooping resolutions by strong assurances that other ships would instantly arrive : and that Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was sent thither by the Lacedæmonians to take on him the command. The Syracusans accordingly resumed their spirits, and immediately marched out of the town, with the whole of their strength, in order to

meet Gylippus; for by this time they had received intelligence that he was actually approaching.

Gylippus, on his route, had made himself master of Leucas, a fortress belonging to the Siculi; and now, at the head of his army, drawn up in order of battle, he came up to Epipolee. Having mounted by the pass of Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their first approach, he marched, in conjunction with the Syracusans, towards the Athenian circumvallation. He happened to arrive in that critical juncture, when the Athenians had completely finished about seven or eight stadia¹ of the double wall extending to the great harbor; when, in consequence, but a very small part remained incomplete, and on which they were laboring with their greatest application. On the other side of their circle, towards Trogilus, the stones for completing their work had been laid ready in heaps almost down to the beach, and some parts of their work on that side stood but half completed, though others had received the finishing hand. To such extremity of danger were the Syracusans now reduced.

Gylippus and the Syracusans coming thus suddenly on them, the Athenians at first were struck with consternation; but formed, however, in order of battle, to give them a reception. But Gylippus, having ordered his forces to halt, despatched a herald to the Athenians, proclaiming that, in case they would evacuate Sicily within the space of five days, with their arms and baggage, he would readily grant them a truce. Such offers they received in a contemptuous manner,²

¹ About three-fourths of a mile.

² Nicias, says Plutarch, disdained to return an answer; but some of his soldiers laughed outright, and asked, ‘ If, at the arrival of a mantle and staff from Sparta, the Syracusans were become so full of spirits as to despise the Athenians, who had lately given up to the Lacedæmonians three hundred of

and, disdaining to return an answer, ordered the herald to move off. And now both sides were busy in marshalling and disposing their men for battle.

But Gylippus, who had made an observation that the Syracusans were in great confusion, and could not easily be formed into proper order, made his army fall back into more open ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance whilst they were making this motion; but, without advancing, stood close under his works; and, when Gylippus found that the enemy would not move forwards to attack him, he made his forces wheel off to the high ground called Temenites, where they reposed themselves for the night.

The next morning he drew up the greatest part of his army before the works of the Athenians, to prevent their sending out succors to more distant posts; for he had detached a party to attack the fort of Labdalum, which he carried by storm, and put all the garrison found within it to the sword. Labdalum was so situated, in regard to the Athenian posts, that they could have no view of what was transacting there. The same day also an Athenian trireme, as it was entering the harbor, was taken by the Syracusans.

After so much success, the Syracusans and allies set about raising a counter-work along Epipolæ. Beginning at the city, they carried it upwards towards the single wall which had an oblique inclination; and intended that, in case the Athenians could not stop its completion, it should intirely exclude them from perfecting their circumvallation. The Athenians, having perfected their works to the sea, had now remounted the eminence; and, as some parts of their work were

their countrymen who had been their prisoners, all of them better soldiers, and who combed their hair, too, much better than Gylippus;

but weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night, and was marching to demolish those: but the Athenians, who passed the night without their works, were no sooner aware of it than they also marched away to defend them. On which, Gylippus, finding them alarmed, desisted, and made his army retreat to their former posts. This however occasioned the Athenians to raise those parts of their wall to a greater height, and to take the guard of it on themselves, as amongst the body of their confederates they had divided the guard of the rest of their works, allotting a proper charge to each.

Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify the spot called Plemmyrium. Plemmyrium is a point of land over-against Syracuse, which, jutting out before the great harbor, renders the mouth of it very narrow. ‘If this were fortified,’ he thought ‘the importation of necessaries for the army would be better secured; because then, from a smaller distance, they could at any time command the harbor where the Syracusan shipping lay; and, should it be their ill fortune to be straitened by sea, might easier fetch in supplies than in the present station of their fleet at the bottom of the great harbor.’ Now also he began with greater attention than before to study how to distress them by sea; convinced, since the arrival of Gylippus, how little room he had to hope for success by land. To this spot therefore he ordered his fleet, and drew his land forces down, and immediately erected three forts. In these the greatest part of the baggage was laid up; and the transports and light ships were immediately stationed there. To this project, however, the havoc that afterwards ensued amongst the seamen is principally to be ascribed; for, as they suffered in this station under scarcity of water, and the mariners were

frequently obliged to fetch both water and wood from a distance, since near at hand they were not to be had, the Syracusan horse, who were masters of the country, slaughtered them in abundance. The Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at their fortress of Olympiseum, to bridle the marauding excursions of the enemy at Plemmyrium.

Now also Nicias received intelligence that the other Corinthian ships were on their passage. To watch their approach, he therefore detached twenty sail, who were appointed to cruise about Locri and Rhegium, and the capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them.

Gylippus in the mean time was employed in building the counter-wall along Epipole, making use of the stones which the Athenians had laid ready in heaps for the continuation of their own work. It was also his daily custom to draw up the Syracusans and allies in order of battle, and lead them out beyond the point of the counter-wall; which obliged the Athenians to draw up likewise, to observe their motions. And when Gylippus judged he could attack them with advantage, he instantly advanced; and, the charge being given and received, a battle ensued in the space between their respective works; but so narrow, that no use could be made of the Syracusan and confederate horse. The Syracusans and allies were accordingly defeated. They fetched off their slain by truce, and the Athenians erected a trophy. But Gylippus, having assembled the army round him, thought proper to make this declaration in the presence of them all:—that ‘the defeat was not to be charged on their want of bravery, but on his own indiscretion; he had deprived them of the service of their own cavalry and darters, by ranging his battle in too confined a spot between the works; that he would now again lead them out in a more judi-

tious manner. He exhorted them therefore, to imprint it strongly on their remembrance, that, as in real strength they were not inferior, it would be intolerably disgraceful, if they, who to a man were Peloponnesians and Dorians, should not manifest themselves so resolutely brave, as to conquer and drive out of their country a parcel of Ionians and islanders, and a promiscuous rabble of hungry adventurers.' Having addressed them thus, he lay on the watch to seize a proper opportunity; and, as soon as he had gained it, led them again to the charge.

It was the opinion of Nicias, and in general of all the Athenians, that, though it was not their own interest to bring on an engagement, yet it highly concerned them to put a stop to the counter-work which the enemy was raising to hinder their progress; for by this time the wall of the Syracusans had only not overreached the extreme point to which the Athenians had brought their circumvallation: 'and, should it be extended farther, it would give the enemy this double advantage—a certainty of conquest whenever they thought proper to fight, and a discretionary power not to fight at all.' Determined by these considerations, they drew out in order to give the Syracusans battle.

Gylippus soon began the engagement. He had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the works, and at a greater distance from them than before. He had posted the cavalry and the darters on a wide and open spot, yet unoccupied by the works on either side, and posted them so that they flanked the Athenians. In the ardor of the engagement, the cavalry broke in on the left wing of the Athenians, which was ranged against them, and intirely routed them. In consequence of which, the remainder of the army was soon defeated by the Syracusans, and in the greatest dis-

order retired for shelter behind their works. And night no sooner came on than the Syracusans, without loss of time, began to carry forward their own works, which they soon extended beyond the Athenian circumvallation: by which they gained this great point, that they could no longer be invested on all sides by the Athenians; and the latter, though masters in the field, were henceforward effectually stopped from perfecting their circumvallation.

After this, twelve ships of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians, the remainder of the squadron designed for this service, having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip, came into the harbor of Syracuse: they were commanded by Erasinides, a Corinthian. By these the Syracusans were now assisted in carrying on their work, till it was completely joined to the transverse wall.

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily, in order to promote the common cause; and to procure additional forces for the services both of land and sea; and to solicit the concurrence of such states as hitherto had manifested either no great inclination, or an open repugnance to join in the present war. Other ambassadors also were despatched by the Syracusans and Corinthians to Lacedæmon and Corinth, instructed to solicit a speedy reinforcement, to be transported into Sicily either in trading vessels, or in boats, or by any other expeditions methods, since the Athenians had also sent for reinforcements from Athens. The Syracusans also assigned complements of men to their shipping, and sedulously trained them to the service of the sea, as designing on this element also to try their fortune; nay, they labored with alacrity and application to increase their strength in all respects.

Nicias, being sensible of this, and conscious that the

strength of the enemy and his own inability became daily greater, despatched his messengers also to Athens, a custom he had ever observed, and on all occasions, to report the particulars of his proceedings. But in his present situation it was more requisite than ever; since now he was convinced that he was environed with dangers; and unless, with the utmost expedition, they either recalled their troops, or sent them another, and that a strong reinforcement, no hopes of preservation remained. Apprehensive, farther, that the persons he should send, either through want of proper address, or through defect of courage, or a passion to soothe the populace, might suppress the truth, he sent a true account of things in a letter written with his own hand. By this method he concluded that his own sentiments of things could not be concealed or invalidated by messengers; that the Athenians would be informed of the truth, and might accordingly adjust their resolutions. These messengers therefore departed, instructed to deliver the letter which he intrusted to their care, and what farther they were to add by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious to guard his shattered forces from annoyance than to plunge into fresh and spontaneous dangers.

In the close of this summer Euetion, an Athenian general, marched in conjunction with Perdiccas and a large body of Thracians against Amphipolis; yet could not render himself master of that city. But then, setting out from Imereum, he brought his triremes about into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the side of the river: and here this summer ended.

In the beginning of winter the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens, where they gave such accounts

of things as he had charged them to give, and resolved such questions as were asked them. They also delivered his letter, which the clerk of the state stood up and read aloud to the Athenians. The contents were these :—

‘ Athenians,

‘ The many letters from time to time received from me have given you all proper information, so far as relates to past transactions; and it is now high time you should be made acquainted with our present situation, that your councils may be adjusted in a proper manner.

‘ After therefore we had defeated, in several engagements, the Syracusans, against whom you sent us out, and when we had thrown up those works before their city, within which we are this moment lying, Gylippus the Lacedæmonian came on us, at the head of an army brought from Peloponnesus, and augmented by the troops of some Sicilian states. In the first battle he was routed by us; but, in the last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry and darters, we have been forced to retire within our intrenchments. Being therefore obliged, by the superior numbers of the enemy, to discontinue our circumvallation, we are this moment lying on the defensive. Nor indeed are we able to draw out our whole force for action, as detachments of our heavy-armed are remotely employed in the guard of our works. They have, farther, run up a single wall to cut our lines; so that there remains no longer a possibility for us to complete the circumvallation, unless, reinforced by a numerous body of troops, we are enabled to assault and demolish the counter-work. And, in consequence of this, we, who designed to besiege others, may with much more propriety be said to

suffer a siege ourselves, at least by land; for we dare not make any distant excursions into the adjacent country, for fear of the horse.

‘ What is more, they have sent ambassadors to Peloponnesus, to solicit reinforcements. Gylippus also is making the tour of the Sicilian states, with a view to obtain the concurrence of such as are at present neutral, and to prevail with the rest to intrust their additional levies for the service both of land and sea under his command: and, according to my present intelligence, they are fully bent to attack, at one and the same time, our intrenchments, with their land forces by land, and with their ships by sea. And, though I say by sea, let not the sound be too terrible in your ears: for they know very well the present state of our navy; which, though at first a most complete equipment, for the cleanliness of the ships and the health and vigor of the seamen, yet at present has scarce a ship which is not leaky; so long have they been necessitated to keep the sea, whilst their hands have daily been mouldering away: for, in fact, we have no opportunity to lay them dry and careen them, as we are under continual apprehensions of being attacked by the ships of the enemy; equal, nay superior in number, to our own. That they will attempt it we have most certain ground to believe, but the seasons of doing it are intirely in their own option; which also enables them to preserve their vessels ever fit for service, as they are not necessitated to be continually in action to strike awe into others; nay, we should hardly be able to do the like, though the number of our shipping were much larger than it is, or though we were exempted from the necessity we now lie under of keeping guard with them all: for in case we make the least abatement of our vigilance, we should be dis-

tressed for want of necessaries, which even now we fetch in with difficulty in the very teeth of the enemy. To this must be ascribed the great waste of our seamen which has already been made, and whose number lessens from day to day; since, obliged to fetch wood, water, and forage, from remote places, they are intercepted by the enemy's horse. Even our servants, who have nothing to dread from our ruined condition, desert us daily. And such foreigners as were forced on board our fleet depart with impunity to their own cities; whilst others, who were allured to the service by the greatness of our pay, and imagined they were rather come to plunder than to fight, when, contrary to their hopes, they behold the enemy possessed of a numerous fleet, and making a brave resistance in every quarter, some catch at the least pretext to go over to the enemy, and others make shift to skulk away, never again to be retrieved in so wide a country as Sicily. Nay, some of those, who, having attended us hither from Athens, and since prevailed with the captains of triremes to accept of the service of Hyccarian slaves in redemption of their own, have by this means subverted our naval discipline.

'I am writing to men well enlightened in naval affairs, and perfectly convinced, that the flower of an equipment is but of short duration, and how few of those on board are skilled at steering the vessel or managing the oar. But what gives me most acute vexation is this; that, though commander-in-chief, I am utterly unable to put a stop to these disorders, since your tempers, Athenians, are hard to be managed; and am quite at a loss from whence to repair the waste that has been made of our seamen. The enemy have abundant resources every where at hand, whereas necessity points out only one to us; that place

from whence we had who now remain, and who are for ever lost: for Naxus and Catana, the cities which still persevere in our alliance, are unable to recruit us; and, should the enemy get one circumstance more in their favor, that the towns of Italy, which at present supply us with food, deterred by the discovery of our low condition and the non-appearance of a reinforcement from Athens, go over to the Syracusans, the war will be finished to their hands without costing them a blow, and we shall be left to the mercy of the enemy.

‘ I could have sent you much more pleasing accounts of things, but none so proper to give you a clear idea of the posture of your affairs here, and such as you ought to have before you proceed to deliberate on them; and at the same time, as I am by no means a stranger to Athenian tempers, since I know you to be fond of hearing what will give you pleasure, but are afterwards inflamed with anger if any article in event drops short of your expectation, I thought it highly concerned my own safety to tell you nothing but the truth. And let me here conjure you to entertain no resentment either against private soldiers or commanders; since, in laboring those points which are the principal ends of the expedition, they have fully done their duty.

‘ But, since all Sicily is in arms against us, and since our enemies expect a reinforcement from Peloponnesus, resolve, without loss of time, that, as your forces are not sufficient to keep the enemy in play, they must either be recalled or be reinforced with a body not inferior to the first equipment, with both a land and a naval force, and a large pecuniary supply. For myself, I must insist that a successor be sent me; since I am quite disabled by a nephritic disorder from continuing in the command: and I think I have just

title to expect my dismission from you; since, in the vigor of my life, I have been intrusted by you with several commands, in which I did you some signal services.

'Whatever you determine, put it in execution on the first approach of spring; and, above all things, keep clear of delays; for the ready supplies given the enemy in Sicily will soon enable them to act; and those expected from Peloponnesus, though they must be longer in coming up, yet, depend on it, that unless you exert your utmost vigilance, some of them will steal hither, as before, through all your guards, and some will infallibly be here before you.'

Such were the advices brought them by the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, however, when they had heard it read, would not so far comply with the request of Nicias as to give him his dismission; but that, afflicted as he was in body, the whole burden of affairs might not lie too heavily on him, they appointed two persons, already in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him in the command, till those who by the public vote should be joined with him in the commission could arrive. They also decreed to him a reinforcement, consisting both of a land and a naval force, to be levied amongst the Athenians on the roll and their dependents; and, for colleagues to share in the command, Demosthenes, the son of Aleisthenes, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began his passage for Sicily about the winter solstice, at the head of ten sail of ships, and with a supply of twenty talents of silver:¹ empowered, farther, to assure them, that 'a large reinforcement will soon come up, as the state had seriously interested itself in their welfare.'

¹ 3875*l.* sterling.

Demosthenes stayed behind to forward the equipment, and was intended to set out on the first approach of spring. He was busied in assembling together their contingents from the dependent states, and in levying amongst them both money, and shipping, and soldiers.

The Athenians, farther, sent out twenty sail to cruise on the coasts of Peloponnesus, and to take care that no one passed over from Corinth and Peloponnesus into Sicily : for the Corinthians, on the arrival of the ambassadors, and the advice they brought, that ‘the face of affairs was much altered for the better,’ priding themselves in the reflection that their former equipment had arrived in time to contribute to this turn, became now more alert than ever, and got transports in readiness to carry over a body of their own heavy-armed into Sicily, whilst the Lacedæmonians were intent on doing the same from other parts of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians, farther, manned out five-and-twenty sail, designing to hazard an engagement with the guard-ships stationed at Naupactus, or to disable the Athenians who lay there from giving their transports the least molestation, by keeping their own triremes ready ranged in order of battle in the very face of that squadron.

The Lacedæmonians also were preparing for an invasion of Attica, in pursuance of a former resolution, and in compliance farther with the pressing instances of both Syracusans and Corinthians. They had no sooner heard of the reinforcement intended to be sent by the Athenians to Sicily than, by making a diversion, they designed to stop its execution. Alcibiades also continued warmly importuning them to execute his plan of fortifying Decelea, and to proceed briskly with the war. But the motives which at this present juncture animated the Lacedæmonians most were, that

the Athenians, if engaged in a double war both against themselves and against the Sicilians, must become a much more expeditious conquest; and, farther, the Athenians were the first aggressors in violating treaties. In the former war they were well convinced the first offence was chargeable on their own heads, because the Thebans had surprised Platæa whilst treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, contrary to an express stipulation in a preceding treaty, that ‘arms should never be taken up against the party which was willing to abide by a judicial determination,’ they themselves had refused to submit to a trial, though claimed by the Athenians. To a conduct so ungenerous they concluded that their ill success in the war ought fairly to be imputed; and reflected, with self-accusations, not only on the calamity they had suffered at Pylos, but on all their other losses in every quarter of the war. But now, since the Athenians, with an equipment of thirty sail, had committed devastations at Epidaurus, at Prasiæ, and at other places, and continued to infest their dominions by robberies from Pylos; nay, as often as disputes had intervened about the intent of articles in the last treaty, in which the Lacedæmonians appealed to a judicial determination, the others had haughtily refused it; concluding hence, that the Athenians were become as guilty aggressors now as themselves had been on the former occasion, with cheerful presages of success, they determined for war. In order to it, they demanded this winter from their allies their contingents of iron, and got all the needful materials in readiness to execute their plan of fortification. Resolved at the same time to transport an aid to Sicily in vessels of burden, they began to levy it at home, and exacted the quotas of augmentation from their confederates. And thus the winter ended; and

the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history, came also to an end.

YEAR XIX.—The following spring no sooner approached, than at an earlier date than on any former occasion, the Lacedæmonians and allies invaded Attica; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, had the command of the army. At first they ravaged the country, particularly the plains; and this being done, having allotted out the work in portions to the several states, they set out about fortifying Decelea. Now Decelea is distant at most but one hundred and twenty stadia from the city of Athens,¹ and lies at the same distance, or very little more, from Bœotia: but in the plain, and on the finest spot of ground, from whence effectually to annoy them, was their fortress raised; and might be seen from the very walls of Athens.

In this manner the Peloponnesians and allies erected a fortress within Attica itself; whilst, in the same portion of time, their friends in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy-armed on-board their transports, and sent them off for Sicily. For this service the Lacedæmonians picked out from the very best of the helots and of those citizens of Sparta who were newly enfranchised, from both together, six hundred heavy-armed; and appointed Eccritus, a Spartan, to command them: and the Bœotians sent three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xeno and Nicon of Thebes, and Hegesander of Thespiae. These were first embarked at Tænarus in Laconia, and thence put out to sea.

Soon after these, the Corinthians sent away five

¹ About twelve miles.

hundred heavy-armed ; some from Corinth itself, others hired from the Arcadians ; and appointed Alexarchus, a Corinthian, to command them. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred heavy-armed along with the Corinthians, and at their head Sargeus a Sicyonian.

But the five-and-twenty sail of Corinthians which launched out to the sea in the depth of winter, lay ranged in an opposite station to the twenty Attic at Naupactus, to give leisure for the embarkation of the heavy-armed on board the transports from Peloponnesus. On this account, principally, they were manned and fitted out to sea, that they might divert the attention of the Athenians from the transport-fleet that was now putting out, and fasten it wholly on the hostile appearance of these triremes.

In the mean time, the Athenians, even during the fortification in hand at Decelea, and at the earliest approach of spring, sent out thirty sail to cruise on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of Charicles, the son of Apollodorus. His instructions were, farther, to touch at Argos, and to summon them, in conformity to the treaty of alliance, to embark a body of heavy-armed on board the fleet.

Demosthenes also, according to promise, they sent away for Sicily, with a numerous fleet; consisting of sixty ships of Athens and five of Chios, on board of which were twelve hundred enrolled Athenians, and as large a number of islanders as with the utmost industry they had been able to draw together. They had also amassed, from their other confederates subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they were able to furnish for carrying on the war with vigor. But Demosthenes was farther instructed to sail at first in company with Charicles, and assist him in the cruise

on the coast of Laconia. Demosthenes therefore, having stood over to Ægina, continued there till the remainder of his force, which was yet behind, had completely joined him, and Charicles had taken on board the Argive auxiliaries.

About the same time in this spring Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, at the head of as large a force as he had been able to collect from the several states, with whom his persuasions had been effectual; and, having convened the Syracusans, he told them that ‘they ought to man out as large a number of shipping as they possibly could, and try their fortune in a naval engagement: such a step, he had reason to hope, might be attended with consequences which would amply compensate the danger, and invigorate the war.’

These instances of Gylippus were well seconded by Hermocrates, who took uncommon pains to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians by sea. ‘The latter,’ he told them, ‘were far from enjoying their naval skill as an hereditary right, or a privilege from time immemorial exclusively their own. In fact, they were by nature land-men much more than the Syracusans; and necessity alone, in the Medish invasion, had forced them to try their fortune at sea. By enterprising men, as the Athenians were, such as were most daring in opposing them must needs be regarded as the most formidable enemies. True, they had been used to intimidate their neighbors, not by a real superiority of strength, but by their daring enterprising genius; and now, by the same methods, themselves might become formidable even to the Athenians.’ He assured them, for his own part, he was perfectly convinced that the Syracusans, if by an effort of bold resolution they would on a sudden attack the Athenian fleet, might reap more benefit from the terror which

such a step would strike on the foe, than could accrue to the Athenians from their superior skill when compared with Syracusan inexperience.' He pressed them therefore 'to try their fortune by sea, and to bid adieu to fear.'

Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Hermocrates, and by others, the Syracusans were eagerly bent on action by sea, and manned out their fleet: and when the whole was ready for service, Gylippus, by favor of the night, at the head of his land army, marched down to the forts at Plemmyrium, intending to assault them on the land side. The triremes of the Syracusans, at the same instant of time, as had been concerted beforehand, to the number of thirty-five, were sailing up out of the great harbor, whilst forty-five were going about out of the lesser harbor where their dock lay. The latter went round, designing to complete their junction with their other squadron, and then in a body to stand against Plemmyrium, that the Athenians on both sides might be thrown into confusion. The Athenians lost no time, but instantly manned out sixty vessels. With twenty-five of the number they engaged the thirty-five Syracusan in the great harbor; with the rest they went to meet the other squadron, that was coming about from the dock. A smart engagement immediately ensued, in the mouth of the great harbor. The dispute was a long time obstinately maintained; one side exerting themselves to clear the passage, but the other to obstruct it.

In the mean time, as the Athenians posted at Plemmyrium had flocked down to the sea-side, and with their utmost attention were looking at the battle on the water, Gylippus seized the opportunity; and, no sooner had the morning dawned than, to the great surprise of the enemy, he attacked the forts. He first

made himself master of the largest of the three, and afterwards carried the two lesser, the defendants of which, seeing the largest so easily taken, had abandoned their posts; nay, on the surprisal of the first, those who had manned it, throwing themselves on board the boats and a transport that lay at hand, found no small difficulty in getting away to the camp; for, as the Syracusans had now the better of the engagement with their squadron in the great harbor, they detached one of their nimblest triremes to pursue the fliers. But, at the time the other two forts were carried, the Syracusans were plainly vanquished, which gave them who abandoned the last an opportunity to sail away without obstruction: for that Syracusan squadron, that was engaged before the harbor's mouth, having forced their way through the Athenian fleet, by sailing forward in a disorderly manner, and continually running foul one on another, gave the Athenians an opportunity to regain the day: for this squadron they soon routed, and afterwards that within the harbor, by which they had been vanquished. They also sunk eleven ships of the enemy, and made a slaughter of all their crews, those of three ships excepted, to whom they granted quarter; and all this with the loss only of three ships on their own side. Having afterwards drawn ashore the shatters of the Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy on the little isle before Plemmyrium, they retired to their main encampment.

Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in their naval engagement. They had carried, however, the forts at Plemmyrium; and, to signalise each of their acquisitions, they erected three several trophies. One also of the two forts that were taken last they levelled

with the ground, but the other two they repaired and garrisoned.

In this surprisal of the forts, many were slain, and many were made prisoners, and a great stock of wealth repositored there became the prize of the enemy: for, as the Athenians had made use of these forts by way of magazine, much wealth belonging to merchants, and corn in abundance, were found within: much also of the stores belonging to the captains of the ships of war, inasmuch as forty masts for triremes, and other materials of refitment, had been laid up there: and three triremes were hauled ashore to be careened. Nay, this surprisal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief if not the greatest source of all the distress which the Athenian army suffered in the sequel; for no longer was the sea open to them for the secure importation of necessary supplies. From this time the Syracusans rushed on them from thence, and awed all their motions. The convoys could no more get in without fighting their way. Besides that, in all other respects, it struck a great consternation, and even a dejection of mind, amongst the troops.

The next step taken by the Syracusans was to send out to sea a squadron of twelve ships, under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these ships was to proceed to Peloponnesus, and land an embassy there, which had instructions 'to notify a present hopeful posture of affairs, and to press the prosecution of the war in Greece with all possible vigor.' The other eleven stood over to the Italian coast, having received intelligence that a number of small vessels, laden with stores for the Athenians, were coming up. They intercepted and intirely destroyed most of these; and the timber on board them,

which was ready wrought for the Athenians to frame together into ships, they burnt to ashes on the shore of Caulonia. This done, they stood away for Locri; and, whilst they lay in that road, one of the transports from Peloponnesus, having on board the heavy-armed from Thespiae, came in. The Syracusans removed those heavy-armed into their own ships, and returned with them to Syracuse.

The Athenians with twenty sail were stationed at Megara, in order to intercept their return; where one ship alone, with all the crew, fell into their hands. They were not able to come up with the rest; since, eluding all pursuit, they recovered with security their own harbors.

There happened also a skirmish, in the harbor of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusans had driven down in the sea before their old docks, that their vessels might ride in safety behind them, and the Athenians be unable to stand in amongst them and do any damage to their shipping. Close up to those piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodigious size, on which turrets and parapets to cover the defendants were erected, whilst others in long boats were fastening cables round the piles, and, by the help of a machine convenient for the purpose, craning them up; and such as they broke, a set of divers sawed off close at the bottom. The Syracusans in the mean time were pouring their missive weapons on them from the docks, which were plentifully returned by those posted on the raft. In short, the Athenians plucked up most of the piles; but one part of the stoccade was exceeding difficult to be demolished, as it lay out of sight; for they had driven down some of the piles in such a manner, that their heads emerged not above the surface of the water. This rendered all access exceeding dangerous;

since, ignorant where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge his vessel as it were on a shelve. But even these the divers, for a pecuniary reward, searched out and sawed away. And yet, as fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove down a fresh set of piles. The contrivances both of annoyance and prevention were strenuously exerted on both sides, as might justly be expected from two hostile bodies posted so near one another; the skirmishings were often renewed, and every artifice of war was successively practised.

The Syracusans, farther, had despatched embassies composed of Corinthians, Lacedæmonians, and Ambraciots, to the cities of Sicily, ‘to notify the surprisal of Plemmyrium, and to give a just representation of the naval engagement in which they had been defeated; not so much by the strength of the enemy as by their own confusion: in other respects to assure them, that their hopes of success were high, and that they firmly depended on receiving soon an aid from them, composed both of a land and naval force: since the Athenians were also in expectation of a reinforcement from Athens, the approach of which would their friends anticipate, the Athenians at present there must be totally destroyed, and the war brought at once to an end.’ Such schemes were now in agitation in Sicily.

But Demosthenes, when he had assembled the whole of the armament with which he was to pass over to the relief of those in Sicily, weighing from Ægina, and standing over to Peloponnesus, completed his junction with Charicles and the squadron of thirty sail of Athenians under his command; and, as a body of heavy-armed had been taken on board the latter from Argos, they steered together for the coast of Laconia. And here, first, they ravaged in part Epidaurus Limera;

and proceeding from thence to that part of Laconia which lies over-against Cythera, and where stands the temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the adjacent country, they inclosed and fortified a neck of land which might serve as a receptacle to such of the helots as deserted the Lacedæmonians; from thence, banditti like, as was done from Pylos, to infest the country. This convenient spot was no sooner taken in than Demosthenes stood away for Corcyra, that he might take on board the auxiliaries there, and make the best of his way to Sicily. But Charicles stayed till he had put the place into a state of secure defence, and fixed a garrison in it. This being done, he carried back his squadron of thirty sail to Athens; and the Argives at the same time received their dismissal.

This summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers, of those called machærophori, and who were originally Dians. This body was intended to have been sent with Demosthenes into Sicily; but, as they arrived not till after his departure, the Athenians had resolved to send them back again to their own homes in Thrace. To retain them merely for the sake of the war waged against them from Decelea, they thought, would plunge them in too large an expense, since the pay of every soldier was a drachma¹ a day: for now, since Decelea, which had been fortified this spring by the joint labors of the whole united army, continued to be garrisoned by detachments from the several states, which at certain intervals of time relieved one another in a regular succession, it gave terrible annoyance to the Athenians, and caused amongst them such havoc of their effects, and such a destruction of their men, as threw them

¹ Seven-pence three farthings.

into great distress. All preceding incursions of the enemy having been only transient, had left them in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands for the rest of the year; but now, as they awed the country by one continued blockade, and as by intervals they received considerable augmentations to enable them to give greater annoyance, as even the regular garrison was periodically obliged to scour the country and plunder for their subsistence; and as Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians, who with the utmost diligence prosecuted the war, in person directed all the operations, the Athenians were sorely pressed: for they were debarred the whole produce of their own lands; more than twenty thousand of their slaves had deserted to the enemy, and a large part of these were mechanics of the city; their whole stock of sheep and laboring cattle was lost beyond recovery; their horses,—as the horsemen were obliged every day to mount, either to ride towards Decelea, to awe the excursions of that garrison, or to guard some important posts in the country,—their horses were either lamed by running incessantly over hard or rugged ground, or by wounds were disabled for service; the constant supplies of provisions for the city, which used to be fetched from Eubœa to Oropus, and to be brought in from thence through Decelea, as the shortest passage, were now forced to go round the cape of Sunium by sea, which considerably enhanced their price. For want also of all foreign commodities, the city was equally distressed; and Athens was now reduced to be merely a place of arms. To keep a guard on the battlements by day, the citizens were obliged successively to relieve one another; but the whole body of the city, except the horsemen, mounted guard by night. The latter ever under arms without, the rest on the constant guard of the city

walls, and this for a summer and winter without any intermission, were reduced to a very low condition. But the point which pressed hardest on them was, having two wars at once on their hands; and yet their obstinacy rose to so high a pitch, as, had it not been visible to all the world, the bare mention of its possibility would have been quite incredible: for who would have believed that this people, so closely blocked up at home by the Peloponnesians, should scorn to give up Sicily? nay, should persevere, with unabating zeal, to carry on the siege of Syracuse, a city in no respect inferior even to Athens itself? that they should exhibit such an astonishing proof of their strength and their courage to the eyes of Greece; where, on the first breaking out of the war, some people had imagined that, in case the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, they could not hold out above one year intire, though others had allowed them two, and others three, but nobody a longer space; and that, in the seventeenth year after the first invasion of this kind, they should attempt the conquest of Sicily; and, when deeply gashed in every part, by one war already on their hands, should wilfully plunge into another, as formidable in all respects as that waged against them from Peloponnesus? But now, when, besides what they had suffered already, they were terribly annoyed from Decelea, and other incidents had exacted from them very large disbursements, their finances were reduced to a very low ebb. At this period, therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of the value of all commodities imported and exported, which they thought would replenish their coffers faster than the former method: for their disbursements were not as they had been in preceding times, but had been exaggerated in the same proportion as the scenes of

war had been enlarged, whilst their annual revenue was constantly decreasing.

Unwilling, therefore, in the present ebb of their treasures, to defray the charge of this body of Thracians, who came too late for Demosthenes, they sent them back to their own country with all possible haste. Diütrephes was the person pitched on to conduct them home; and was instructed, that 'in the passage (for they were to go through the Euripus) he should employ them, if opportunity offered, against the enemy.' He landed therefore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner carried off a booty from thence. About the close of evening he also crossed the Euripus from Chalcis of Eubœa; and, having landed his Thracians in Boeotia, led them against Mycalessus. His design was not discovered that night, though he halted at the temple of Mercury, which is distant from Mycalessus but sixteen stadia¹ at most. But early the next morning he assaulted this city, which is of large extent: he carried it on the first attack, as there was no guard to resist him; and the inhabitants could never have imagined that a maritime body would have marched so far into the country to make attempts on them. The wall, besides, was weak; in some places it was fallen, and the remaining part of it was low; and the gates, from too great a confidence of security, had been left open. No sooner had the Thracians broken into Mycalessus than they gutted both houses and temples: they massacred the inhabitants, showing no regard to either old age or youth, but venting their fury on all that came in their way: they butchered even the women and the children; nay, all the laboring cattle, and every creature that had life which came before their

¹ More than a mile and a half.

eyes : for the Thracians, when once their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood as any other the greatest savages in the barbarian world. On this occasion the confusion was terrible, and every ghastly method of destruction was exemplified in act : they even fell on the public school, which was a very large one, when the youth of the town were just got in, and hacked all the children to pieces. And thus the whole city was involved in a calamity, a greater than which no city had ever felt ; nay, a calamity unexpected and dreadful indeed !

The Thebans had no sooner intelligence of it than they marched to their assistance ; but came not up with the Thracians till they were retired to some distance from the town, where they recovered from them their booty ; and, having put them to flight, continued the chase down to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels which had brought them lay at anchor. Here they made a slaughter of most of those who endeavored to get on board but could not swim ; since the persons left in the vessels, when they saw what passed on the shore, put them off beyond their reach. But in the other parts of the retreat the Thracians behaved with some gallantry against the Theban horse, which attacked them first ; since, sallying frequently out on the pursuers, and rallying again after the discipline of their country, they made good their retreat : and thus few of this body were destroyed. A number, farther, who stayed behind in the city to plunder, were found there and put to the sword. The whole number of the slain, amongst this body of thirteen hundred Thracians, amounted to two hundred and fifty men ; though, in return, they killed, of Thebans, and others who accompanied by way of aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes,

one of the rulers of Boeotia: the lives of some more Mycalessians were also lost in their company. Such was the calamity which fell to the unhappy lot of Mycalessus; and which, for excess of horror, is more to be deplored than any other of the tragical events of this war.

Demosthenes, who, after marking out the fortification, had stood away from Laconia to Corcyra, surprised a transport vessel, which rode at anchor in the road of Phia, of the Eleans, on board of which a number of heavy-armed Corinthians were to pass over into Sicily, and sunk it: but the mariners, having saved themselves by flight, found afterwards another vessel, and proceeded in the voyage.

From hence Demosthenes came up to Zacynthus and Cephallene, where he took their heavy-armed on board, and sent for those of the Messenians from Naupactus. He also crossed over to the opposite continent of Acarnania, to Alyzia and Anactorium, both belonging to the Athenians. Thus employed as he was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent in the winter to carry a supply of money for the army, met him; and, amongst other intelligence, related, that 'he had heard, since he was on his return, that Plemmyrium had been taken by the Syracusans.' Conon also, who commanded at Naupactus, came to them with advice, that 'the five-and-twenty sail of Corinthians which lay over-against their squadron had not quitted that station, and even threatened them with an engagement.' He exhorted, therefore, these commanders to detach some vessels thither; since their squadron at Naupactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, was not a match for the enemy, whose squadron amounted to twenty-five. On this, Demosthenes and Eurymedon detached

ten of the prime sailors, amongst those under their own command, to follow Conon for the reinforcement of the squadron at Naupactus.

The two former continued to assemble forces for the grand expedition. Eurymedon, for this purpose, sailed to Corcyra; commanded them to man out fifteen ships, and selected himself the heavy-armed for the service: for, as he was returned from carrying the stores, he joined himself with Demosthenes in the command, in pursuance of the prior nomination. Demosthenes was collecting a body of slingers and darters from the towns of Acarnania.

The ambassadors from Syracuse, who were sent round to the Sicilian cities after the surprisal of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their negotiations; and, having assembled a large body of succors, were intent on bringing them up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelligence of their motion, sent to such of the Siculi as lay on their route and were in his alliance, namely, the Centoripes and Alycæans and others, ‘by no means to yield a free passage to the enemy, but to assemble in a body and obstruct their march.’ It was impossible for them to reach Syracuse by any other route; for the Agrigentines had refused them a passage through their territories. Now, therefore, the Sicilians being on their march, the Siculi, in compliance with the request of the Athenians, had placed three different ambuscades in their way. From these rushing suddenly on them, as they were advancing in a careless manner, they destroyed about eight hundred men, and all the ambassadors, excepting one Corinthian; and this Corinthian brought up afterwards to Syracuse all those who escaped by flight, the number of whom amounted to fifteen hundred.

About the same time the Camarineans also sent up

a body of succors, consisting of five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, and three hundred archers. The Geloans also sent them a squadron of about five sail, besides four hundred darters and two hundred horsemen.

Now almost all Sicily except the Agrigentines (for these still adhered to their neutrality), all the rest of the island, I say, who hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, united themselves against the Athenians in behalf of Syracuse : though the Syracusans, after the blow they had just received from the Siculi, thought it not proper to attack the Athenians again on a sudden.

But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having now completed their embarkations at Corcyra and on the continent, at the head of this united and powerful armament crossed over the Iopian to cape Iapygia ; and, standing away from thence, reached the Chœrades, islands of Iapygia. Here they took on board their fleet a party of Iapygian darters to the number of fifty, and one hundred more of the Messapian nation ; and, after they had renewed a friendship of ancient date with Artas (who, being lord of these islands, supplied them with the darters), they proceeded to Metapontium in Italy. On the plea of an alliance subsisting between them, they prevailed on the Metapontians to furnish them out three hundred more, and two triremes, with which augmentation they stood along the coast of Thuria ; where, on their arrival, they found that the party who had acted against the Athenian interest had in a late sedition been driven out of the city. Desirous here to take a view of the whole armament, and to know whether any part had straggled and was left behind ; hoping, farther, to prevail on the Thurians to join them with their forces in the most

cordial manner; and, since their welfare was connected with that of Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the Athenians to be equally their own, they stayed some time at Tharia, and completed their designs.

To return to the Peloponnesians. About the same portion of time, their squadron of five-and-twenty sail, which, to favor the passage of the transports to Sicily, lay ranged in opposition to the fleet at Naupactus, having now made all things ready for an engagement, and equipped out some additional vessels, which had almost equalised their number to that of the Athenian ships, took their station at Rhypica, near Erineus of Achaia. As the place in which they rode was bent in the form of a crescent, the land-force of the Corinthians and adjacent confederates, who marched to their assistance, was posted on each wing of the squadron, on the jutting necks of land, whilst the ships drawn up close together composed the centre of their arrangement; and Polyanthes, the Corinthian, commanded the fleet.

The Athenians, with three-and-thirty sail, under the command of Diphilus, weighed from Naupactus, and stood in against them. At first, the Corinthians lay still without motion; but, so soon as it was judged necessary for them to act, and the signal-flag was accordingly hoisted, they advanced to charge the Athenians, and an engagement ensued. The contention was maintained a long time on both sides. Three of the Corinthian vessels were destroyed, whilst not a single ship on the Athenian side was sunk, though seven were disabled for service by blows they had received from the enemy's beaks, by which their fore-tasties had been shattered by the Corinthian ships, made firm and compact for this very purpose by stays

on each side of the beak. The event of the engagement remaining doubtful, from whence both sides took occasion to claim the victory; the Athenians however being masters of all the wreck of the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove right into the sea, and which the Athenians made no efforts to recover, they dropped away from each other. Yet no kind of pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners were taken by either; for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, who fought close under the shore, were by that enabled to make an easy escape; but on the Athenian side not even a single ship was sunk: and yet, when the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy, as if the victory was their own, because they had disabled a larger number of the enemy. They farther looked on themselves as not defeated, because their enemies were not clearly victorious; for it is the way with the Corinthians to pronounce themselves victors if they are not sadly beaten; whereas the Athenians esteem themselves defeated if they have not made a signal conquest. But farther, when the Peloponnesians had retired from their station, and the land army was dismissed, the Athenians erected a trophy. The spot they chose whereon to place this token of their victory was distant about twenty stadia¹ from Erineus, the station in which the Corinthians rode. Such was the event of this naval engagement,

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, as soon as the Thurians had got in readiness seven hundred heavy-armed, with three hundred darters to attend them in the expedition, ordered the fleet to coast along the shore towards the Crotoniatis; whilst themselves, after having taken a review of all their land army on the banks

¹ About two miles.

of the Sybaris, marched them over land through the Thuriatæ. But, when they were advanced to the river Hylias, they were met by a message from the Crotoneans, intimating to them, that their consent should never be given for the passage of this army through their dominions; on which they wheeled off downwards towards the sea and the mouth of the Hylias, where they halted a night, and were joined by the whole body of the fleet.

The next morning they re-embarked and proceeded along the coast, touching at every city except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in the district of Rhegium.

But, during this interval, the Syracusans, who had received advice of the approach of the reinforcement, determined to make another attempt with their fleet and the whole augmented body of their land army, which they had assembled together for this very design of attacking the Athenians again before the reinforcement arrived. But, like men who in the former action had clearly perceived what would give them advantages over the enemy, they had made some alteration in the structure of their vessels. Having shortened the heads of their ships, they made them more firm and compact, and fastened very substantial stays to each side of the beak; they strengthened these again by rafters of six cubits in length, which were laid along the ribs both within and without, in the same manner as the Corinthians had strengthened the whole prow of their ships for the last naval engagement against the squadron at Naupactus. By these means the Syracusans concluded they should gain an advantage over the ships of the Athenians, which were of a different structure, as in the prow they were but weak, because of their usual practice, in an engagement, not to charge ahead, but by tacking

about to strike on the sides ; that, farther, should the battle be fought in the great harbor, where sea room would be small and the ships be crowded, this must also be an advantage in their favor ; since, darting themselves ahead, they must needs shatter the prows of the enemy, when with compact and solid beaks they struck against such as were hollow and weak : that again, for want of sea room, the Athenians would be too much straitened to make their tacks, or to run through their lines, which were points of art on which they chiefly relied ; they were determined to the utmost of their power to check all attempts of the latter sort, and the narrow space in which they must engage would of itself prevent the former ; and now they intended with dexterity to turn to their own advantage the method of striking ahead, which on the former occasion appeared to be an error in the masters ; that hence infallibly the day must be their own ; for the Athenians, if once repulsed, would not have room to go round and return to the charge, since thus they must directly be forced on the shore, which lay but a small distance from their camp, and would sadly cramp them up ; that they themselves must be masters of the rest of the harbor, whilst the enemy, crowded together, in case they should be forced to give way, must be driven into narrow compass, and even falling foul on one another, a total confusion and disorder must certainly follow : for, what hurt the Athenians most, in all their naval engagements, was their inability to make use of the whole harbor for tacking about or returning to the charge, in the same manner as the Syracusans ; that, finally, the Athenians could not possibly get out into wider sea, as the entrance of the harbor and the space behind the lines of battle were in their own command ; may, other obstacles

would co-operate, such as Plommyrium, which would now oppose any attempt of this kind, and the very nature of the harbor's mouth, which was exceeding narrow.

By such a project the Syracusans had given an increase to their former skill and strength; and, animated more than ever by the thought of having improved from their errors in the former engagement, they sallied out to encounter the enemy both with their land and naval force. Gylippus showed himself a small portion of time before the rest at the head of the infantry; whom, sallying out of the city, he drew up near the Athenian intrenchment, in that quarter where it faced the city. Then the garrison of Olympisœum, to a man, as well heavy-armed as horsemen, with all the light-armed parties of the Syracusans, came and drew up on the other quarters; and, immediately after, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies came sailing forwards.

The Athenians at first imagined that at present they were threatened only with an assault by land; but when, on a sudden, they saw the fleet bearing down against them, they were struck with confusion. Some of them were taking post on and without the intrenchments, to make head against the assailants; others had sallied forth to encounter the troops from Olympisœum, and those from remoter parts coming on with full speed, a numerous body of horsemen and darters. The rest were hurrying on board to man the ships, or to give what assistance they could on the beach: no sooner were the proper complements on board than seventy-five ships stood out to meet the enemy; but then the number of the enemy's vessels was about eighty.

Great part of this day was spent in advancing towards, and retiring from one another, and in reciprocal endeavors to seize advantages; but neither side was able to execute any remarkable piece of service, excepting that the Syracusans sunk one or two of the Athenian ships; on which they parted, and at the same time the land army drew off from the intrenchments.

The day following the Syracusans lay quiet, affording the enemy no room to guess at their future designs.

But Nicias, conscious to himself that hitherto no advantages had been gained by sea, and fully expecting that the enemy would repeat their attempt, obliged the captains of the triremes to repair their ships if any were damaged, and stationed the transports before the piles which they had driven down in the sea, to secure the ships, and lock up as it were that space in which they lay. The transports he ranged in a line, at the distance of the breadth of two plethra¹ from one another; that, in case a ship was repulsed, it might run in hither as a place of security, and might again stand out without any molestation. In perfecting these dispositions the Athenians were all this day employed from morning till night.

The next day, the Syracusans, earlier in the morning than before, and with the same parade of their land and naval force, came out to attack the Athenians. Now again, facing each other in the lines of engagement, they spent great part of the day in the same endeavors as before to overreach and surprise one another.

¹ A plethron is said by some to contain 1444, by others, 1000 square feet.

ther; till at length Aristo, the son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, and the most expert seaman in the fleet of Syracuse, persuaded the commanders of that fleet to despatch their orders to the magistrates within the city, ‘with all expedition to bring the provisions which were for sale down to the beach of the sea, and hold the market there; nay, farther, to compel all those who had any meat to sell to offer it instantly on the beach, that the mariners might come ashore and dine under the sides of their vessels; so that, after a short repast, they might this same day unexpectedly fall on the Athenians.’ This counsel being approved, the necessary orders were despatched away, and the market was furnished out. Then suddenly the Syracusean fleet fell back, and stood away towards the city; where, disembarking with all possible haste, they took their repast.

But the Athenians, who ascribed this dropping off of the enemy to a consciousness of their own inferiority, quitting their own ships as if there was nothing farther to be done, diverted their attention to their own affairs, and especially to prepare a refreshing meal for themselves, confident there would be no engagement on this day: but, on a sudden, the Syracuseans, repairing on board, stood out a second time to give them battle. Then the Athenians, in much hurry and confusion, and most of them still fasting, re-embarking without any regularity or order, with great difficulty, after a considerable interval, stood out to receive them. For a certain space, each side stood on their guard, and declined the charge. At length it occurred to the Athenians that it was imprudent to dally so long, and exhaust their spirits by the mere labor of the oar, which ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious attack. On which, animating one another with a

shout, they darted on the enemy, and the engagement began.

The Syracusans received the shock without giving way, and, keeping the heads of their vessels right against the enemy, executed their project, and with their strengthened beaks shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships; whilst their darters, who were ranged along the decks, galled the Athenians sorely with their missile weapons: though not near so much as did the crews of some light Syracusan boats, which scoured about the enemy's fleet; sometimes getting under their wards and gliding along the sides of their vessels, and from these close positions aiming their darts at the mariners. In fine, the Syracusans, persevering in this manner to gall their foes, were masters of the day; whilst the Athenians being put to flight, were obliged to retire, through the intervals of the line of transports, into their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued as far as to this line of transports; but were obliged to stop there, for fear of the machines¹ which hung on the yards of the transports to harall approach. Two ships, indeed, of the Syracusans, elevated with success, approached too near, and were sunk; and another, with all her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now the Syracusans, who in the action had sunk seven ships of the enemy, had damaged many, had taken many prisoners, and made great slaughter, judged it proper to retire. Then they erected trophies as victorious in two engagements, and plumed themselves in the assurance, that by sea they had the superiority over the enemy; presuming, at

¹ Called dolphins, from their form. They were masses, made of lead, and hung on the sail-yards by cords and pulleys; and when thrown into the enemy's ships either burst or sunk them.

the same time, that they must soon be victorious also by land: on which they got every thing in readiness to attack them once more on both elements.

But at this crisis Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived at the head of the reinforcement from Athens; which consisted of seventy-three sail of ships, including foreigners; of about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and their confederate troops; besides a considerable number of darters, as well barbarian as Grecian, and slingers, and archers, and a complete supply of military stores. The first appearance of this grand reinforcement struck the Syracusans and their allies with no small consternation. It looked as if the war must be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers that knew no bounds. They saw that in spite of the annoyance which Decelea, now fortified, gave them, the Athenians had arrived before Syracuse with another armament as great and as formidable as the former; and that, in every view, the strength of Athens must be quite insurmountable. And now also the Athenians, who remained of the former armament, respired from that dejection of spirit into which a series of misfortunes had plunged them.

Demosthenes, after taking a view of the present posture of affairs, thought it absolutely necessary to avoid delays, and keep clear of those errors which had done so much prejudice to Nicias: for Nicias, at his first appearance, struck an universal consternation; and yet, by declining the immediate attack of Syracuse; and loitering a whole winter away at Catana, he became an object of contempt, and Gylippus had time to land a succor from Peloponnesus, which disconcerted all his measures. That succor however the Syracusans could never have sent for had Nicias assaulted them on his first approach; for, deluding them,

selves with the thought that they were a match for their foes, they would have found, by sad experience, that they had indulged a cruel mistake, and must the same moment have been invested on all sides: and, in such a state, though they had invited those succours, yet no effectual relief could have been obtained from them.

Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on these past mistakes, and sensible that he himself, this very moment, on the first day of his arrival, appeared most terrible in the eyes of the enemy, resolved without loss of time to increase the present consternation which his reinforcement had struck amongst them. He farther took notice, that the counter-work of the Syracusans, by which the Athenians had been excluded from perfecting their circumvallation, consisted only of a single wall: and in case the heights of Epipolæ could again be regained, with the camp, which at first had been occupied there, that work might easily be carried, since the defendants could not now be able to withstand the Athenian strength; he determined therefore to put this project in execution; judging that, in case it succeeded, it would be a means of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion: for, if the scheme took place, the surrender of Syracuse must soon follow; at worst, he would draw off the army, and not waste the lives of those Athenians who were employed in this service, and the strength of the whole state, to no manner of purpose.

Now, therefore, the Athenians began to act offensively; and, in the first place, sallying out from their camp, they ravaged the country along the banks of the Anapus, and were now again, as on the first approach, masters without control both by land and sea; for in neither element durst the Syracusans any longer

come out to check their motions, abating what small resistance was made by the cavalry and darters from Olympieum.

In the next place, Demosthenes thought proper to try what could be done against the works of the enemy by the help of machines. But when, on applying them, those machines were fired by the Syracusans, who from the top of their works made a gallant defence; and, though the army attacked in several quarters at once, they were every where repulsed; he determined to waste no longer time on the trial: but having prevailed with Nicias and his other colleagues in command to assent to the scheme he had formed to recover Epipolæ, he proceeded to put it in execution. Yet, by daylight, it was judged impossible for them either to march or to mount the ascent without being discovered. On this, having issued out his orders, that every man should take with him subsistence for five days, and that all the masons and carpenters should attend the march, with proper store of missive weapons, and all needful materials for raising new works in case the attempt was successful, he put himself, about the first sleep, at the head of the whole army, and assisted by Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards Epipolæ. But Nicias was left behind in the intrenchments.

When now they were advanced to the pass of Eryalus, by which the first army gained formerly the ascent, they were yet undiscovered by the Syracusan guards; and, mounting the heights, surprised the fort which was there manned by the Syracusans, and slaughtered some of the defendants. But the majority flying amain towards the camps, of which there were three among the advyanced intrenchments of Epipolæ (one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians, and a

third of the confederates), they spread the alarm, and also notified the enemy's approach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at first were selected for the guard of this quarter of Epipole. These sallied out instantly to stop their progress; and Demosthenes, with his Athenians, falling in with them, put them to flight, after they had made a gallant stand. On this success, they immediately pushed forwards, that they might improve the present ardor of the soldiers to the immediate completion of those points for which they had made this bold attempt. Another party, which had been advancing all along without a check, surprised the counter-work of the Syracusans; of which, since abandoned by its defendants, they were throwing down the battlements.

But now the Syracusans, and their confederates, and Gylippus with the body under his command, marched out of their intrenchments; yet, having been attacked in so daring a manner amidst the darkness of the night, they had not recovered their surprise when they fell in with the Athenians; and thus, not able to stand the first shock, they were obliged to give way for a time; but, as the Athenians pushed forward with great irregularity, as if the victory was quite their own; eager, farther, to make themselves masters of all the track not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear lest, should they slacken in their ardor, the enemy might have time to rally into a body, the Boeotians first put a stop to their career; and rushing boldly among them, routed and put them to flight. By this turn the Athenians were thrown into such disorder and confusion, that the particulars which followed cannot easily be gathered, neither from themselves nor their antagonists; for, even in daylight, when objects are clearest to the sight, men present

in a battle are not able to see all that passes; each single combatant can barely relate what happened about his own person. When, therefore, armies engage amidst the darkness of the night (though this is the only instance of it between powerful armies in the present war), how is it possible to come at the knowledge of the several incidents? The moon indeed shone at this time; but then they only saw one another as objects appear by moon-light, so as to discern the appearance of human bodies, but not to distinguish between friends and enemies. The heavy-armed, farther, numerous on both sides, were too much crowded for want of room. One party of the Athenians was already clearly defeated; another, unbroken by the first attack on them, was pushing forward. Of the remainder of their army, a great part had already mounted the ascent; yet some were still busied in mounting up; but none of these, when they had got on the eminence, knew which way to advance; for before them, as the rout was begun, there was one grand medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud that no sounds could be distinctly heard. The Syracusans and their confederates were animating one another with loud exultations, (for the season of the night made all signals useless,) to complete the blow, and were clearing before them all that came in their way: but the Athenians were prying about for one another, and regarded every thing they met, even though they fell in with their own friends, as the flight was now begun, for an assured enemy. Obliged, farther, by frequent iterations to demand the word, as the only method to distinguish one another, all calling out aloud for it at the same instant of time, they heightened the general distraction, and clearly discovered their own word to the enemy. But then they

had not equal opportunities to discover that of the enemy; because, as the latter were now the victors, and kept more in bodies, it was less liable to detection. Hence it came to pass that, though a stronger party of the Athenians fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet they judged it best to fly; because they were sensible that their own word was divulged; and, as they could not return the word of the Syracusans, they must unavoidably be cut to pieces. But what had the greatest effect, and did most hurt to the Athenians, was the singing the pæan; since that used on both sides, being nearly the same, raised the utmost confusion: and, when the Argives and Corcyreans, and all others of Doric descent, who were with the Athenians, began from time to time their pæan, it struck the same alarm into the Athenians as when the enemy themselves sang it; so that, in short, falling in amongst one another in different quarters of the army, when once the confusion had risen to a height, friends against friends, and citizens against fellow-citizens, they not only impressed a reciprocal terror, but proceeded to blows with so much fury that they could not easily be parted. The pursuit was briskly followed; in which many of them, plunging headlong down the precipices, were dashed in pieces, because the pass downwards from Epipolæ was too narrow for their numbers. But of those who from the heights got down into the plain, many, and all in general who came in the first armament, since better experienced in the country, escaped in safety to the camp; whereas of the last comers, some, straggling into bye-ways, were bewildered in a country to which they were utter strangers, and at break of day were cut to pieces by the Syracusan horse, who scoured the plains.

On the day following the Syracusans erected two

trophies on Epipolæ; one on the summit of the pass, and the other where the Boeotians first stopped the enemy's progress. The Athenians also obtained a truce, to fetch off their dead; the number of which was large,¹ both in their own troops and those of their allies; and yet more arms were taken by the enemy than bore proportion to the slain: for, of the number of light-armed who were pushed to the brink of the precipices, and, throwing away their shields, were obliged to leap down, though some perished by the fall, yet others escaped with life.

But, after this, the Syracusans, highly animated again with this fresh unexpected turn in their favor, sent out Sicanus, at the head of fifteen sail, to Agrigentum, now embroiled in a sedition, with orders to exert the utmost of his power to reduce it to their obedience. Gylippus also made once more the tour of Sicily, to levy another army; confident that, with such a reinforcement, he could carry the very intrenchments of the enemy by storm, since affairs had taken such a favorable turn on Epipolæ.

In the mean time the Athenian generals were employed in the needful consultations since the last misfortune and the present universal dejection of their troops. They saw that all their attempts were blasted by ill success, and that the soldiers were chagrined at the continuance of so fruitless a service; for a sickness spread amongst their people from a double cause; from the present season of the year, in which the human body is most subject to disorders, and the marshy unwholesome ground on which they were encamped; be-

¹ Plutarch puts it at two thousand; but Diodorus Siculus says it was two thousand five hundred.

sides that, in every respect, their situation appeared desperate and quite beyond the power of redress.

The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore totally repugnant to a longer continuance before Syracuse. He urged 'the immediate execution of the scheme he had formed before he made the late dangerous attempt on Epipole; which, since it had miscarried, they should no longer protract their departure, whilst yet the season of the year was proper for their voyage homewards, and they had strength enough in the last reinforcement to force their passage in spite of the enemy.' He affirmed, 'it would be more conducive to the public welfare to turn their arms against those who were erecting fortifications within Attica itself than against the Syracusans, whose reduction now was almost impracticable; and that it was madness to persist any longer in a siege which dissipated the wealth of the state in fruitless vain expenses.' In this manner Demosthenes declared his sentiments.

As for Nicias, though convinced within himself that their affairs were in a bad situation, yet he was unwilling with his own mouth to confess their low condition, or that a departure should be fixed by the general votes of a public council, where all that passed must be reported to the enemy; because, should the determination be formed in this manner, the execution could not go forward without the enemy's privity. Besides, as he knew the state of the enemy somewhat more perfectly than others, he imagined there were grounds to hope that the state of the latter would soon become worse than their own, would they only continue to press the siege. A want of supplies must soon reduce them to great straits; and this the sooner, as by the accession of the last squadron, themselves were

now again masters of the sea: and, what is more, in Syracuse itself there was a party which wished to see the city fall into their hands. These had despatched their agents to Nicias, and insisted he should not quit the siege. Yet, thus enlightened as he was, in reality he knew not how to act, as his mind was balanced between two measures, which equally required mature deliberation: but, for the present, he openly declared himself in council against drawing off the army. He told them, ‘he was perfectly well assured that the Athenians would never forgive him, should he carry their troops from Sicily without peremptory orders: that the affair would not then lie under the cognisance of such as here advised it, and with their own eyes were convinced of the necessity of such a step, but of men who would form their judgments on the spiteful calumnias of others, and the influence some malicious demagogues would have over their understandings, by which their fate would be determined.’ He farther represented, that ‘many, nay, the greater part of the soldiers, who now formed the troops, and make such tragical outcries about the perils that environ them at present, would change their notes so soon as they were landed again at Athens, and ascribe their return to the treachery and corruption of their commanders.’ For such reasons, he declared, ‘as he was well acquainted with Athenian tempers, he would choose, rather than be undone at Athens by base criminations and an unjust sentence, to hazard the last extremity, and perish, if so it must be, under the violence of the enemy.’ He maintained, however, ‘that the state of the Syracusans was worse than their own. The demand on them for the pay of foreigners was large; their expenses in securing the outworks of Syracuse were high: they had now supported a large

navy for the space of an intire year ; want therefore must soon come on them, and they must shortly be totally distressed ; because the sum of two thousand talents¹ they had already expended of their own stock, and had even contracted a large debt besides : and, in case they abate of their present punctuality, or making good the appointments of the forces they have on foot, their strength must moulder away ; since it consisted, not like the Athenians, of troops which must serve, but of such as were only discretionary aids.' He concluded with 'the necessity they lay under, from the ties of duty, to continue the siege with vigor, and by no means expose a superior strength to ruin, through a false presumption that they were inferior in point of supplies.'

Nicias expressed himself on this occasion with an air of neat confidence, as a person perfectly well acquainted with the state of Syracuse and the failure of money there, and because there was a party within the city which acted in favor of the Athenians, and had advised him, by their agents, by no means to raise the siege. And, what is more, he placed a stronger dependence now on the fleet than ever he had before the late unsuccessful engagement.

As to the proposal of continuing the siege, Demosthenes would not yield the least degree of attention to it: 'If the army must not evacuate Sicily without a peremptory order from Athens, but must persist in this destructive service, he judged it would be better to draw them off to Thapsus or to Catana, where they might find opportunity enough to make incursions with the land army on the territories of the enemy, and by committing devastations, might highly distress them.

¹ 387,500*l.* sterling.

Their fleet might then engage in the open sea, not in a space confined and straitened, which was the greatest advantage to the enemy, but in sufficient sea room, where all their superior skill might fairly be exerted; where they would be able to make their tacks, and bear down again on the foe with greater agility, and more violent shocks, than could be done in the limitary space of a close pent-up harbor. On the whole, he affirmed, that his consent should never be given to a longer continuance in their present posts; but he was for moving off with all possible expedition, and they had not a moment to lavish on delay.'

Eurymedon then declared that his sense of things coincided with that of Demosthenes; and, Nicias persisting in the contrary opinion, a fit of languor and suspense ensued, attended with the secret imagination that the positiveness of Nicias resulted from some stronger hopes of success he had conceived above his colleagues. And in this manner the Athenians fell into dilatory measures, and continued in their camp before Syracuse.

But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse: Sicanus truly disappointed of Agrigentum, for he was advanced no farther than Gela when the sedition in favor of the Syracusans was brought to an amicable period; but then Gylippus was returned at the head of a numerous body, consisting of levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-armed troops from Peloponnesus, who in the spring had put to sea on board the transport, but came over last from Africa to Selinus; for into Africa they had been driven by contrary winds; and, having there been furnished by the Cyreneans with two triremes and a set of pilots, as they coasted along the African shore, they relieved the Evesperitæ, then blocked up by the Libyans. The

latter they defeated in a set battle ; and, proceeding from thence along the shore, they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to Sicily, being only a passage of two days and a night. Hence therefore they stood across, and landed at Selinus.

With this accession of strength, the Syracusans instantly prepared to attack the Athenians again both by land and sea. But the Athenian generals, finding they had received so large an augmentation, and that the posture of their own affairs was so far from being changed for the better, that day after day it grew worse in every respect ; and, what was worst of all, that their troops were quite exhausted with fatigue and sickness, they repented now in earnest that they had not drawn off in time ; and, as Nicias now no longer opposed that step with the same vehemence as he had done before, but merely endeavored that it should not be determined in public council, they issued out orders, with the utmost secrecy, that the whole armament should hold themselves in readiness to put to sea on a signal given : but, all things now ready, the very moment they were going to embark the moon was eclipsed ; for it was now the time of the full. The bulk of the army, struck with the awful appearance, called out on the generals to halt ; and Nicias, always addicted too much to superstition and such vulgar scruples, positively declared, ‘ that it should no more be debated whether they should remove or not, till the three times nine days were past, which the soothsayers prescribe on such occasions.’ So, for this reason, a longer stay was forced on the Athenians, who had been too dilatory already.¹

¹ That the bulk of an army or a fleet should be frightened at such appearances, is no wonder at all : they are ever igno-

The Syracusans, who had soon an intelligence of their designs, were now more animated than ever to

rant; and the most daring of them in other respects have been much addicted to superstition. But one cannot help being surprised at the ignorance and superstition of Nicias; one cannot help pitying and deplored the foible of a man who had so good a heart. Plutarch expatiates largely on this occasion. ‘Even the vulgar,’ says he, ‘at this time were well apprised that an eclipse of the sun was often occasioned, about the time of the change, by an interposition of the moon; but, as to the moon, by the interposition of what body, and how on a sudden, at the full, its light fades away or emits variety of color, was not easy for them to conceive. They thought it a strange occurrence, and sent from God as a prognostic of great calamities. The first person who wrote a clear and bold solution of the enlightening and obscuration of the moon, was Anaxagoras, who now had not been long dead; nor was his account in every body’s hands, but concealed, imparted only to a few, and that with caution and assurances of secrecy. The world could not bear that naturalists and meteormongers, as they were then styled, should seem to restrain the Divine power by quaint argumentations, invisible operations, and necessary consequences: for such attempts Protagoras was banished; and Pericles, with much ado, procured the release of Anaxagoras when thrown into prison. Nay, Socrates, who never meddled with any of these points, was however put to death on the charge of philosophising. It was not till late that the glory of Plato shone abroad; who, by his irreproachable life, and subjecting natural necessities to a divine and sovereign power, cleared away all bad imputations from studies of this kind, and by a mathematical beginning opened a field to other sciences. And thus his friend Dion, at what time he was setting sail from Zacynthus against Dionysius, was not at all disheartened by an eclipse of the moon, but landed safe at Syracuse, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfortune of Nicias, at this juncture, not to have even a skilful soothsayer with him; for his intimate, Stilbides, who had cured much of his superstition, had died a little before; since this portent, as Philochorus says, was not a bad one, but an excellent good one, for a flying army; since acts which are accompanied with fear stand in need of concealment, and light is ever an adversary to them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was the usual custom, as Autoclides has informed us, to hold only a three days’ cessation from business. But Nicias persuaded himself that a complete revolution of the moon ought to be

press briskly on the Athenians, as on men who had given proofs of their own inward conviction that they were no longer a match for their foes, either by sea or land; since with other thoughts they never could have projected a re-embarkation. Apprehensive, at the same time, that should they remove to any other quarter of Sicily, they would become more difficult of reduction, they saw the necessity of engaging them by sea without a moment's loss, whilst yet they had an advantage in compelling them to fight. On this they ordered the complements of men on board their ships, and exercised their crews as many days as was judged sufficient: but when opportunity offered of fighting to advantage, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian intrenchments; and a party of heavy-armed and horsemen, though not numerous, sallying out at some of the ports to beat them off, they cut off some of the heavy-armed from the rest of that party, and, having put them to flight, followed the pursuit. As the spot, farther, on which the assault was made, was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and a small number of their heavy-armed. Nothing more happened on this day, as the army of the Syracusans now made their retreat.

But on the day following they stood out with their fleet,¹ to the number of seventy-six ships; and, at the

waited for; as if with his own eyes he had not seen her shine bright again, when she had passed the shadow and the earth's interposition. Yet, throwing up all attention to other points, he minded nothing but sacrificing, till his enemies attacked him.' Life of Nicias.

¹ Plutarch adds, that 'on this occasion the very lads came out in fishing boats and skiffs, taunting and insulting the Athenians. One of these lads, Heraclides, of a noble family, who had advanced too near, was in great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel; but Pollichus, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for his safety, charged instantly with the ten

same time, the land army marched up to the intrenchments. The Athenians launched out, with fourscore and six, to give them a reception ; and thus charging one another, an engagement ensued. Eurymedon commanded the right wing of the Athenian fleet, and endeavored to overreach and surround the ships of the enemy. For this purpose he opened his line, and stood along too close to the land ; which gave the Syracusans and their allies, who had now defeated the centre of the Athenians, an opportunity to intercept him in the bottom and recess of the harbor, where they slew Eurymedon himself, and destroyed the ships which had separated in his company ; and, this done, they gave chase to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them ashore.

Gylippus, now perceiving that the ships of the enemy were defeated and driven aground quite wide of the piles and their camp, formed instantly a design to make slaughter of the men as they were leaping on shore, and of giving the Syracusans an opportunity easily to draw off all the ships from land, of which they were intire masters. At the head therefore of one division of the land force he marched down to the pier to second the fleet. The Tyrrhenes happened to have been posted nearest by the Athenians ; who, seeing a body of the enemy running down thither in a disorderly manner, advanced eagerly to meet them ; and charging briskly on the van, put them to flight, and drove them into the lake of Lysimelia : but, soon after, a reinforcement of Syracusans and their allies coming up, the Athenians also advanced with speed to succor their friends ; and, trembling for their ships, triremes he had under his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet, now alarmed for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brought on a general engagement.' Life of Nicias.

soon came to an engagement with them, and after routing, pursued them amain. They slaughtered now a great number of the heavy-armed ; and, what was more, preserved the far greater part of their fleet, and towed again to their former moorings all their ships, except eighteen, which the Syracusans and their allies made prizes, and put all the men on board them to the sword. With a view, farther, to destroy the rest by setting them on fire, they filled an old transport ship with fascines and combustible matter, and, as the wind blew right on the Athenians, set her on fire, and let her drive in amongst them. The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put all their engines instantly at work to extinguish the flames ; which, having at length effectuated, and kept this fire-ship clear of their own vessels, they were delivered from this imminent danger.

After this the Syracusans erected a trophy for their victorious engagement on the water, and for the interception of the party of the heavy-armed before the intrenchments, where they had taken so many horses. The Athenians also did the same, for the repulse given by the Tyrrhenes to the land forces of the enemy, and their being chased into the lake, and the larger success they afterwards obtained with the rest of their army.

But now, when, beyond the reach of doubt, the Syracusans, though at first alarmed at the large reinforcement of shipping brought against them by Demosthenes, had gained a signal victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged into a total dejection of spirit : they were thunderstruck by the reverse of misfortunes so little expected ; and began to repent, with much more bitterness of thought, that they had ever engaged in so fatal an expedition. They had invaded states whose policy was already of a piece with their own ; whose form of government was popular, like that of Athens ;

and which flourished in shipping, in horses, and each article of power: and yet, finding themselves unable to give any measure of success to their projects by introducing dissensions amongst them through political embroilments, nor even by a powerful force, superior to that of their foes, able to ward off the many blows they had received, they had fallen beforehand into great anxieties; and now, sadly beaten as they were at sea, one thought of which they never could hitherto have conceived, their despondency became more violent than ever.

From this time the Syracusans scoured the whole harbor, without having any thing to fear. They had also formed a scheme of barring up its mouth; that the Athenians, though ever so intent on it, might for the future not have it in their power to steal away. Their care and diligence were no longer employed on the view alone of their own preservation, but on the larger view of ruining the Athenians. They concluded, and justly too, that the latter turns in their favor had given them the ascendant over these invaders; and, could they but compass the total overthrow of this body of Athenians and their allies, the grand achievement would strike all Greece with admiration. Nay more, all other Grecians must reap the fruits of such success; of whom some would in an instant recover freedom, and others be delivered from the fear of losing it; for the remaining strength of Athens would never be able to stand against that weight of war with which she must be soon encompassed about. And thus, could they (Syracusans) be the glorious authors of such desirable events, they must infallibly become objects of wonder, not only to all the present age, but to latest posterity. And of a truth, considered in such a light, it was great and glorious ambition to aim at

the conquest, not only of the Athenians, but also of their whole extensive and combined alliance ; and this, not merely to earn laurels for themselves, but for the auxiliaries also who had engaged in their cause ; since, exposed in the front of the war with the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, they had objected their own state to the fury of a storm which threatened them all, and, by their own personal valor in naval engagements had contributed most to such a height of success.

The various people, now got together at this one city of Syracuse, were so very numerous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehensive roll of those who, in the series of the present war, sided either with the states of Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is subjoined of those who mustered in the offensive and defensive armies at Syracuse ; who fought against or in behalf of Sicily ; who joined for the reduction or preservation of this island, not so much from just and lawful motives, or a concurrence resulting from the ties of blood, as from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion.

The Athenians, truly, in quality of Ionians, had voluntarily come hither against the Syracusans, who were Dorians ; attended by those who spoke the same dialect and used the same institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, and Imbrians, and those Æginetæ who were the present possessors of Ægina. The Hestians, farther, now inhabiting Hestia, in Eubœa, as an Athenian colony, had joined in the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, some came along with them because they were dependents ; some, though independent, because they were confederates ; and some there were who attended merely for their pay. The dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, and Chalcideans, and Styrenians, and Carystians, from

Eubœa; from the islands, the Ceans, and Andrians, and Teians; from Ionia, the Milesians, and Samians, and Chians; of these the Chians, being not subjected to a tribute, but only to furnish a quota of shipping, though independent at home, yet followed their arms. And all these hitherto recited were Ionians and Athenian colonies, excepting the Carystians, for these last are Dryopes; but, as subjected to Athens, not so much from choice as Ionians, as by mere compulsion, they now followed their masters against Dorians. To these were added Æolians; the Methymneans, for instance, who were to furnish shipping, but were exempted from tribute; the Tenedians, farther, and Ænians, who were tributaries; but these, being Æolians, were now compelled to fight against other Æolians; namely, their own founders, the Boeotians, who adhered to the Syracusans. The Plateans did the same, and were the only Boeotians that acted against Boeotians on the justifiable pretext of lasting enmity. The Rhodians, farther, and Cytherians, attended, though both of Doric descent: the Cytherians, truly, who are a Lacedæmonian colony, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian side, against the Lacedæmonians, under the command of Gylippus; and the Rhodians, Argives by descent, were obliged to turn their arms against the Doric Syracusans; nay, against the Geloans, a colony of their own, now acting in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people of the isles on the coast of Peloponnesus came the Cephallenians and Zacynthians; independent, in fact, but through their situation controlled in some measure by the Athenians, who are masters of the sea. The Corcyreans, farther, who were not only of Doric, but, what is more, were even of Corinthian original, as being a colony of the latter, and by blood allied to the former, from compulsion, as

they gave out for a cofor, though in truth from deliberate malice, since opposing the Corinthians, whom they hated, they followed the Athenians with an ardor inferior to none. The Messenians, also, now styled Messenians of Naupactus, and those from Pylos, which was still held by the Athenians, were brought along to the war; to whom must be added a small party of Megarean exiles, who by a sad reverse of fortune now took part against the Selinuntians, who were also Megarean. The residue of the confederates were engaged rather on free and spontaneous choice. The Argives, for instance, not more from obligations of subsisting treaties than the rancor they bore the Lacedæmonians, and the gratification of private spleen, though Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians against their Doric kindred. But the Mantineans and the rest of the Arcadians, who are mercenaries, and eternally habituated to act against any foe pointed out to them, were now so far influenced by gain as to regard those Arcadians as their enemies who came over on this occasion in company with the Corinthians. The Cretans also and Ætolians were there, allured by an advantageous pay: and thus it happened that the Cretans, who, in concert with the Rhodians, had founded Gela, readily took part, for the sake of gain, not with, but against, a colony which themselves had planted. There was also a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly induced to join by the pay they received, but principally for their personal regard for Demosthenes and their attachment to the Athenians. And thus have we run them over to the utmost boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of the Italic nations, the Thurians, and those Metapontians whom intestine feuds had reduced to the necessity of fighting for subsistence, joined their arms; and, of the Sicilian, the Naxians and Cataneans; of barbarian,

the Egesteans, who were the first movers of this grand contention, and the major part of the Siculi; and, out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrhenes, from enmity to the Syracusans, and the mercenary Iapygians. So many nations were assembled together at present under command of the Athenians.

The auxiliaries, on the side of the Syracusans, were the Camarineans, who border close on them, and the Geloans, who are situated next the Camarineans. To proceed regularly: as the Agrigentines were neutral, the Selinuntians next occur, who are seated beyond the Agrigentines, since they inhabit that tract of the island which faces Africa. Then the Himereans, the only Grecian people who inhabit that part of the island which lies off the Tyrrhene sea, and were the only body which came from thence to the aid of Syracuse. The several nations of Greek descent settled in Sicily, being all Doric, and independent, acted together in concert. Of the barbarous people they had those Siculi alone who did not openly revolt to the Athenians; but, out of Sicily, the Lacedæmonians sent them a citizen of Sparta to command, and a body of neodamodes and helots. By a neodamas is meant a citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians alone aided them both with shipping and a land force, in conjunction with the Leucadians and Ambraciots, by blood allied to Syracuse. From Arcadia also came a body of mercenaries, sent by the Corinthians; and the Sicyonians, who acted on compulsion; and of those who dwell without the Peloponnesus, were the Bœotians. But, beside these foreign aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great and powerful cities, furnished out in all respects a much greater and well-appointed force: for by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, of ships, and horses, and other kinds of military force,

in an amazing abundance, were raised and brought to Syracuse: and yet it must be said that the domestic force of the Syracusans was more to be considered than all the rest, from the greatness of their state and the immediate urgency of those perils with which they were environed.

These were the aids, the numerous aids, assembled together by the contending parties; and at this juncture all these were present on each side of the contest; and from this crisis neither party received any accession.

The Syracusans therefore, and their confederates, thought, since the signal victory they had gained on the water, it would be a brave exploit, and highly for their glory, to make the whole extensive camp of the Athenians their prize, and cut off their retreat on both elements, both by land and sea. With this project they immediately barred up the great harbor, the mouth of which is about eight stadia¹ over, with a line of triremes placed side by side, and other vessels and boats moored fast together by anchors; and got every thing besides in readiness, in case the Athenians should venture on another engagement. Their every view was now become large and aspiring.

When the Athenians saw the harbor thus barred up, and perceived, farther, the whole of the enemy's designs, it was judged high time to go to consultation. The commanders of the different bodies were called to council, with the generals; in which, on representations made of the great distress to which they were reduced, and that they had not a stock of provisions ample enough for their immediate subsistence; for, bent on sailing away, they had sent already to Catana

¹ Nearly a mile.

to countermand any fresh convoys; and, unless they could recover their mastery at sea, it would be impracticable for the future to obtain a supply,' they came to a final resolution, 'to quit their intrenchments on the higher ground, and before the station of their shipping to raise a circular work, of as little compass as possible, but sufficient to serve for a magazine and hospital, and to this only to assign a guard: as for the rest of the land army, they were to oblige every soldier to go on board, that all the ships, which yet were undamaged, or had been laid up for want of hands, might be completely manned; and thus they must fight their passage out of the harbor; and, if it succeeded, make directly for Catana; but, if repulsed, they would burn their shipping, and, moving off in one body by land, would endeavor by the most expeditious marches to reach the nearest place that would receive them, whether barbarian or Grecian.'

Such was the plan resolved on, and which they began immediately to execute; for now, abandoning their upper intrenchments, they drew down to the beach, and manned the whole of their shipping, on board of which they forced, without exception, all such as had youth and vigor enough to be of service there. The whole number of ships they were by this means enabled to man amounted to a hundred and ten. They also placed on board the fleet a large number of archers, the darters of the Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries; and provided in all other respects for action, as well as their condition would permit or the nature of the project required.

When things were thus in great forwardness Nicias, taking notice that the soldiery were much dejected by the great defeats, which, contrary to their wonted custom, they had received by sea, and yet desirous to

hazard another engagement as soon as possible, because pinched for want of necessary subsistence, he gathered them all round about himself, and endeavored to raise their drooping spirits by the following exhortation, the first of the kind he had ever made :

‘ My fellow-soldiers, whether of the Athenian or confederate troops! the bold attempt we are now going to make is of equal concern to each individual amongst us; since, not more for victory over our foes than for the preservation of ourselves and our country, we are now to fight; and, if our naval efforts be crowned with victory, each of us may again be blessed with the sight of his own native city. Away therefore with these faces of despair, this painful dejection, fit only for a raw inexperienced multitude, who, unsuccessful in their first attempts, for ever after bid adieu to hope, and by unmanly fears anticipate misfortunes !

‘ As for you, Athenians, who form so considerable a part of this assembly, experienced as you are in such variety of warfare; and you also, our allies, who have ever fought under our banners; recall to your reflection the unexpected turns of war; encourage the hope that fortune may at length declare for us, and determine once more to engage the foe with a spirit worthy of that numerous strength of which, by ocular demonstration, you see yourselves this moment possessed. Those points, of which we may perceive we may avail ourselves against the narrowness of the harbor’s mouth against such a multitude of vessels as will be crowded together, and against that particular disposition of soldiers on their decks, from which on the former occasion we suffered so much; all these, I must tell you, are as well adjusted as our present con-

dition will permit, by the united care of us your generals and your own masters; for many archers and darters shall now line your decks, and that crowd of soldiers, which, when we engage in the open sea, we never can use, because the vessels would be too heavily laden to allow the proper exertion of our skill; that crowd, I say, in this pent-up contracted space, shall give to our naval battle the strength and stability of a land engagement. We have also devised the proper means to compensate the inferior structure of our ships, and, in return for the consolidated beaks of the enemy, have provided the ships with grappling-irons, which will hold fast a vessel that has run against you from getting clear, provided those on board will perform their duty; because, as necessity enforces us now to fight a mere land battle from our decks, it highly concerns us neither to be beaten off ourselves, nor to suffer them to get clear from our grapple; especially when all the ambient shore, excepting the small tract now occupied by our own army, is hostile in regard to us. Mindful of these things, it behoves you to fight it out so long as strength and vigor shall enable you, and never suffer yourselves to be driven on such a shore; but, when once your ship has grappled with a foe, never once to think of losing your hold, till you have cleared the enemy's decks of all the defendants. But these points I give in charge to the heavy-armed, not less than to the seamen; since this method of engagement is more particularly your province, and since it still remains within your power to earn a glorious victory, by putting your land method into practice. But the seamen I exhort, and with my exhortations mingle my intreaties, not to shrink too much under the sensibility of past defeats, as your decks are now better armed in all respects than

they were before, and as the number of the shipping is enlarged. Recall the idea of that heart-delighting privilege, of which you are now to secure the continuance : to you I speak, who, though not of Athenian extraction, have hitherto been regarded and honored as Athenians ; and, for speaking well our language, and appropriating our manners, have been admired through the whole extent of Greece, have participated the benefits of our largely extended empire, not less than ourselves in point of profit, and much more than ourselves in striking awe into your vassals, and being exempted from the attacks of injustice. Since, therefore, you alone have freely shared our empire with us, you are bound by all the ties of honor by no means to desert its present vindication. Then, in open despite of those Corinthians whom you have so often conquered, and of those Sicilians not one of whom durst look us in the face so long as the vigor of our fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes before you, and strike into them the plain conviction, that your military skill, though struggling with weakness and misfortunes, is yet far superior to all their strength and luck united.

‘ But, to the native citizens of Athens amongst you, I must once more suggest that you have now no longer in your docks such another fleet as this, nor have left behind you such another body of heavy-armed. If therefore your immediate fate be any thing less than victory, your enemies will sail and be directly at Athens ; and the remainder of our forces there will no longer be able to repulse the united assaults of their domestic foes and such foreign invaders. Nay, the infallible result must be, that you at once put on the chains of Syracusans, against whom you are conscious with what intentions you at first came here, whilst

your country must be forced to submit to a Lacedæmonian bondage. Now therefore summon all your courage, to earn the day in which your own liberty and that of Athens is to be the victor's prize ; and let each individual amongst you invigorate himself with the thought ; nay, let it throw life and spirit into the whole army, that those who are now to engage on board this present fleet are the whole of the land and naval force of your country ; are the surviving supports of the state, and the great name of Athens. In so momentous a conflict, whoever amongst you excels in military skill or inward bravery, that person had never so fine an opportunity to give demonstration of his superior worth, or to perform a great service for himself, or for the welfare of his country.'

Nicias, after he had finished this earnest exhortation, ordered them to repair directly to their posts on board the fleet.

As all this hurry of preparation lay within their view, Gylippus and the Syracusans could not escape the conviction that the Athenians were bent on another engagement. They had moreover received intelligence of the new project of the grapping-irons. As therefore they had provided against every thing besides, they also made provision to counterwork that project. For this purpose they had covered the prows and almost the whole gunwale of their ships with hides ; that, when the grapping-iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no hold. And no sooner were all their preparations completed than the Syracusan generals, in concert with Gylippus, animated their men to engage with resolution, by the following harangue :

' That your past achievements have been glorious indeed, and for the acquisition of greater honor and glory that you are now on the brink of engaging, the

generality of you, ye Syracusans and confederates, are well convinced, and need not at present to be informed; for otherwise you could never have persisted so far in this warm career of bravery and success: but, if there be a man amongst you whose sense of things drops short of their real position, we shall now throw on it the needful illustration.

‘ This land, our property, the Athenians have invaded; aiming in the first place at enslaving Sicily; and, had this design succeeded, at inflicting an equal fate on Peloponnesus, and the rest of Greece. And yet these very Athenians, who enjoy already the largest tract of empire that any ancient or modern state of Greece has at any time enjoyed, you are the first who have bravely resisted; and of that navy, on which they erected their encroaching pile of power, are plainly the victors in several engagements; as again, in that which now approaches, you will assuredly beat them: for men, who have received such severe checks in a point for which they so highly plumed themselves, will for the future have a much worse opinion of their own merit than if they had never conceived so high a value of it; and, when all their towering pretensions are so unexpectedly blasted, their subsequent efforts must of course drop short of their real strength: and this, you may rest assured, is the present state of yonder Athenians. And by parity, in regard to ourselves, that proportion of strength we enjoyed at first, with which, though far inferior in skill, we boldly and successfully presumed to withstand them, must now be suitably enlarged; and, with the farther accession of this inward assurance, that we are really the best, since we have beaten the best seamen in the world, our hopes of success are in every light redoubled; and then human experience teaches us that, in every com-

petition, the warmest hope is ever accompanied with the greatest resolution.

‘ But farther, those late alterations which they have introduced among their shipping, in order to equalise and balance ours, have been a long time familiar to our own practice ; and each of their new preparations we shall dexterously improve to our own advantage : for when, contrary to the long and inveterate discipline of their fleet, there are crowded together on their decks a numerous body of heavy-armed, as well as another numerous body of mere *terra firma* darters, as they may properly be styled ; when thus Acarnanians and other landmen are forced on board, who even sitting would be unable to poise and direct their weapons, how can they avoid endangering their vessels ? or, jumbled confusedly together, and tottering under motions to which they are not inured, how can they escape a total disorder ?

‘ What still makes more against them, the multitude of their shipping will only serve the more to embarrass them ; and let this dispel the fears of those who may be afraid of engaging against their superior numbers ; for a multitude of ships in a contracted space will be more slow in executing orders, and are at the same time most easily exposed to the annoyance which our preparations are contrived to give them. And now attend to the true and real situation of the foe, as from good intelligence we are enabled clearly to declare it to you.

‘ Environed on all sides with misfortunes, and distressed in a present want of the necessaries of life, they are become quite desperate : and hence, though they have resigned all confidence in their real strength, yet in the fury of despair they are throwing themselves on the decision of fortune ; that either, if the passage can be forced, they may launch out to sea ;

or, that project failing, may attempt a retreat by land ; as if to a worse condition than their present it were not in the power of fortune to reduce them. Warmed therefore with brave resentment, let us also try the encounter against such confusion, and against the fortune of our inveterate foes, now treacherously bent to finish their destruction. Let us charge with the full conviction, that on an enemy who would justify their invasion on the principle of redressing wrongs, it is most fair and equitable to satiate all the fury of revenge ; nay more, that vengeance on a foe is an appetite of our nature, and commonly said to be the sweetest of all human enjoyments. But that those men yonder are our foes, our most bitter unrelenting foes, you need no farther proofs ; since, bent on enslaving this our country, they first made the voyage ; and, had this their odious project been successful, on our citizens they had inflicted the most cruel torments, on our wives and children the most indecent enormities, and on Syracuse the most ignominious appellation. In a work of so just retaliation, to indulge a tenderness of mind, or to think it gain to let them depart without additional revenge, will be a matter of just reproach ; for the latter is all they will be able to effect, even though at length they may be victors : but to us, could we execute the fair and equitable wishes of our hearts, by inflicting on them the punishment they well deserve, and in setting the liberty of all Sicily, as it has been ever enjoyed by us, beyond the reach of any future insults, how glorious must such achievements be ! for such critical moments of adventure are most rarely to be met with ; which, if unsuccessful, can do the least disservice ; but, if successful, draw after them the most valuable acquisitions.'

When the Syracusan generals, seconded by Gylippus, had finished this their exhortation to their own

soldiers, they also, in their turn, repaired immediately on board their fleet, as they found was already done by the Athenians.

But Nicias, whose mind was surcharged with present cares, sensible how extreme the danger, and how nearly approaching; since this very moment they were only not in motion; and once more reflecting that, as generally happens in affairs of such prodigious moment, some points might yet be left imperfect, something of energy, and weight, and influence, be yet left unsaid; he called out again on every single captain in the fleet, addressing himself separately to them, with the honorable mention of their fathers, themselves, and their tribe; and conjuring each, by his own distinguishing splendor, whatever it was, ‘not now to betray it, nor tarnish those hereditary virtues on which their ancestors had founded their glory;’ reminding them earnestly ‘of the uninterrupted freedom of their country, and the privilege they had ever enjoyed of living in it quite free and uncontroled;’ asserting other arguments, such as, with men who had their all so much at stake, might have influence and weight; no matter now how trite or hacknied by frequent repetitions, or how equally applicable to every case, as fetched from the endearments of their wives, and their offspring, and their paternal gods; such as from every topic, in a plunge of horror and distress, are rung in the ears of men, as likely to animate and persuade. And thus at last, though fearful that not even yet he had said enough, but all that the time would permit, he parted from them; and, placing himself at the head of the land army, marched down to the beach; where he drew them up in as large a line as they could possibly form, that their appearance might have the greater effect in emboldening those on board the fleet.

And now Demosthenes, and Menander, and Euthydemus (for these went on board to command the fleet), getting clear from their moorings, stood away directly towards the barricade of the harbor, and that interval of its mouth not yet completely barred, in order to clear the passage. The Syracusans also and their allies had now launched forth against them with their usual number of ships. A detachment of these were so stationed as to guard the passage; the rest were spread circularly quite round the harbor, that on all sides at once they might attack the Athenians, and their land army on the beach might second them on approaches to the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, who were respectively stationed in each of the wings, whilst Pythen and the Corinthians composed the centre.

When the Athenians were come up to the barricade, they ran boldly at it; and, by the violence of the first shock, they beat off the vessels ranged about it, and were intent on clearing away the whole barricade. But here, the Syracusans and allies falling in amongst them from every quarter, a general engagement ensued, not only at the barricade, but in every part of the harbor. Obstinate it really proved, and such a battle as they had never fought before. Great, in truth, was the ardor of the seamen on both sides, in running on the enemy, whenever the word was given; and great was the art exerted by the officers, in attack and defence, and reciprocal contention. The soldiers on board exerted all their efforts, that, when ship came to close with ship, no stretch of military skill should be omitted on the hatches. Every individual, abiding firmly in his post, strained all his diligence to signalise his own behavior. But, as numerous ships were falling in together amongst one another in little sea room, and

so large a number never fought before in so small a space (since the amount of both fleets fell little short of two hundred), the direct incursions with the beak were few, because room was wanting for tacks and passages; but boardings were frequent, as the vessels were continually running foul of one another, or in sheering off met with others which were coming on; and, so long as a vessel was in her approach, those on the hatches poured plentifully against her whole showers of javelins, and arrows, and stones; but, when they were once come to grapping, the soldiers, closing in firm battalion, endeavored by force to board one another. Nay, it most frequently happened, through the straitness of sea room, that the very moment one party boarded the enemy, the very same moment they were also boarded themselves, as two vessels lay often alongside of an enemy; nay, sometimes more, by necessity mingled and squeezed fast together. In the mean time, the care of the officers was not confined to one single point, but distracted on all sides by a whole round of perils: they were here intent on their own defence, and there on the annoyance of the enemy. And, farther, the prodigious crash that was made by such a number of ships, running at the same instant on one another, struck such dismay and loss of hearing, that the voices of those who issued out orders could no longer be distinguished. Loud, besides, were the exhortations and shouts of the officers on both sides, partly in conformity to rule, though swelled at present by the ardor of contention. Amongst the Athenians it was shouted amain—‘To force the passage, and now or never to exert their utmost stretch of bravery to earn a safe return to their native country:’ amongst the Syracusans and their allies—‘How glorious it would be to hinder their escape, and, by present victory, for every one amongst them to increase the grow-

ing honors of his country !' The commanders also, on both sides, if they saw a vessel dropping off before it was overpowered by the enemy, called out aloud by name on the captain, demanding, on the Athenian side, ' Did they retire on the wild presumption that yonder most hostile shore would prove more friendly to them than the open sea, which by long prescription they had claimed as their own province ?' But, on the Syracusean—' Would they, who were perfectly assured that the Athenians wanted nothing so much as to escape—would they fly first from those who were flying ?' The land army, farther, of each party on the beach, whilst yet the battle was alternately fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost anxiety and the most painful conflict of mind ; earnestly bent, as the one domestic party was, on gaining accumulated honors ; but fearful, as the other invading party was become, that their condition might soon become worse than it was already ; for, the whole hope of the Athenians centering at present in that fleet, their anguish for the event was more acute than ever they had felt, and was aggravated by their own position on the beach, which gave them a clear uninterrupted prospect of all that passed in the battle on the water. The scene was but at a trifling distance from their eyes ; and, as the looks of all of them were not at the same instant fastened on the same spectacle, if any saw their own party prevailing, they grew at once exalted, and immediately began an invocation to the gods, that the efforts of their friends might be crowned with success ; whilst another party, beholding those who were vanquished, uttered a loud shriek which ended in a groan ; and, by the sight of such affecting turns, were more subdued in spirit than those who were actually engaged in this medley of horror. Others, farther, who were intent on a quarter of the engagement where the event

was yet in suspense, and no judgment amidst such confusion could be formed, adjusted the contortions of their bodies to their own inward fears, and passed that interval in extremity of anguish ; for every moment they were within a little of escaping or being sunk. And thus, in one and the same army of Athenians, so long as the event was under decision, a whole medley of noises was heard together ;—shrieking—shouting—victory !—undone ! undone ! and all other sounds of various import, which, in such extremity of danger, a numerous body of men may be forced to utter.

Those, farther, on board were equally sensible of all the quick alternatives of passion ; till at last, after the battle had for a long time been obstinately maintained, the Syracusans and allies put the Athenians to open flight ; and, plying briskly in the chase, with obstreperous clamor and loud exultations drove them on the beach. And here, the land soldiers which had served on board, excepting such as had been taken in the deeper water, leaping in all parts, as they severally could, on the shore, ran in great confusion for shelter to the camp. The army on the beach, with passions no longer diversified, but with one and the same uniform vehemence, having expressed their resentment of the horrible conclusion by a shriek and a hearty groan, some hurried along the beach to succor the shipping ; others to defend what yet remained of their intrenchments ; whilst a third party, and the bulk of the army, confined their whole care to themselves, and were solely intent on their own personal preservation. The horrid consternation, in which this moment they were universally plunged, was greater than Athenians had ever felt before. They suffered now what on a former occasion they had made others suffer at Pylos. There the Lacedæmonians, having first lost their fleet, had

the farther mortification to see all their gallant Spartans in the island undone. And now the desperate condition of the Athenians offered no glimmering of safety on the land, unless some miraculous contingency should take place in their favor.

After an engagement so hardy and well disputed—after the sinking of a large number of ships and the death of numbers on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who were masters of the day, took up the wreck and the dead. This being done, they sailed in triumph to the city, and erected a trophy.

But the Athenians, quite sunk with the weight of their present misfortunes, never so much as once entertained the thought of recovering their shattered vessels or their dead, but were contriving how to decamp by favor of the approaching night. Demosthenes, on this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own opinion, that manning at once the whole number of their vessels, they should exert their utmost efforts to force their passage out of the harbor early the next dawn; affirming, that they had still a larger number of shipping fit for service than the enemy; for the Athenians had yet about sixty left, whereas those of the enemy were under fifty. Nicias came into the proposal; but, when both joined in issuing proper orders for the execution, the seamen flatly refused to go on board. Dispirited as they were by the last great blow, they had resigned all hope of ever beating these enemies again. No measure now remained but a retreat by land, on which the universal attention was henceforth employed.

Hermocrates, the Syracusan, had conceived a suspicion that such a step would be taken by them; and, foreseeing what difficulties might arise if so large an army should march across the country, and, posting

themselves afresh on Sicilian ground, should again resume their spirits and renew the war against Syracuse, he waited on those in authority, and suggested to them, that ‘they ought not, by any rules of policy, to let the enemy steal off by night (inserting here his own sentiments of the affair); but that all the Syracusans and their allies, sallying out in a body, should preoccupy and secure the roads, and in good time beset and put strong guards in all the passes.’ The magistrates were sensible, as much as he who gave this advice, how reasonable it was, and declared themselves for its execution: but then ‘the men who now, indulging their joy for the late victory, were intent on recreations, and as, besides, it was a festival time, (for this very day they were performing the anniversary sacrifice to Hercules,) in all probability would refuse to march; because, transported as they were with success, the generality no doubt were celebrating the festival with good cheer and wine; and any thing might sooner be hoped from them than obedience to an order for taking up their arms and sallying forth at a minute’s notice.’ As the magistrates were convinced that things would so turn out, the scheme was judged impracticable, and Hermocrates could in nowise prevail: but he thought of an artifice to play off against the foe; afraid lest the Athenians, dislodging quietly by night, might possess themselves of the most difficult passes before any opposition could reach them, he despatched some of his most trusty friends, under an escort of horse, to the Athenian camp, as soon as it was dark; who, riding up so near to the intrenchments that their words might be distinctly heard, and calling out aloud on some persons to come forth, since they were a party sent from his friends in Syracuse to bring Nicias some intelligence, charged them to carry word

immediately to Nicias, ‘ by no means to draw off the army by night, because the Syracusans had beset the roads; but to defer his march till daylight, when he had leisure to make the proper dispositions :’ and after delivering this message they rode off, whilst those who received it went and reported it faithfully to the Athenian generals.

Wrought on by this piece of intelligence, in which they were far from suspecting any fraud, they continued all night in their posts; and then, as they had not dislodged at once in a hurry, they thought it advisable to stay there but one day longer, that the soldiers might pack up and carry away with them as large a part as was possible of their necessary stores. The rest of the baggage it was agreed should be abandoned to the enemy: they were only to carry off, each person for himself, what was absolutely necessary for food and raiment.

But, in this interval, the Syracusans and Gylippus, by sallying out with the land forces, had gained a march before them, had blocked up the roads along the country by which it was judged the Athenians would march, and had posted strong guards on all the fords of brooks and rivers; nay, their detachments stood ready drawn up in battalia to beat off the enemy from the most convenient passes. Standing out farther into the harbor with their fleet, they dragged from the shore the Athenian shipping: some few of these they burnt, as the Athenians themselves had designed to do; but the residue at their leisure, from the spot where each lay stranded, they took in tow and carried away to the city. And this being done, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged that they had completed such preparations for their march as were absolutely needful, the dislodgement of the whole army was put in

execution on the third day from the naval engagement.

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed in one particular light, as that they retreated because they had lost the whole of their fleet, and all their mighty hopes had terminated in such personal dangers to themselves, and such as even boded the ruin of Athens, but the very abandoning of the camp presented to their sight the most cutting spectacles, and struck each soul amongst them with heart-piercing anguish : for, as the dead lay uninterred on the surface of the earth, when the remains of an old acquaintance, thus miserably laid out, arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly seized with regret and horror. But the living, who on account of wounds and sickness were left behind, were causes of much greater affliction to the sound than were even the dead ; and, in truth, were much more to be deplored than those who had no longer a being : for, bursting out into prayers and lamentations, they occasioned a wild irresolution of thought ; earnestly intreating that they might not be left behind, and screaming out aloud on each by name, as they saw a friend, or an old comrade, moving off, throwing their arms about their necks, and so dragged along whilst they could keep their hold ; but, when strength and bodily vigor failed, and left them destitute of resource, they gave them the last adieu, not without a shower of curses and a hideous howl. By such cutting incidents the whole army was filled with tears and a wild irresolution ; so that they could not depart without the highest regret, though from a spot so hostile, where they had suffered more than tears could alleviate ; and the dread of more, which yet might be impending, was inexpressible. Dejection of the head and self-accusation were general through all

the troops ; and they resembled nothing less than a large subjugated city, whose numerous inhabitants were escaping from the fury of a sack ; for the amount of those who were now marching off together was not less than forty thousand men.

Of these, the generality carried off merely what necessary subsistence they had scraped together ; but the heavy-armed and horsemen, contrary to custom, were now obliged to carry their own sustenance themselves beneath their armor ; some, because they had none ; others, because they durst not trust their servants. The desertions had for a long time been large, but of late in greater numbers than ever : neither were they thus provided with sufficient stores ; for there was no longer any corn to be found in the camp. Nay, truly, the general calamity and equability of misfortunes, which in many cases alleviate the pain, as numbers are involved, were unable to render the present evils in any degree supportable ; especially when the thought occurred, from what a height of splendor and preceding glory, to what a plunge and miserable state they were now reduced ! for a most cruel turn of fortune this really proved to a Grecian army ; who, coming hither to enslave others, were departing now with the sad alternative of fearing to be made slaves themselves ; and, instead of the prayers and paens with which they first began the voyage, were now dislodging with omens that portended nothing but misery : those, farther, who came hither as lords of the ocean, were now stealing away by land, from henceforth to be saved, not by naval skill, but the perseverance of a land army. However, all these reflections put their patience nothing on the stretch, in comparison of that weight of misery which this very instant was hovering over their heads.

Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be overwhelmed in despair, and sunk in this plunge of distress, addressed himself severally to the troops, exhorted, and comforted, by every topic which occurred, each single party, whom he visited by turns; elevating his voice far beyond the ordinary pitch, to suit the earnestness of his heart, in hope that, the louder he spoke, the more extensive effect it might have on his hearers.

‘Even yet, and in the present low ebb of our fortune, my dear countrymen and confederates, we ought to encourage hope. Instances may be given of armies who have been rescued from a deeper plunge of dangers than that which is now our portion: nor ought you to torture yourselves with too painful regret at what you suffer, or at the unmerited miseries which this moment environ you about. Even I myself, who have much less room to boast of a constitution superior to hardships than the meanest soldier in your ranks (for your own eyes can witness to how low a state my bodily infirmities have reduced me); who, however, in the continued happiness of my former course of life, or in any other regard, am inferior to none amongst you, yet am buffeted now, by the storms and outrages of fortune, as cruelly as ever were the vilest and most abject of my fellow creatures. It is true, I have ever habitually worshipped the gods, with a conscientious deference to established laws; and have made justice and beneficence to man the constant practice of my life. On the strength of this, when I look forward to the future, my mind is enlivened with invigorating hope; though I own these misfortunes, so far undeserved, strike no little terror on my thoughts. But better times, perhaps, may be approaching; for sure our enemies have been blessed with an ample measure of success; and, though some deity may have frowned

at first on this our expedition, yet by this time his wrath must be fully wreaked on us. We are not the first instance of a people who have wantonly invaded the possessions of another ; many such offences have taken their rise from the impulse of human passions, and have been punished with such a measure of vengeance as human nature was able to endure. Good reason therefore have we now to hope for a milder fate from the offended deity, who, depressed as we are, seem objects of compassion more than of resentment. Cast therefore your eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed, and the goodly numbers which even now compose your retreat, and let the sight revive and cheer your drooping spirits. Conclude that, wherever you choose to halt, you are of yourselves that instant a mighty community ; such as no other Sicilian people can presume to stand before, should you attack ; nor to dispossess, wherever you think proper to settle. But, that your march be orderly and safe, be that the care of each individual amongst your ranks, made warm and earnest by the thought, that, on whatever spot you may be compelled to fight, on that, if crowned with victory, you regain a country and a bulwark of your own. But then, our march must be continued both day and night, with unabating speed, because our stock of provisions is but scanty ; and, can we but reach some friendly territory belonging to the Siculi, who, from their excessive dread of the Syracusans, will ever preserve their attachment to us, conclude yourselves that moment to be beyond the reach of danger. Send therefore your messengers beforehand to them, with orders to meet us on our route, and bring us the needful supplies of food. On the whole, my fellow-soldiers, rest assured that the last necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave, since to cowardice now no place of shelter is any longer open ; and only

if you stem the efforts of your foes, can you again be happy in the enjoyment of those scenes your eyes so fondly regret; and can Athenians re-erect the extensive power of the Athenian state, how low soever it may be fallen at present: for they are men who make a state, not walls nor ships by men abandoned.'

With these words of encouragement Nicias ran regularly through all the ranks of the whole army; careful, at the same time, if he saw any parties straggling from the main body, and quitting the order of the march, to fetch them up and replace them. Demosthenes exerted himself as diligently in his own department, encouraging his troops with the same energy and ardor of address. The body under Nicias, drawn up in a square, led the van of the march; that under Demosthenes brought up the rear; whilst the baggage-men, and the numerous crowd that attended the camp, marched within the centre of the heavy-armed.

When they had advanced to the place of fording the Anapus, they found a body of Syracusans and allies drawn up in battalia, there to oppose the passage: but, putting these to flight, they gained the passage of that river, and advanced into the country beyond; though their march was terribly harassed by the incursions of the Syracusan horse, and by the missive weapons which the light-armed of the enemy poured in from time to time among them: and yet, in this day's march, the Athenians advanced about forty stadia,¹ and halted for the night on an eminence.

On the ensuing day, by early dawn, they were again in motion, and advanced about twenty stadia;² when, descending into a certain plain, they halted and formed an encampment. Their design in this was to fetch in some provisions, for the adjacent country was inha-

¹ About four miles.

² Two miles.

bited; and to get a proper supply of water to carry along with them; for in the country beyond, through which their route was fixed, no springs were to be met with for the length of several stadia. But, during this halt, the Syracusans, advancing beyond them, threw up a work across their route to stop their farther progress. The spot chosen for this was a strong eminence, flanked on both sides by an inaccessible crag, and known by the name of Acrenum-Lepas.

On the day following the Athenians resumed their march; but the horse and numerous darters of the Syracusans and allies stopped their advance; the latter pouring in their weapons on, and the former riding up and disordering their ranks. For a long time, it is true, the Athenians maintained their skirmishes against them; but at length they retreated again to their last encampment. And now all farther supplies of provisions were totally cut off; it being no longer possible to fetch in any, for fear of the horse.

But, decamping early in the morning, they continued their march, and forced their progress to the eminence which was fortified by the new work. Here they found the Syracusan infantry drawn up before them in firm and deep battalia, posted also on the strong eminence they had occupied on purpose; for the pass was very narrow. The Athenians marched up and assaulted the work; but, being pelted by showers of darts from the eminence, which was very steep, and so gave those on it a great advantage in throwing their weapons home, and finding themselves unable to force it, they again drew off, and attempted it no farther. It happened, at the same time, that some claps of thunder were heard, accompanied with rain; effects not unusual in this season, as the year was now in autumn; and yet these accidents contributed still more to dispirit the Athenians, who concluded that every

thing now acted in combination for their destruction: During this interval of inaction Gylippus and the Syracusans sent off a detachment of their forces to throw up a work in their rear, where the enemy had already passed: but the Athenians sent also a detachment of their own body, which prevented its execution; and, after this, wheeling off with their whole body more into the plains, they halted there for the night.

The next morning they began to move forward again: and now the Syracusans, besetting them quite round in a circle, poured volleys of darts and arrows amongst them, and wounded numbers. If, indeed, the Athenians sallied out against them, they retreated; but, when the Athenians drew back, they then pressed on their retreat; and, falling in chiefly amongst their rear, if at any time they put small parties to flight, they struck a consternation into the whole army. But for a long time, in such a train of skirmishings, the Athenians made good their ground; and advancing afterwards the length of five or six stadia,¹ they halted in a plain. Here also the Syracusans no longer molested them, but withdrew to their own camp.

This night it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes, that since the army was reduced to so low a condition, and began already to be pressed with a total failure of provisions; since, farther, large numbers had been wounded in the many incidental assaults of the enemy, they should first kindle a great number of fires, and then march the whole army off, no longer by the route which they had first projected, but by another towards the sea, quite contrary to that which the Syracusans had already preoccupied and guarded. The residue of the march was no longer pointed to-

¹ Above half a mile.

wards Catana, but to the other coast of Sicily, towards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that quarter, both Grecian and barbarian. In pursuance of this, a large number of fires being kindled, they dislodged in the dead of night.

This part of their retreat, as is the general fate of armies, but especially of the greatest, ever subject to fears and panics, particularly when moving in the night and on hostile ground, and conscious, farther, that the enemy is close at their heels, was made in a sad and disorderly manner. The column, indeed, under Nicias, which composed the van, kept firm together in a body, and quite outmarched the rest of the army: but that under Demosthenes, being one half at least, if not the major part, of the whole force, was separated from the van, and came on in great confusion and disorder. However, by the dawn of day they reached the coast; and, gaining the great road which is called the Helorine, took their route along it, that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis, they might pierce upwards along the course of that river into the heart of the country; for thus they hoped to meet with the Siculi, whom they had summoned to be ready on their route. But, when they had gained the sight of that river, they found its banks already occupied by a Syracusan guard, busy in throwing up a rampart and palisade to defend its passage. This party they soon dispersed, and passed the river, and from thence advanced towards another river, the Erineus; for thus their guides had planned their route.

In the mean time the Syracusans and allies, when the day was clearly broke, and they knew the Athenians had stole off, began in general to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus, as if the Athenians had made their escape through his connivance. Yet, be-

gaining the pursuit with all possible expedition (and it was easily discoverable what route they had taken), they came up with them about the hour of repast; and, as they fell in first with the column under the orders of Demosthenes, which composed the rear, and had moved in a more slow and disorderly manner than the van, because the darkness of the night had so highly incommoded and confounded their march, they immediately charged them and fought. The Syracusan cavalry beset them quite round (the more easily, indeed, as they were separated from the van), and drove them into one crowded heap. But the column under Nicias was now fifty stadia¹ before them; for Nicias led them forward with great celerity, concluding that their safety consisted, not in lingering voluntarily at so critical a period, or exposing themselves to an engagement, but in pushing forward with their utmost speed, and fighting only when by absolute necessity they were compelled to fight. But then Demosthenes was involved in a much more laborious and continued toil; because, as he filed off last, the enemies were left on his rear; and, soon convinced that they had begun the pursuit, he was obliged, not so much to move forward, as to draw up his troops in the order of battle, till by such necessitated lingering he was environed by them, and himself and the body of Athenians under him were thrown into high tumult and confusion: for now, hemmed in as they were on a certain spot, surrounded quite by walls, and whence the issues both on one side and the other were full of olive-trees, they were terribly galled on their flanks by the darts of the enemy. This kind of annoyancethe Syracusans wisely chose to give them,

¹ About five miles.

and to decline all close engagement; because, to hazard the latter against enemies now become quite desperate, they judged would make more for the advantage of the Athenians than of themselves; though, at the same time, a kind of frugality, inspired by the great career of success they had already obtained, taught them not to exhaust their strength on superfluous encounters, and persuaded them that thus they might effectually subdue and make this great army their prisoners. When, therefore, for the whole remainder of the day, they had galled them on all sides with missive weapons, and now perceived that the Athenians and their allies were reduced to a miserable plight by the wounds which they had received and the other calamities which lay hard on them, Gylippus, in concert with the Syracusans and allies, caused a herald to proclaim: first, that 'such inhabitants of the isles as would come over to them should rest in the secure enjoyment of their liberty:' on which, some cities, though not many, went over to them: and, in the next place, after some time, a surrender was agreed on of the whole body of troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the terms, that they should deliver up their arms, and no one should suffer death, either by public execution, or the miseries of a prison, or the want of necessary subsistence. Thus this whole body, to the number of six thousand men, surrendered themselves prisoners, and produced all the silver they had about them, which they were commanded to throw into the hollows of shields, four of which in this manner were filled full with spoil: and these prisoners the victors immediately led away to Syracuse.

But Nicias and the column under his command arrived the same day on the banks of the Erineus; and, having passed that river, halted on an eminence.

The day following, the Syracusans coming up to his post, notified to Nicias, that ‘ those under Demosthenes had surrendered,’ and summoned him to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, he begged leave to send out a horseman to discover the truth; who on his return affirming that ‘ they had actually surrendered,’ Nicias sent an intimation to Gylippus and the Syracusans, that he was ready to stipulate, in the name of the Athenians, that ‘ whatever sums the Syracusans had expended in this war should be fairly reimbursed, on condition the forces under his command might have free departure; but, till the money could be paid, he would leave with them a number of Athenians as hostages for performance, a man for a talent.’

Gylippus and the Syracusans refused the offer; and resuming offensive measures, ranged their missive weapons on them till the evening. This body of troops was also sadly distressed for want of bread and necessary subsistence. Watching, however, for the dead and silent hours of the night, they were then determined to continue their march. They accordingly took up their arms; the Syracusans perceived it, and sang the pean of alarm. The Athenians were thus convinced that they could not dislodge without being discovered, and so grounded their arms again, all but one party of three hundred men; for these having forced themselves a passage through the guards, made off in the night as fast as it was possible.

So soon as the day appeared Nicias, at the head of his troops, led them forward. But the Syracusans and allies pressed on him on all sides in the usual manner, pouring in volleys of darts and javelins. The Athenians made the best of their way to reach the river Assinarus; not only because, annoyed on all sides by the irruption of the numerous cavalry and

skirmishing parties, they concluded they should be eased of these, could they once pass that river, but also through bodily fatigue and a vehement desire to extinguish their thirst. When, therefore, they were on the bank, they rushed into the river; no longer observant of order, but each single soldier intent on passing the first of the army. And the enemy, who now pressed hard on them, had rendered the passage already a business of toil: for, obliged as they were to go down in confused heaps, they fell and trampled on one another; some, embarrassed by their spears and baggage, met with instant destruction; others, entangled in the crowd, were carried away by the current. The hither bank of the river was now filled with Syracusans; and, it being naturally steep, they poured down their darts on the Athenians, numbers of whom were drinking greedily of the stream, confusedly hampered together in the hollow of the channel. The Peloponnesians, plunging in after them, made a great slaughter of those who were in the river. The water was immediately discolored with blood; but the stream, polluted with mud and gore, deterred them not from drinking it greedily, nor many of them from fighting desperately for a draught of it. But, in short, when the carcasses of the dead began to be heaped one on another in the river, and the whole army was become a continued carnage,¹ of some in the river, and those who were making off from the banks, by the horsemen of the foe, Nicias surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus, into whose power he chose to fall sooner than into that of the Syracusans. He told him, ‘that he himself and the Lacedæmonians might

¹ According to Diodorus Siculus, the number of the slain amounted to eighteen thousand men.

decide his fate as best pleased themselves; but intreated that a stop might be put to the slaughter of his soldiers.' On this, Gylippus issued out orders to give quarter; and thus they carried off the remnants of this body as prisoners of war, such excepted as were secreted by their captors, the number of which was large. Having, farther, detached a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who in the night had broke through the guard, they also made them prisoners. The whole number now collected together as the public prize was not large; but very numerous were they who were clandestinely secreted. Not a town in Sicily but was crowded with them, since these had not surrendered on terms like those under Demosthenes. A considerable number had also perished: for this was a terrible slaughter; nay, there was not one greater in the course of the Sicilian war: and in the preceding skirmishes, which had happened very frequently during the march, not a few had been slain. Yet, notwithstanding all this, many made their escape; some from the scenes of action, and others from their prisons, from whence they afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. These repaired to Catana, as a safe resort.

And now the Syracusans and allies, in one grand collective body, having amassed together as large a number of prisoners as they possibly could, and all the spoils, returned in triumph to Syracuse. The bulk of prisoners, whether of the Athenians or their confederates, whom they had taken, they thrust down into the quarries, concluding that from such a confinement they could not possibly make escape; but Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite of all the remonstrances of Gylippus, they butchered: for Gylippus imagined that the finishing of this war would invest himself with pre-eminent degrees of glory, if, besides the rest of his

achievements, he could carry home to the Lacedæmonians the generals of the enemy. It had, farther, so happened, that one of these, that is, Demosthenes, was regarded as their most inveterate enemy, because of his exploits against them in the island of Sphacteria and Pylos; and the other, Nicias, as their most sincere wellwisher, from his behavior on those very incidents: for Nicias had strenuously exerted himself in behalf of those Lacedæmonians who were made prisoners in the island. It was he who prevailed with the Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of which they were released. For such services done them, the Lacedæmonians had a kindness for him; and it had been chiefly owing to his assurance of this that he had surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus. But a party of the Syracusans, as was generally reported, fearful, because they had kept up a correspondence with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might now, amidst the general prosperity, involve them in trouble; others also; and not least of all, the Corinthians, lest as he was rich he might purchase the connivance of his keepers to get his liberty, and then again might have influence enough to foment fresh stirs to their prejudice, obtained the concurrence of their allies, and put him to death. For these, or other reasons most nearly neighboring to these, was Nicias doomed to destruction; though the man of all the Grecians in the present age, who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe, since his whole life was one uniform series of piety towards the Deity.¹

As for those who were doomed to the quarries, the Syracusans treated them at first with outrageous seve-

¹ Mr. Hobbes in his translation has omitted this last comma.

rity. As great numbers were crowded together in this hollow dungeon, the beams of the sun, in the first place, and then the suffocating air annoyed them in a more terrible manner, because the aperture was left uncovered; and each succeeding night, the reverse of the preceding day, autumnal and nipping, through such vicissitudes threw them into strange disorders. Thus straitened as they were for room, they did whatever they had to do on one and the same spot; and the carcases of those who died lay heaped up promiscuously together, as some expired of their wounds, and others perished through the vicissitudes of the air they breathed, or some other such deadly cause. At length the stench became intolerably noisome; and they were farther oppressed with hunger and thirst; for, during the space of eight months, the allowance to each was only a cotyl¹ of water and two cotyls of bread a day. Nay, whatever species of misery numbers cooped up in so close a confinement might be liable to suffer, not one of these but pressed cruelly on them. They were all thus thronged and dieted together for seventy days: but after this term all but the Athenians, and such of the Sicilians and Italians as had joined with them in the invasion, were sold out for slaves.²

¹ Little more than half a pint.

² The decent and engaging behavior of the Athenians was of great service to them; for by it they either soon obtained their liberty, or were highly esteemed and caressed by their masters. Some of them were indebted for their freedom to Euripides. The Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse of Euripides than were even the people of Greece itself. If the strangers, who were often resorting to Sicily, brought them any specimens or morsels of his poetry, they learned them by heart, and with high delight communicated them to their friends. It is said that several, who by this means earned their liberty, went afterwards to wait on Euripides, in token of their gratitude; assuring him, some of them, that

What the whole number of prisoners was, it is hard exactly to relate; but, however, they could not be fewer than seven thousand. And this proved to be the greatest Grecian exploit of all that happened in the course of this war; and, in my opinion, of all that occurred in the whole history of Greece; since the event to the victors was most glorious, and to the vanquished most calamitous: for in every respect they were totally overpowered, and their miseries in no respect had mitigation. In short, root and branch, as is commonly said, their land armies and their shipping were now ruined; nay, nothing belonging to them was exempted from destruction; and few, out of all their numbers, had the good fortune to revisit their native country.

Such were the transactions in Sicily.¹

they had been released from slavery for teaching their masters what pieces of his writing they were able to repeat; and others, that, when vagabonds after the defeat, they had been supplied with meat and drink for singing some of his lines. This is not to be wondered at; since even a Caunian vessel, which, being hard chased by pirates, and endeavoring to get refuge into a Sicilian harbor, was however kept off by force; till at length, being asked whether they could repeat any of Euripides' verses, they answered in the affirmative; on which they obtained immediate reception and refuge.' Plutarch in the life of Nicias.

¹ Some iambic verses of an unknown author are found at the end of this book in the later Greek editions; and I beg the reader to accept the following translation of them:

The pride of glory, the exalted height,
The frequent trophies on the land and sea,
The long career of well-deserved success,
On which their great forefathers tower'd aloft,
Whilst Persia trembled at th' Athenian name,
Now droop'd at once!—A chaos soon succeeds,
Of anarchy, destruction, and distress:
Low ebb'd the state, as high it erst had flow'd

BOOK VIII.

YEAR XIX. B. C. 413.—WHEN the news was reported at Athens, no belief for a long time was given, even though the most creditable part of the soldiery, who had made their escape from this disastrous business, proved it by a circumstantial relation, that so total a destruction was become their lot. But no sooner were they convinced of its reality¹ than their resentments burst forth against those of the orators who had advised and recommended the expedition, as if their own suffrages had never concurred to its execution. They farther vented their gall against those retailers of oracles and foretellers of future events, against all in general, who, pretending privity to the will of heaven, had elevated their hopes with the certain conquest of Sicily. On all sides now all manner of disasters environed them about; and never had Athens been thrown into so great a consternation and dejection as at the

¹ Plutarch, from report, tells an odd story on this occasion: ‘A stranger, who, it seems, had come ashore at the Piraeus, and had set him down in a barber’s shop, began to talk about the overthrow in Sicily, as of a point well known at Athens. The barber, hearing it before any other person had the news, ran with all speed up into the city; and, having first informed the magistrates of it, spread the news in an instant all over the forum. Consternation and tumult at once ensued. The magistrates convened an assembly of the people, and produced the barber before them. He was called on to tell from whom he had the news; and when he could not name the person, being looked on as an idle fellow, and a disturber of the public peace, he was immediately tied on the wheel, and a long time whirled round on it, till several persons arrived who gave a minute and circumstantial account of the whole.’ Life of Nicias.

present juncture: for now, beside what each private family suffered, as the public at the same time had lost the bulk of its heavy-armed and horsemen, and that flower of its youth, which they saw it impossible to replace, they were sorely dejected. Conscious, farther, that they had not shipping sufficient in their docks for a fresh equipment, nor money in the public treasury, nor even hands to man what vessels they had left, they gave up all hope of deliverance in the present crisis. Their enemies from Sicily they imagined would soon enter the Piræus with a powerful navy, especially as they were flushed with such a career of success; and their enemies nearer home would now, for a certainty, redouble their preparations, and with the utmost resolution fall on them at once both by sea and land, and be farther strengthened by the revolt of their own temporising confederates. At last, however, they agreed it was their duty to do what might yet be done; not basely to abandon their own preservation, but to fit out a navy, by collecting from all possible resources both timber and money; and timely to secure their own dependent states, above all, Eubœa; and to reduce the expenses of the civil administration with all possible economy; and to lodge the sovereignty in the hands of a select body of old experienced statesmen, whose maturer counsels might, if possible, yet extricate the state from its present misfortunes. Such an effect had the general consternation now on them, an effect not unusual with a people, that they became heartily disposed to order their government aright. And, as to such resolutions they came, they proceeded, farther, to put them in execution: and the summer ended.

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, animated by the terrible blow the Athenians had received in Sicily,

the whole body of Greece was alert against them. Even such as had hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so much as waiting for a formal invitation to accede, thought it incumbent on themselves no longer to be absent from the war, but voluntarily to enter the lists against the Athenians. Not a state but reasoned thus: that themselves also, these Athenians, had they succeeded in Sicily, would undoubtedly have attacked; and then concluded that, as the war for certainty was very nearly finished, it would be glorious for them to have a hand in its completion. But the old confederates of the Lacedæmonians, as their desires were greater, so they exerted themselves now with greater alacrity than ever to procure a speedy relaxation of their heavy burdens. Yet, in a most remarkable manner, such states as were dependent on Athens manifested their readiness to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution; since now they formed their judgments in all the warmth of indignation, and could discern no probable method by which the Athenians could retard their ruin for another summer.

All these circumstances coinciding, the Lacedæmonian state became prodigiously alert: and, above all, with the expectation that their confederates of Sicily, with a powerful reinforcement, as their navies must now of necessity act in concert, would be with them, in all probability, very early in the spring. In every view their hopes were gallant and elate. They determined to go on with the war without any delay; concluding that, if once brought well to a conclusion, they should ever for the future be released from such dangers as had lately threatened from Athens, in case Sicily had been reduced; and, should they now demolish their competitors, must remain for the future supreme leaders of Greece, without fear of a reverse.

Instantly, therefore, Agis their king, though in the depth of winter, sallying forth with a body of troops from Decelea, marched round the confederacy, levying sums of money for the service of the marine. Turning his route to the Melian gulf, he took a large booty from the Ætœans, against whom their enmity had been of long duration, which he converted into money. He also compelled those Achæans who were seated in the Phthiotis, and other states in this quarter dependent on Thessaly, spite of all the complaints and murmurs of the Thessalians, to give him some hostages for their good behavior, and to furnish him with money. He disposed of these hostages into safe custody at Corinth, and spared no pains to get them over into the alliance.

The Lacedæmonians, farther, circulated an order among the states for the building of one hundred sail of ships. They taxed themselves and the Bœotians to furnish respectively twenty-five; the Phocians and Locrians fifteen; the Corinthians fifteen; the Arcadians, and Pellenians, and Sieyonians, ten; the Megareans, and Trozenians, and Epidaurians, and Hermioneans, ten. They went to work with all other needful preparations, that they might prosecute the war briskly on the first approach of spring.

The Athenians, on the other hand, were not remiss in preparing for their own defence; since, in pursuance of the plan they had formed, they were busy during all the winter in building of ships, having collected proper quantities of timber; and in fortifying Sunium, that the navigation of their victuallers round that cape might be preserved from molestation. They also evacuated the fortress in Laconia which they had raised in the voyage to Sicily; and in all respects, where they judged themselves involved in any less needful ex-

pense, they contracted their disbursements with the utmost frugality. But their principal care was keeping a close eye on their dependents, that they might not revolt.

Amidst these employments of both parties, which were nothing less than most earnest preparations on all sides, as if war was just in its commencement, the Eubœans took the lead, and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with Agis about a revolt from the Athenians. Agis accepted what terms they proposed; and sent for Alcamedes, the son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus, from Lacedæmon, to pass over as commanders into Eubœa. Accordingly they arrived with a body of citizens newly enfranchised,¹ to the number of about three hundred; and Agis was preparing for their transportation; but in this interval the Lesbians arrived, with declarations of their readiness to revolt; and, as they were seconded by the recommendations of the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded to put off for a time the affair of Eubœa, and began to expedite the revolt of the Lesbians, having assigned them Alcamedes for their governor, who was to have passed over to Eubœa. The Boeotians promised to send them ten ships, and Agis ten. These points were transacted without the privity of the Lacedæmonian state: for Agis, so long as he continued at Decelea, having under his command the army of the state, was invested with a power of sending detachments whithersoever he thought proper, and to levy men and money at his own discretion; and it may with truth be affirmed, that the confederates, during this period, paid a much greater deference to him than to the state of Lacedæmon: for, having a powerful force under his own

¹ Neodamodes.

orders, he was formidable in his every motion. And thus he arbitrarily settled the negotiation of the Lesbians.

But then the Chians and the Erythræans, who were also desirous to revolt, addressed themselves, not to Agis, but at Lacedæmon. In their company also went thither an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who was lieutenant for Darius, the son of Artaxerxes, in the maritime provinces of Asia. Even Tissaphernes concerned himself now to inflame the Peloponnesian ardor, and promised them large supplies: for lately he had been summoned by the king to make returns of the revenue of his government; which not being able to exact from the Grecian cities, because of the Athenians, he had run into a large arrear. He concluded therefore that, could he demolish the Athenians, he then with great ease might levy the tributes; what is more, might make the Lacedæmonians confederates to the king; and might at length convey to him, either dead or alive, Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria, as the king had expressly commanded. The Chians therefore, and Tissaphernes, were now negotiating this point in concert.

Calligitus, the son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timagoras, the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their native places, and refused with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnabacus, arrived at Lacedæmon about the same point of time, commissioned by Pharnabazus to procure an aid of shipping for the Hellespont, by which he might be enabled, the very same thing as Tissaphernes desired, to work the revolt of the cities within his district from the Athenian obedience, because of the tributes, and expeditiously to gain for himself the credit of having procured for his

master the alliance of the Lacedæmonians. As the agents of Pharnabazus and those also of Tissaphernes were negotiating the same point, though apart from each other, a great debate arose among the statesmen at Lacedæmon; one party insisting, with vehemence, that an aid of shipping and a land force should be sent to Ionia and Chios; another party, that they should be sent first to Hellespont. The Lacedæmonians however complied by far the soonest with the demands of the Chians and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades indeed espoused the cause of the latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark hereditary friendship to Endius, who at this juncture presided in the college of ephori. On this account it was that the family of Alcibiades, in compliment to this friendship, had taken a Lacedæmonian name; for this Endius was the son of an Alcibiades. Yet, previously, the Lacedæmonians despatched Phrynis, a person born and educated in those parts, to Chios, to inspect the state of affairs there, and report whether they had so large a number of shipping as they pretended, and their situation in other respects equalised the fine account they had given of it. Accordingly, when Phrynis had reported that all the accounts they had heard were true, the Chians and Erythreans were instantly admitted allies. They voted, farther, to send them forty sail of shipping, as there were already assembled at Chios not fewer than sixty from places which the Chians named. Ten of these they designed to despatch, as soon as possible, under the command of Melanchridas, who was appointed admiral. But afterwards, the shock of an earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchridas they sent Chalcideus; and, instead of ten, equipped in Laconia only five ships for this service.

Here the winter ended; and the nineteenth year of

this war came also to an end, of which Thucydides has compiled the history.

YEAR XX.—Summer now coming on; as the Chians were earnestly soliciting the despatch of the ships, and also afraid lest the Athenians should get notice of their transactions, for the whole of the negotiation had been carried on without the knowlege of the latter, the Lacedæmonians sent to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, to prevail with that state for the transportation of their ships with all possible expedition across the isthmus, from the other sea into that which lies towards Athens, that all in a body might stand away for Chios ; as well those which Agis had destined for the service of Lesbos as the rest. The whole number of shipping belonging to the alliance, now assembled together there, amounted to thirty-nine.

But Calligitus truly and Timagoras refused, in the name of Pharnabazus, to have any participation in the expedition to Chios ; nor would part with the money they had brought them, which was five-and-twenty talents,¹ to disburse in this equipment. They intended to get another fitted out, which should sail away under their own orders.

As for Agis, when now he perceived that the Lacedæmonians were determined to go first to Chios, he no longer suffered his own projects to clash with those of the state ; but the confederates now assembling at Corinth proceeded to draw up a plan of operations. It was accordingly agreed that they should go first to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who fitted out the five ships in Laconia ; from thence to Lesbos, under the command of Alcamedes, whom Agis had

¹ 484*l.* 15*s.* sterling.

destined for that service : in the last place, they should proceed to the Hellespont ; and in this service it was agreed beforehand that Clearchus, the son of Rambphias, should take on him the command : but the first step should be the transportation of a moiety of their shipping across the isthmus, which were immediately to stand out to sea, that the attention of the Athenians might be less engaged on such as were already in their course than on those which were to follow ; for now they determined to cross the sea in an open insulting manner, as they contemned the present impotence of the Athenians, because they had no considerable force any where at sea.

When these resolutions were formally completed, they immediately transported one-and-twenty ships. Expeditious sailing was earnestly solicited ; but the Corinthians declared a reluctance to go the voyage till they had celebrated the Isthmian games, which were at hand. To remove this obstacle, Agis declared himself ready to have the whole procedure charged to his own account, that they might be cleared from a breach of the Isthmian cessation. The Corinthians not complying with this proposal, and delay necessarily resulting from it, the Athenians gained by this an earlier discovery of the negotiation of the Chians ; and despatching Aristocrates, one of their generals, charged them openly with the guilt of such a procedure. The Chians as strenuously denying the charge, they commanded them to send away their shipping forthwith to Athens, by way of pledge for their safety.

The Chians accordingly sent seven : but the detachment of these was intirely owing to the popular party of that island, who had been kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. The few who were privy to it had no mind to incur the popular resentment before

they were enabled to stem its fury; especially as now they had resigned all hope of the arrival of the Peloponnesians, whose motions were exceedingly dilatory.

In the mean time the Isthmian games were solemnised; and at these the Athenians, who had the regular invitation sent them, assisted in form. The practices of the Chians became here more apparent to them than ever. No sooner therefore had they returned to Athens than they put all the needful expedients in readiness, to prevent the squadron which was to sail from Cenchreæ from passing undiscovered.

When the festival was over, the latter, with one-and-twenty sail, under the command of Alcmenes, stood out to sea in order for Chios. And the Athenians, advancing against them, at first with an equal number of ships, stood off again into open sea; but, when the Peloponnesians would not follow them far, but stood in to the land, the Athenians disappeared; for, having amongst their number the seven ships of the Chians, they thought it not safe to trust them. But, having afterwards manned out others, to the amount of thirty-seven, they drove the enemy along the coast into Piraeus of the Corinthians: this is a desert harbor, and the last on the confines of Epidauria. One ship, indeed, which the enemy came up with at sea, the Peloponnesians lost; but all the rest they drew together to a station within the harbor. Here the Athenians attacked them on the water with their ships, and by land with a party sent purposely on shore. The attack was attended with great confusion, and carried on in a disorderly manner. The party of the Athenians which attacked from the land disabled the bulk of the squadron, and killed the commander Alcmenes; some also of their own people perished in the action. But, when the dispute was ended, they posted a sufficient

number of their ships to lie facing those of the enemy; and, with the remainder, anchored near a little island, on which, as it lay at a small distance, they formed an encampment, and sent away to Athens for a reinforcement.

In favor of the Peloponnesians came up, on the day following, not only the Corinthians, but soon after a number also of others, from the adjacent country, in aid of the squadron; who, perceiving that the preservation of it would be a work of laborious toil on so desert a coast, were sadly perplexed. Some argued vehemently for setting the ships on fire; but at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, and, encamping with their land forces round them, to guard them from the enemy till some convenient opportunity should offer of getting them away. Agis, also, when informed of their situation, sent to them Thermo, a citizen of Sparta.

To the Lacedæmonians the first advice that had been sent was this, that ‘the squadron had set sail from the isthmus:’ for orders had been given Alcamedes by the ephori that when this point was executed he should despatch a horseman to them: and immediately then they had determined to despatch away the commander Chalcideus, accompanied by Alcibiades, with the five ships of their own equipment; but, at the instant they were ready to move off, the news arrived that the squadron had been driven into Piræus. Dejected by this unexpected event, because they had stumbled in the very first entrance on an Ionian war, they no longer persisted in the design of sending away their own ships, but even thought of recalling some of those which were already at sea. But, as this was discovered by Alcibiades, he again persuaded Endius, and the other ephori, by no means intirely to give up

the expedition ; assuring them, that by a timely despatch they might yet make that island before any information of the disaster which had befallen the squadron could reach the Chians ; and of himself, were he once in Ionia, he could easily effect the revolt of the cities, by opening their eyes in respect to the weakness of the Athenians and the hearty and vigorous interposition of the Lacedæmonians ; since on these topics he should be heard with greater deference than any other person whatever. He also privately encouraged Endius with the prospect of great glory to himself, if through him Ionia could be brought to revolt, and the king be made confederate to Lacedæmon, whilst Agis had no hand in these masterly strokes of policy ; for he happened now to be at variance with Agis.¹ By such insinuations Alcibiades prevailed on the ephori and Endius, and sailed away with the five ships, in company with Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian ; and the voyage they performed with all possible expedition.

¹ No reasons are here assigned for the variance between Alcibiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones might occur from the different tempers and manners of the persons ; but we learn from Plutarch that Alcibiades had been intriguing with Timæa, the wife of Agis, and had had a son by her, who was called Leotychides, disowned afterwards by Agis, and incapacitated from succeeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always dissolute ; and yet this, it seems, was merely to gratify his pride, since he declared his intention in this intrigue to have been that his descendants might reign at Sparta. This fine gentleman from Athens was exceedingly agreeable in the eyes of her Spartan majesty ; even though his deportment at Sparta was such as if he had been trained from his birth in the severe discipline of Lycurgus. He was a thorough Spartan, shaved close, plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry bread, and feast on black broth. ‘One would think,’ says Plutarch, ‘he had never kept a cook in his life, never seen a perfumer, nor ever worn a Milesian robe.’ Life of Alcibiades.

About the same time the sixteen ships, which had been at the war of Sicily under the orders of Gylippus, regained in safety the Peloponnesian ports. They had been intercepted near Leucadia, and terribly harassed by twenty-seven sail of Athenians, commanded by Hippocles, the son of Menippus, who was stationed there to watch the return of the fleet from Sicily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The rest, escaping the Athenian chase, arrived safe in the harbor of Corinth.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were now on their voyage, stopped and detained whatever they met; that their course might not be divulged: and, touching first at Corycus on the main, and there setting at liberty such as they had detained, and gaining a conference with some of the Chians who were privy to their designs, by whom being advised to make directly for the harbor of Chios, without any formal notification, they arrived there, intirely unexpected by the Chians. By this, the many were thrown at once into astonishment and terror; but the few had so conducted matters, that the council was that moment sitting; in which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admitted, they said, that many other ships were coming up; but, suppressing all mention of the squadron blocked up at Piræus, the Chians declared a revolt from the Athenians; and the Erythræans soon followed their example.

So far successful, they passed on with three ships to Clazomenæ, and caused that city also to revolt. Instantly on this the Clazomenians crossed over into the continent, and fortified Polichne, to be a place of safe resort for themselves, in case obliged to quit the little island they occupied at present. All the revolters, in

short, were warmly employed in fortifying their towns, and making preparations for war.

At Athens the news soon arrived of the revolt of Chios. They were now convinced that horrid and apparent dangers already environed them about, and that the rest of their dependents would not long be quiet, when the most powerful state amongst them had thrown off the yoke. Now, therefore, the thousand talents,¹ which through all the course of the war they had religiously refrained from touching, the penalties being discharged which the law inflicted on him who should move, or whoever should vote it, amidst their present consternation, they decreed ‘should be employed in the public service, and that a large number of ships should by this means be equipped ; that, farther, from the squadron which blocked up Piræus eight ships should immediately be detached ;’ which, accordingly, quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron under Chalcideus ; but being unable to come up with them, returned again. This detachment was commanded by Strombichides, the son of Diotimus ; that ‘soon after twelve others, under the orders of Thrasykles, should repair to Chios, there also to be detached from the same blockade.’ Having, moreover, fetched off the seven vessels belonging to the Chians, which assisted in forming the blockade at Piræus, they set at liberty the slaves who were on board them, and threw all the freemen into prison. But to replace the whole number detached from the blockade of the Peloponnesians, they lost no time in fitting out other vessels and sending them to that post. They had also a scheme for the expeditious equip-

¹ 193,750*l.* sterling.

ment of thirty more. Great, indeed, was their ardor; and nothing of small importance was taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no less than the recovery of Chios.

In the mean time Strombichides, with the eight sail of ships, arrived at Samos, and taking with him one Samian vessel, stood onwards to Teos, and required of them to have no participation in the present commotions. From Chios, also, Chalcideus was now coming over to Teos with a fleet of three-and-twenty sail; and the land force of the Clazomenians, and also of the Erythreans, attending his motions, was marching thither by land; but Strombichides, having timely notice of their approach, put out again before their arrival. Standing out aloof into open sea, he had a view of this numerous fleet in their course from Chios; on which he fled amain to Samos. But the enemy followed in pursuit.

The Teians, who at first refused admittance to the land forces, when now the Athenians plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. Here the bulk of them were inactive for a time, attending the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit. But, when time wore on without his appearing, they demolished of their own accord the wall which the Athenians had built on the side of Teos, facing the continent. In this they were also assisted by a small party of barbarians, who in this interval had joined them, and were commanded by Tages, the deputy of Tissaphernes.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, having furnished the mariners of the Peloponnesian vessels with proper arms, left them as a garrison in Chios. Having manned their vessels afresh at Chios, with an addition

of twenty others, they stood away for Miletus, as meditating its revolt. This was owing to Alcibiades; who, having an interest in persons of the first rank among the Milesians, made it a point to effect their accession before the fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and to secure the whole honor to the Chians and himself, and Chalcideus and Endius who had sent him, in pursuance of his engagements, to work the revolt of the cities, with the sole power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. Having therefore performed the greatest part of their voyage thither without being discovered, and prevented by a small portion of time Strombichides, and also Thrasycles, who was lately come up from Athens with twelve ships, and in junction with the former, followed after them, they caused Miletus to revolt. The Athenians, indeed, with nineteen sail, arrived on their heels; but, as the Milesians denied them a reception, they took their station at Lade, an adjacent island.

The first alliance between the king and the Lacedæmonians was made immediately after the revolt of Miletus, by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as follows:

‘On these terms the Lacedæmonians and confederates make an alliance with the king and Tissaphernes:—

‘Whatever region or cities the king possesses and the ancestors of the king possessed, be those the king’s.

‘And, out of those cities, whatever sums of money or any other supply went to the Athenians, let the king and the Lacedæmonians and confederates jointly stop, that the Athenians may no longer receive those sums of money, nor any other such supply.

‘ And the war against the Athenians let the king and the Lacedæmonians and confederates jointly carry on.

‘ And be it unlawful to put an end to the war against the Athenians without the consent of both the contracting parties; of the king on one side, of the Lacedæmonians and confederates on the other.

‘ If, farther, any revolt from the king, be they declared enemies to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

‘ And, if any revolt from the Lacedæmonians and confederates, be they declared enemies, in the same manner, to the king.’

This alliance was now formally concluded.

Immediately after this the Chians, who had manned out ten additional ships, stood away to Anæa; being desirous to pick up some information of what was doing at Miletus, and at the same time to cause the revolt of the cities. Here, being reached by an order from Chalcideus to return back to Chios, with an intimation that Amorges with a land army would soon be on them, they sailed away to the temple of Jupiter. From hence they descried sixteen ships, which Diomedon was bringing up from Athens, from whence he had sailed somewhat later than Thrasycles. On this discovery they fled amain with a single ship to Ephesus, but with the rest of their fleet to Teos. Four, indeed, of the number, which their crews had abandoned, the Athenians took; yet all the hands escaped on shore; but the remainder reached in safety the city of the Teians. After this the Athenians stood away into Samos: but the Chians, putting again to sea with the residue of their ships, and attended by a land force, caused Lebedos to revolt, and also Eræ. And,

these points carried, both the land force and the squadron returned respectively to their own homes.

About the same time the twenty sail of Peloponnesians, which had been chased into Piræus, and lay blocked up there by an equal number of Athenians, having made an unexpected sally on the enemy, and got the better in a naval engagement, took four of the Athenian ships; and sailing away from Cenchreæ, were again fitting out for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus also came down thither from Lacedæmon as admiral, in whose hands the whole command at sea was now lodged.

When the land army had quitted Teos, Tissaphernes in person came thither with a body; and, after completely demolishing those parts of the wall before Teos which were yet left standing, marched away.

Not long after his departure Diomedon, arriving there with ten sail of Athenians, in order to gain a reception, made a truce with the Teians. From thence he coasted along to Eræ, and assaulted the place; but, not being able to take it, he sailed away.

Coinciding with this in point of time, an insurrection was made at Samos by the people against the nobility. The Athenians, who with three ships were then lying at Samos, assisted the former. On this occasion the Samian people massacred about two hundred persons, all of the nobility. Four hundred others they condemned to exile; and, having divided amongst themselves their lands and houses, and obtained from the Athenians a decree of being governed by their own constitutions, as men whose fidelity was no longer to be suspected, they assumed the whole civil administration; leaving no share of it in the hands of the landed gentry, and absolutely prohibiting to the peo-

ple all alliance for the future with them, so as neither to give their daughters to them, nor ever to marry theirs.

After these transactions, during the same summer, the Chians, proceeding with unabating ardor, left nothing undone to compass the revolt of the cities. Even without Peloponnesian aid they made them visits with their own single force; and, desirous at the same time to involve as large a number as possible in their own dangers, they undertook a voyage with thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. This agreed exactly with the Lacedæmonian plan; which was to make the second attempt on that island, and from thence to proceed to Hellespont. The land force at the same time of such Peloponnesians as were at hand, and their adjacent allies, attended their motions by the route of Clazomenæ and Cyme: these were commanded by Eulas, a Spartan; but the fleet was under the orders of Deixiadas, a native of those parts: and those ships, steering first towards, and arriving at Methymne, caused its revolt.¹

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But Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral-in-chief, putting to sea from Cenchreæ, where he had taken on him the command, with four sail of shipping arrived at Chios: and the third day after his arrival there twenty-five sail of Athenians, commanded by Leon and Diomedon, reached the isle of Lesbos; for Leon had been lately sent from Athens with a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening of that day Astyochus put out again to sea, with the addition of one Chian ship,

¹ From what follows it looks as if some words were wanting here. The Latin translators have endeavored to supply it, thus: ‘And the Chians, leaving four ships here for the defence of the place, stood away with the rest to Mitylene, and caused it to revolt.’

and stood away for Lesbos to give them all the assistance in his power. Accordingly he touched first at Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day following to Eressus, where information met him that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians at a shout; for the latter, as their arrival was intirely unexpected, standing boldly into the harbor, seized at once all the Chian vessels; and then landing, and gaining a victory over such as made head against them, became masters of the city. Astyochus, informed of this event by the Eressians, and the Chian ships under the command of Eubulus from Methymne,—which, having been left in the harbor of that place, had fled at once when Mitylene was taken, three of them came up safe to Astyochus, but one had fallen into the hands of the Athenians,—Astyochus now desisted from proceeding to Mitylene. Having effected the revolt of Eressus, and provided the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the soldiers from on board his own squadron to march by land, under the command of Eteonicus, towards Antissa and Methymne; whilst himself, with his own ships and the three Chians, advanced along the shore towards the same places. He hoped the Methymneans, on the sight of this succor, would resume their spirits, and abide by their revolt. But, when every thing in Lesbos seemed to act in concert against his scheme, he took his landmen again on board, and made the best of his way back again to Chios. The forces, farther, that had attended the motions of his squadron, and which were to have proceeded with him to Hellespont, were dismissed to their respective cities. After this they were joined at Chios by six ships, which were sent thither by the confederate fleet of Peloponnesians assembled at Cenchreæ.

The Athenians in the mean time were employed in

resettling the state of affairs in Lesbos. Standing across from thence, and demolishing Polichne, on the continent, lately fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed all the latter back again to their city in the island, excepting such as were authors of the revolt; for these had retired to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ once more became subject to the Athenians.

The same summer the Athenians, who with twenty ships had stationed themselves at Lade to awe Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, killed Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian, who with a handful of men endeavored to repulse them. The third day after this action they re-embarked, but first erected a trophy; which the Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not fixed on a spot which was the property of the victors.

Leon also and Diomedon, at the head of the Athenian fleet on the station of Lesbos, assembling together what force they could from the Oinussæ islands, which lie before Chios, and from Sidusa and Pteleum, fortresses of their own in Erythrae, stood away from Lesbos in a body, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. The land soldiers on board them were some of the heavy-armed of the public roll of Athens, now pressed into this service. At Cardamyle they landed; and at Bolissus, having routed in battle a body of Chians that made head against them, and done great execution on them, they reduced all the places in that quarter of the island. At Phanae also they fought a second time with great success; and, a third time, at Leuconium: but as, after these repeated defeats, the Chians no longer showed themselves in the field to oppose them, the victors made cruel ravage on that rich and fertile country; and which, from the invasion of the Medes to the present period of time, had

been totally exempted from the miseries of war : for, next to the Lacedæmonians, the Chians are the only people who (as far as I have been able to observe) have enjoyed a series of public prosperity with a steady and uniform moderation, and, in proportion as their state increased in wealth and power, made suitable accessions to its domestic splendor and security. Nay, even their late revolt, if this should chance to be ascribed to a want of judicious and cautionary measures, they never ventured to declare, till they had fortified the hazardous step with numerous and gallant confederates, and saw plainly that the Athenians (as even the Athenians themselves could not possibly deny), after the blow received in Sicily, were plunged into the lowest depth of impotence and distress. If therefore they proved mistaken, it was one of those cases inseparable from the constant mutability of human affairs, where numbers were involved in the same mistake with themselves, who yet in their judgment were perfectly convinced that the entire ruin of Athens was fast approaching.

Now, therefore, blocked up as they were by sea, whilst their lands all around were ravaged by the enemy, a party among them were concerting the method of delivering up the city into the hands of the Athenians. But those in the administration, getting wind of their design, refrained indeed from making a bustle about it in public ; but, fetching over Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral-in-chief, with his four ships from Erythræ, they consulted how to prevent the execution of the plot by the mildest and most gentle methods, either by taking hostages for the fidelity of the suspected, or some other such cautionary expedients. In this posture stood affairs at Chios.

But, from Athens, in the close of the same summer, one thousand five hundred heavy-armed Athenians and a thousand Argives, (for five hundred Argives, who were but light-armed, the Athenians had equipped in a manner more complete,) with the addition of a thousand confederates, in eight-and-forty sail of ships, including the transports of the heavy-armed, and put under the command of Phrynicus, and Onomacles, and Skironidas, sailed away to Samos, and thence stretching over to Miletus, encamped themselves before it. The Milesians marched out into the field, to the amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, assisted by the Peloponnesians who came over with Chalcideus, and a body of foreign mercenaries furnished by Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes also assisted them in person with an aid of cavalry; and thus battle was joined against the Athenians and confederates. The Argives, of whom a whole wing was composed, advanced before the rest of the line; and contemning their enemy too much, as Ionians, and unable to stand their shock, they charged in a disorderly manner, were routed by the Milesians, and no less a number than three hundred of their body were destroyed. But the Athenians beat first the Peloponnesians, and then cleared the field of the barbarians and all the rabble of the enemy; yet came not at all to an engagement with the Milesians; for the latter, returning towards the city from the chase of the Argives, no sooner perceived that their own side was vanquished than they quitted the field of battle. The Athenians, therefore, as victors, posted themselves under the very walls of Miletus. It is observable that, in this battle, the Ionians had on both sides the better of the Dorians: for the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians who were ranged against them; and the Milesians did the same by the Argives. But now, after

erecting a trophy, as the town was seated on an isthmus, the Athenians were preparing to cut it off by a work of circumvallation ; concluding that, if they once could get possession of Miletus, they should easily complete the reduction of the other states.

It was now about the close of evening, and advice was brought them that five-and-fifty sail of ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily were only not at hand : for from Sicily, where Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuously advised to go on with what yet remained in regard to the total demolition of the Athenians, twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Selinuntians came over. The Peloponnesian fleet, which had been fitting out, was now ready for service ; and both these were sent out in conjunction, under the orders of Theramenes the Lacedæmonian, who was to carry them to Astyochus, the admiral-in-chief. They arrived first at Eleus, an island before Miletus. Being there informed that the Athenians lay before Miletus, they departed thence ; and, steering first into the gulf of Iasus, were desirous to pick up information how things went at Miletus. Alcibiades had now ridden to Teichiussa in the Milesian ; in which quarter of the gulf the fleets had come to anchor for the night, and received there a full account of the battle. Alcibiades had been present at it, and had given his assistance to the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He therefore earnestly pressed them, unless they were desirous to see all Ionia lost, and all their great expectations blasted at once, to repair with all possible expedition to the succor of Miletus, and by no means to suffer it to be invested by a circumvallation. In pursuance of this it was resolved that at the first dawn of day they should stand away to its succor.

But Phrynicus, the Athenian commander, when ad-

wised from Lerus of the certain arrival of this united fleet, even though his colleagues declared openly for keeping their ground and hazarding an engagement by sea, protested boldly that ‘ such a step, for his own part, he could not take ; and, were he able to hinder it, that neither they nor any one should force him to it : for, since it would be afterwards in their power, when they had got better intelligence of the numbers of the enemy, and made what possible accessions they could to their own, and when they had prepared for action in an ample and leisurely manner,—since it would be still in their power to fight, the dread of a shameful or reproachful imputation should not bend him to risk an engagement against his judgment. It could be no matter of reproach to the Athenians to retire with their fleet when the exigences of time required it ; but, in every respect, it would be highly reproachful to them should they fight and be vanquished. He would not therefore involve the state, not only in reproach, but in the greatest of dangers ; the state which, but just now respiring from the terrible blows it had received, scarce thought it prudential with most ample preparation to choose voluntary hazards, or even, when the last necessity demanded, to strike first at the enemy ; why now, when no necessity compelled, must it be thrown into wilful spontaneous dangers ? ’ He exhorted them, therefore, without loss of time to carry the wounded on board, to re-embark their troops, and, securing what baggage they had brought along with them, to leave behind what booty they had got from the enemy, that their ships might not be too deeply laden ; and make the best of their way to Samos ; and from thence, after collecting together what additional force they could, to watch for and seize the seasons of advantage to attack their foes.

The advice of Phrynicus, thus given, was prevailing, and accordingly was put in execution. He was regarded, not only on the present, but on future occasions, not only for this, but all the subsequent instances of his conduct, as a man of an excellent understanding.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, so soon as the evening was closed, made the best of their way to Miletus, and left the victory imperfect. And the Argives, without making the least stay, chagrined as they were at their late defeat, departed immediately from Samos to return to Argos.

The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, weighing from Teichiussa, stood in for Miletus. After one day's stay in that harbor, on the next, having augmented their squadron with the Chian ships which had formerly been chased in company with Chalcideus, they determined to go back again to Teichiussa to fetch off what stores they had landed there. Accordingly, when they were thus returned, Tissaphernes, being come up with his land army, persuaded them to stand directly against Iasus, in which his enemy Amorges at that instant lay. Thus, falling on Iasus by surprise, the inhabitants of which expected none but an Athenian squadron, they became masters of it. In this action the Syracusans were the persons who gained the greatest honor. Amorges, farther, the bastard son of Pisuthnes, who was a revolter from the king, was taken prisoner by the Peloponnesians. They delivered him up to Tissaphernes, that if he pleased he might send him to the king, in obedience to his orders. Iasus, farther, they put to the sack; and the army made on this occasion a very large booty, for this city had ever been remarkable for its wealth. They gave quarter to the auxiliaries in the service of Amorges; and without

committing the least insult on them, took them into their own troops, as the bulk of them were Peloponnesians. They delivered up the town into the hands of Tissaphernes, as likewise all the prisoners, whether slaves or freemen, on covenant to receive from him a daric stater¹ for each. This being done, they again repaired to Miletus; and from hence they detached Pædaritus, the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent expressly to be governor of Chios, to march over land to Erythræ, having under his command the auxiliaries who had served under Amorges, and appointed Philippus to command at Miletus. And the summer ended.

The winter now succeeding, after Tissaphernes had garrisoned and provided for the security of Iasus, he repaired to Miletus, and distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance of his engagements at Lacedæmon, to all the ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma² to each mariner by the day; but for the remainder of time he declared he would only pay at the rate of three oboli,³ till he had consulted the king's pleasure; and, in case his master's orders were for it, he said he would make it up a complete drachma. But, as Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, remonstrated sharply against this usage, (for Theramenes, not regarding himself as admiral, since he was now at the head of the fleet merely to carry it up to Astyochus, was very indolent about the article of pay,) it was at length compromised, that excepting the five supernumerary ships, the crews of the rest should receive more than three oboli a man: for to the five-and-fifty ships he paid three talents⁴ a

¹ One pound twelve shillings and three-pence halfpenny.

² Seven-pence three farthings.

³ Half a drachma.

⁴ There is manifestly a fault here; for 'three,' in the origi-

month ; and, for the rest, as many as exceeded that number, pay was to be furnished at the rate of three oboli a day only.

The same winter, the Athenians now lying at Samos had been reinforced by the arrival of five-and-thirty sail from Athens, under the command of Charminus, and Strombichides, and Euctemon ; and they had farther assembled all their ships from Chios, and

nal, should be read ' thirty ' talents a month. Mr. Hobbes has taken the pains to compute, and finds that the Peloponnesian ships carried eighteen men apiece. What ! only so small a crew as eighteen men for a ship of war with three banks of oars ? or, where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did Tissaphernes only pay a tenth part of that number ? Xenophon, in the first book of his Greek history, enables us to set all to rights. Lysander is negotiating with Cyrus for an increase of pay. Cyrus insists on the former agreement, made by Tissaphernes, that every ship should receive but thirty minæ a month. The daily pay of each was of course one mina, or one hundred drachmas ; whence it appears that, at three oboli, or half a drachma a man, the pay of sixty ships, each carrying two hundred men, would be just thirty talents. Thirty talents therefore, paid to fifty-five ships for a month, was two talents and a half above three oboli a day : and hence it seems pretty clear that the complement of a Peloponnesian ship of war was two hundred men.

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm what has already been said, and serve at the same time to ascertain the number of men on board a ship of war. In the sixth book Thucydides says the Egestans brought to Athens sixty talents, as a month's pay for sixty ships. He says also, that in the Sicilian expedition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised to a drachma a man. Now a talent a month, reckoning thirty days to the month, is two minæ a day ; and two minæ are just two hundred drachmas. Hence it is plain the complement of an Athenian ship was two hundred men ; and, according to the former computation, that of a Peloponnesian ship was, as might reasonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a farther confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed copies of the original, as was said above ; where, instead of three talents, which amount but to 58*1l. 5s.* sterling, should have been read thirty talents, amounting in English money to *5812l. 10s.*

others. A resolution was therefore taken, after assigning each his peculiar command by lot, to make up against it with a naval force, and awe Miletus; but to send against Chios both a naval and a land force; and this accordingly they put in execution: for in fact Strombichides, and Onomacles, and Euctemon, with a squadron of thirty sail and a body of transports; which had on board a detachment from the thousand heavy-armed which came against Miletus, stood away for Chios, as this service had fallen to them by lot: but the rest of the commanders who now remained at Samos, having under them seventy-four ships, were quite lords of the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Miletus.

Astyochus, who happened at this juncture to be in Chios, selecting hostages as a prevention against treachery, thought proper for the present to desist, when he heard of the arrival of the squadron under Tharamenes, and that their engagements with Tissaphernes were much altered for the better. But, taking with him ten sail of Peloponnesians and ten of Chians, he put to sea; and, having made an attempt on Pteleum, though without success, he crossed over to Clazomenæ. He there summoned such of the inhabitants as were attached to the Athenians to remove with their effects up to Daphnus, and leave him in possession of the place; Tamus, farther, the sub-governor of Ionia; joined with him in the summons. But, when the inhabitants rejected the offer, he made an assault on the city, which had no fortifications; yet, miscarrying in the attempt, he put off again to sea in a hard gale of wind, and reached, with those ships that kept up with him, Phocea and Cyme; but the rest of the squadron was by stress of weather forced over to the isles which lie near to Clazomenæ; Marathusa, and Pele,

and Drimussa ; and whatever effects belonging to the Clazomenians had by way of security been deposited there, during eight days' continuance, which the stormy weather had obliged them to stay, they partly plundered, and partly destroyed ; and, having secured their booty on board, got away to Phocea and Cyme, and joined Astyochus. But, whilst he was yet in this station, ambassadors reached him from the Lesbians, imparting to him their desire to revolt. Him, indeed, they persuaded ; but, when the Corinthians and the rest of the confederates declared their repugnance, because of the former miscarriage, he weighed from thence and made sail for Chios. And now, a storm dispersing his squadron, at last they all came in, though from different quarters to which they had been driven, and rejoined him at Chios.

The next step to this was the junction of Pædaritus ; who, being now at Erythræ, after marching by land from Miletus, passed over in person with the troops under his command to Chios. He had also with him about five hundred soldiers, taken out of the five ships under Chalcideus, who had been left behind with their arms.

But now, the Lesbians notifying again their readiness to revolt, Astyochus, in a conference with Pædaritus and the Chians, maintained the necessity of going thither with a squadron to support the revolt of Lesbos ; since, in consequence of it, they must either enlarge the number of their confederates, or, even through miscarrying in the design, must hurt the Athenians. But they were deaf to this remonstrance ; and Pædaritus positively declared that he should not be attended by the ships of Chios. On this, taking with him five sail of Corinthians, a sixth ship belonging to Megara, and one more of Hermione, and all the La-

conian which he himself brought thither, he stood away from thence to his station at Miletus, uttering grievous threats against the Chians, that, ‘ how low soever they might be reduced, they should never receive any succor from him.’ Accordingly, touching first at Corycus of Erythrae, he moored there for the night. The Athenians, who, from Samos, with a considerable strength, were now bound against Chios, were lying the same instant of time on the other side of the cape ; but so stationed that neither party knew of the nearness of the other. At this juncture, a letter being delivered from Psædaritus, that a party of Erythreans, who had been prisoners at Samos and released from thence, were coming to Erythrae to betray that place, Astyochus put out again immediately for Erythrae ; and thus narrowly, on this occasion, did he escape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Psædaritus, farther, had made the passage on this affair ; and both having joined in making all necessary inquiries about those who were accused of this piece of treachery, when they found the whole to have been a plot of the prisoners at Samos, merely to recover their liberty, they pronounced them innocent, and so departed, the latter to Chios ; but the other, in pursuance of his first destination, made the best of his way to Miletus.

In the mean time, the armament of the Athenians, having sailed round from Corycus to Arginum, fell in with three long vessels of the Chians, and no sooner had despatched than they gave them chase. And now a violent storm arose, and the vessels of the Chians with great difficulty escaped into harbor : but, of the Athenian squadron, three, which had most briskly followed the chase, were disabled and driven ashore at the city of the Chians ; the crews of them were partly

made prisoners, and partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet got into a safe harbor, which is known by the name of Phœnicus, under the Mimas. From hence they afterwards took their course to Lesbos, and got all in readiness to raise fortifications.

From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian, putting out to sea with ten sail of Thurians commanded by Doricus, the son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, with one ship of Laconia and one of Syracuse, arrived at Cnidus. This place was now in revolt from Tissaphernes. Those at Miletus were no sooner advised of the arrival of this squadron, than they sent them orders, with one moiety of their ships, to keep guard on Cnidus, and with the other to post themselves at the Triopium, in order to take under their convoy the trading vessels which were in their course from Egypt. The Triopium is a point in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the sea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athenians, informed of their designs, and standing away from Samos, took six of the ships which were stationed at Triopium: the crews, indeed, quitted their ships, and reached the shore. This being done, the victor sailed directly to Cnidus; and, making an assault on that city, which was quite unfortified, had very nearly taken it. On the next day they renewed the assault: yet, as the inhabitants had taken care to make it more secure by favor of the night, and the men escaped from the vessels taken at Triopium had thrown themselves into the place, they did less damage than on the preceding day. After scouring and laying waste the territory of Cnidus, they sailed back to Samos.

About the same time, Astyochus having rejoined the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponnesians were still abounding in all the needful expedients of war. Good pay

was regularly advanced them, and the soldiers had store of money yet remaining of the rich booty they made at Iasus. The Milesians, farther, sustained with alacrity the burden of the war. It was, however, the opinion of the Peloponnesians that the first treaty made with Tissaphernes by Chalcideus was in some articles defective and less advantageous to themselves. On this they drew up and ratified a second in the presence of Theramenes. The articles of it are these :

‘ Stipulated by the Lacedæmonians and confederates, with king Darius and the sons of the king and Tissaphernes, that peace and amity subsist on the following conditions :

‘ Whatever province or city soever belongs to king Darius, or did belong to his father or ancestors, against them in a hostile manner not to march, and no injury to do, are bound both Lacedæmonians and confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Not to exact tribute from any such places, are bound both Lacedæmonians and confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Neither shall king Darius, nor any subject of the king, march in a hostile manner against, nor do any injury to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

‘ But, in case the Lacedæmonians or confederates need any assistance whatever from the king, or the king from the Lacedæmonians and confederates ; whatever either party can convince the other to be right, let that be done.

‘ Be the war against the Athenians and confederates carried on by both parties in strict conjunction ; and, in case an accommodation be taken in hand, be it settled by both parties acting in conjunction.

‘ But, whatever army be brought into the territories of the king at the request and summons of the king, the king to defray the expense.

‘ And, if any of the states, comprehended in this league with the king, invade the territories of the king, the others to oppose and act with all their power in defence of the king.

‘ And, if any province belonging to the king, or subject to his dominion, invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians or confederates, the king to oppose, and with all his power to defend the party invaded.’

When the finishing hand was put to this treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the fleet to Astyochus, put to sea in a fly-boat, and intirely disappeared.

But the Athenians from Lesbos, having now made their passage and landed their forces in Chios, and being masters of the coast and sea, fortified Delphinium; a place remarkably strong by nature towards the land; abounding, farther, with harbors, and seated at no considerable distance from the city of the Chians. And now the Chians, dispirited by the many defeats they had already received, and, what is worse, far from being actuated by general unanimity, (but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and his adherents having been lately put to death by Pædaritus for atticing, and the rest of the citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the few, each individual amongst them suspecting his neighbor,) the Chians now remained quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons above mentioned, they neither looked on themselves, nor the auxiliaries under Pædaritus, as a match for the enemy. Yet, as their last resource, they sent to Miletus, requesting Astyochus to come over to their succor: but, as he was deaf to their intreaties, Pædaritus sent a letter to Lacedæmon about him, which accused him of injustice. And to this situation were brought the Athenian affairs at Chios.

Their squadron also at Samos made several visits to

the squadron of the enemy at Miletus: but, as the latter refused to come out to engage them, they returned again to Samos, without committing any hostilities.

From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, twenty-seven sail of ships, equipped by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus, at the instances of his agents, Calligitus the Megarean and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to sea, and made over to Ionia, about the solstice. Antisthenes the Spartan was on board as admiral. With him the Lacedæmonians sent also eleven Spartans, to be a council to Astyochus; in the number of whom was Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus. To these an order was given, that, ‘when arrived at Miletus, they should in concert act in all respects as might be best for the service; and this squadron, or one equal in strength, or larger or smaller, at their own discretion, should proceed to Hellespont for the service of Pharnabazus, and be sent away under the command of Clearchus, the son of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the voyage; and, in case it was judged expedient by the council of eleven, to dismiss Astyochus from the chief command, and substitute Antisthenes.’ On account of the letters of Pædaritus, they began to suspect the former. This squadron, therefore, standing out to sea from Malea, arrived first at Melos; and, falling in with ten sail of Athenians, they took and burned three of them, which their crews had abandoned: but, apprehensive that those Athenian ships which had escaped might advertise the fleet at Samos of their approach, as was actually the case, they stretched away for Crete; and for better security, keeping a good look-out, and taking more time, they made land first at Caunus of Asia. From thence, as being now beyond the reach of danger, they despatched

a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend and bring them up.

But, about the same juncture of time, the Chians and Pædaritus, not bearing to acquiesce under the dilatory answers of Astyochus, pressed him, by repeated messages, ‘to come over with the whole of his force, and relieve them from the present blockade; and by no means to look indolently about him, whilst the most important of the confederate states in Ionia was shut up by sea, and by land exposed to rapines:’ for the domestics of the Chians, being many in number, nay, the largest that any one community except the Lacedæmonians kept, and accustomed, because of their multitude, to be punished with extraordinary severity for their misdemeanors, no sooner judged that the Athenian forces, by throwing up works, had gained a sure footing in the island, than large numbers of them at once deserted to the enemy, and were afterwards the persons who, as perfectly well acquainted with the country, committed the heaviest depredations. The Chians therefore urged, that ‘the last necessity called on him, whilst yet there was hope or a possibility of success remaining, (the works round Delphinium yet incomplete, and a larger circle even still to be taken in and fortified for the security of the camp and the fleet,) to undertake their relief.’ On this Astyochus, who to verify his threats had never before thought seriously about it, being now convinced that the whole confederate body was bent on their preservation, determined in person to go to their succor.

But, just at this crisis, advice was brought him from Caunus, that ‘twenty-seven sail of ships and the assistant-council of Lacedæmonians had arrived.’ Concluding, on this, that every other point ought to be postponed to this large reinforcement, that his junc-

tion with it might be effected in order to invest them with the sovereignty of the sea, and that the Lacedæmonians who came to inspect his own conduct might securely finish their voyage ; throwing up immediately all concern for Chios, he sailed away for Caunus. But having landed at Cos Meropidis, the inhabitants of which had refuged themselves in the mountains, he rifled the city, which was quite unfortified, and had lately been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the greatest that had been felt there in the memory of us now living. By excursions also through all the country, he made prize of all he found, excepting seamen ; for such he dismissed unhurt.

From Cos, advancing by night to Cnidus, he was dissuaded by the Cnadians from landing his men ; but, on the contrary, without loss of time to get out to sea, and make head against twenty sail of Athenians, which Charminus, one of the commanders from Samos, had under his orders, and with them was watching the approach of the twenty-seven sail coming up from Peloponnesus, which Astyochus was now going to join : for they at Samos had received from Miletus advice of their coming ; and Charminus was appointed to cruise for them about Cyme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia ; and by this time he knew, for a certainty, that they were lying at Caunus.

Astyochus, therefore, without loss of time, stood away for Cyme, with a view to surprise the ships of the enemy at sea before they could get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain and thick cloudy weather occasioned the dispersion of his vessels in the dark, and sadly disordered him.

When morning broke, the fleet being widely separated and the left wing driven within the view of the Athenians, the remainder yet driving in confusion

about the island, Charminus and the Athenians launched out against them with all possible expedition, though with fewer than twenty sail, imagining this to be the squadron from Caunus whose approach they were to observe; and proceeding instantly to action, they sunk three and disabled others. They had by far the better in the action, till the numerous remainder of hostile ships appeared, to their great consternation, and encompassed them round on all sides. Then, taking to open flight, they lost six of their ships; but with the remainder reached in safety the island of Teuglussa, and from thence proceeded to Halicarnassus.

This being done, the Peloponnesians, putting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-seven sail from Caunus completing here their junction with them, they put out again to sea in one body; and, after erecting a trophy at Cyme, returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus.

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no sooner been informed of the engagements of the squadrons, than with the whole of their fleet they put out from Samos, and made the best of their way to Cyme: and yet against the fleet at Cnidus they made no sallies, as neither did the enemy against them; but, after taking up the tackling of the vessels left at Cyme, and making an assault on Lorima on the continent, they returned to Samos.

The whole united fleet of the Peloponnesians, now lying at Cnidus, was busy in refitting completely for service; and the Lacedæmonian council of eleven had a conference with Tissaphernes, who was now come to them, in which they notified to him their dislike of some things in past transactions; and, in regard to the future operations of war, debated in what manner they might be carried on for their joint benefit and conve-

nience. But Liebas was the person who scrutinised most closely into the past, and expressed a dissatisfaction with both treaties ; affirming that even the last settled by Theramenes was far from being good ; but that terrible it would be, should the king now claim, on that pretext, the possession of that tract of country of which either he or his ancestors had formerly been masters : for thus he might be enabled once more to enslave all the islands, Thessaly and Locris, quite as far as Boeotia ; whilst the Lacedæmonians, instead of freeing, would be obliged to impose the Median subjection on the Grecians. He insisted therefore that a better treaty should be made, or at least the former should be instantly disannulled ; for on terms like the present they would scorn to take pay from the king. Nettled at this, Tissaphernes went from them in a fit of choler, without bringing affairs to any kind of settlement.

The scheme now next in agitation was a voyage to Rhodes, which the most powerful persons there had by embassies solicited them to undertake. They were full of hopes to bring into their subjection an island by no means inconsiderable either for number of mariners or soldiers ; and at the same time judged themselves able, by their present alliances, to defray the expense of their fleet without requesting pay from Tissaphernes. Accordingly, this winter, with great dispatch, they put to sea from Cnidus ; and arriving first at Camirus, on the Rhodian coast, with ninety-four ships, they struck a consternation into the multitude, who knew nothing of past transactions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon their dwellings as the city was not guarded by the least fortification. The Lacedæmonians afterwards summoning to a conference these, and the Rhodians also from two other cities,

Lindus and Ielysus, persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly went over to the Peloponnesians.

At the same juncture of time the Athenians, who had discovered their design, put out with their fleet from Samos, earnestly bent on preventing the scheme. They were seen indeed out at sea by the enemy, but made their appearance a little too late. For the present therefore they put back to Chalce, and from thence to Samos; and afterwards, making frequent trips from Chalce, and Cos, and Samos, they warred against Rhodes.

The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rhodians a sum amounting to about two-and-thirty talents;¹ and having laid their ships aground, continued with them eighty days without subjecting them to any farther imposition.

During this interval of time, nay, extended farther back, before they undertook this enterprise against Rhodes, the following transaction happened:—

Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, falling under the suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through them a letter having been sent from Lacedæmon to Astyochus to put him to death, for he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in other respects was become notorious, Alcibiades, I say, fearful of his life, withdrew himself first to Tissaphernes, and, in the next place, did all in his power to undermine what interest the Peloponnesians had in him. Grown at length his dictator in every affair, he abridged their pay; that, instead of an Attic drachma,² three oboli only should be given them, and that too

¹ Six thousand two hundred pounds sterling.

² Six oboli, or seven-pence three farthings sterling.

with no punctuality. He advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate with them, that ‘the Athenians, who through a long tract of time had gained experience in naval affairs, paid only three oboli to their seamen; not so much through a principle of frugality as to prevent their seamen from growing insolent through too much plenty; some of them would otherwise render their bodies less fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to purchase those pleasures by which weakness is occasioned; and others would desert, and leave their arrears to balance their desertion.’ He instructed him, farther, how, by seasonable gratuities to the commanders of ships and generals of the states, he might persuade them all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting the Syracusans; for, amongst these, Hermocrates alone made loud remonstrances in behalf of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades himself took on him to give the denial to such states as petitioned for money; making answer himself, instead of Tissaphernes, that, for instance, ‘the Chians were void of all shame; who, though the most wealthy of the Grecians, and hitherto preserved by the auxiliary efforts of others, yet are ever requiring strangers to expose their lives and fortunes to keep them free.’ As for other states, he maintained ‘they acted basely, if, when subjected to vast expenses before they revolted from the Athenians, they refused to lay out as much, nay, a great deal more, in their own defence. He was also dexterous at proving, that ‘Tissaphernes, since now he supported the war at his own private expense, was in the right to be frugal; but assuredly, when returns were made him from the king, he would make up the present abatement of pay, and do strict justice to every single state.’ He farther suggested to Tissaphernes, that ‘he should not be too much in a hurry to bring

the war to a conclusion ; or entertain the wish, either by bringing up the Phœnician fleet which he had provided, or by taking into pay a larger number of Grecians, to turn the superiority at land and sea in favor of the Lacedæmonians. He ought rather to leave both parties pretty nearly balanced in strength ; and so enable the king, when one of them became troublesome, to let the other party loose against them : whereas, should the dominion in both elements be given exclusively to either, he would then be distressed for want of sufficient power to pull down the triumphant state ; unless, at a prodigious expense, and through infinity of danger to himself, he should choose to enter the lists in person and war them down. The risks incurred by the other method were far more eligible, because attended with a smaller proportion of expense ; and his master might lie by with perfect security, whilst he was wearing out the Grecians by their own reciprocal embroilments.' He moreover hinted to him, that ' the Athenians were the best suited of the two to share the dominion with him ; because they were less desirous of power on the continent, and by their peculiar turn of politics and military conduct were better adapted for this purpose. They would be glad, at the same time, to subdue the maritime parts to their own yoke ; and to that of the king all Grecians whatever who live on the continent. The Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, came thither with the sole passion to set them free ; nor in common prudence could it be judged likely, that men, who were this moment employed to deliver Grecians from the yoke of Grecians, would in that case be stopped by any thing but a superior force from delivering them also from the yoke of barbarians.' He advised him, therefore, in the first place, to wear out the strength of both ; and, after clipping

as much as possible the wings of the Athenians, then instantly to drive the Peloponnesians from off his coasts.'

The larger part of this advice Tissaphernes determined to follow, so far at least as may be gathered from his actions: for, satisfied by this means with Alcibiades, as a person who on these points gave him sound advice, and resigning himself up to his guidance, he paid but sorrowly their subsistence to the Peloponnesians, and would not suffer them to engage at sea. By the constant pretext that the Phœnician fleet was coming up, and then with so great a superiority of strength the war might be brought to a clear decision, he ruined all operations of war; he suffered the vigor of their fleet, which in fact was strong and mighty, insensibly to moulder away, and disconcerted them so openly in other respects, that his motives in doing it were no longer to be concealed.

Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the king when he had opportunities, and which he really thought to be the best in policy: but at the same time he had deep in his heart and in his study his own return to his country; assured within himself, that if he preserved it from a total destruction, he might find a time to compass his own restoration; and nothing, he judged, could expedite his purpose more, than if it appeared to the world that Tissaphernes was his friend; which also was verified by fact.

For when the Athenian troops at Samos perceived that he had so great an interest with Tissaphernes, and Alcibiades had already paved the way, by sending intimations beforehand to the men of influence and authority amongst them how desirous he was they should patronise his return with the consent of the persons of

the greatest honor and worth in their company ; since only under an oligarchy, but not under an iniquitous cabal or that democracy which had formerly banished him, could he even desire it ; and, thus recalled, he would come and join his cares with theirs for the public welfare, and procure them farther the friendship of Tissaphernes ; when, more than this, the officers of those Athenians at Samos, and the men of highest authority amongst them, were voluntarily inclined to put an end to the democracy ; the method of bringing it about began to be agitated first in the army, and from thence soon made a stir in Athens itself.

Some persons passed over from Samos to concert matters with Alcibiades ; who gave them room to hope that he could render first Tissaphernes, and in the next place the king, their friend, if they would dissolve the democracy ; since, on this sole condition could the king be assured of their sincerity. This contributed to enhance their sanguine expectations, that on this their affairs might take a new turn, in which men of first rank in the community, who in the present management were most depressed, might recover the administration, and gain the ascendant over their enemies. Returning therefore to Samos, they took in the most proper persons there to be assistants to the scheme ; and to the many made public declarations, that the king might be made their friend, and supply them with money, were Alcibiades recalled, and the democracy suspended. The effect of these declarations on the many was this, that, though for the present they were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, yet, soothed by the flattering hope of the royal subsidies, they refrained from all manner of tumult.

But the set which was caballing in favor of an oligarchy, after such open declarations to the multitude,

reconsidered the promises of Alcibiades amongst themselves, and with a larger number of their associates. The scheme was judged by all the rest to be feasible and sure; but Phrynicus, who was yet in command, declared a total dislike to it. It appeared to him (which was really the case) that Alcibiades cared as little for an oligarchical as a democratical government; and that no other thought lay seriously at his heart than to throw the present government into some state of confusion, which his friends might so far improve as to carry his recallment. Of consequence, the first point they should guard against was, not to be thrown into seditions for the benefit of the king. It was not probable, he plainly told them, when the Peloponnesians had gained a power by sea equal to their own, and were masters of cities not the most inconsiderable amidst the king's dominions, that the latter should turn the balance in favor of the Athenians, in whom he had no confidence at all, whilst he might firmly depend on the friendship of the Peloponnesians, who had never done him any harm. As for confederate states, to whom they were to give a certain pledge of future oligarchy, by setting up that government amongst themselves, he told them he was well assured that on that account neither such as had revolted would the sooner return, nor such as were at present their own would the longer continue in their duty; since the point on which their wishes turned was, not to be enslaved by an oligarchy rather than a democracy, but to recover their liberty, indifferent equally to either form. As for those of their fellow-citizens to whom was given the appellation of worthy and good, even they would perplex the train of government as much as the people, when, by cajoling that people, and authoritatively leading them into a series of bad measures, they would prin-

cipally regard their own private emoluments; and, should they be subjected to the caprice of such, to die by violence and without a trial must be the general fate; whereas the people was a sure resource in seasons of extremity, and ever tempered the fury of the great. He was well convinced, the states enlightened by a long tract of experience judge of their government in the same light. On the whole, therefore, the negotiations of Alcibiades, and all at present on the carpet, could in nowise be approved by him.

The party, however, associated together in this design, abiding by their former determinations, resolved to proceed to their execution, and were preparing to send Pisander and others by way of deputation to Athens, to set on foot the negotiations concerning the return of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the popular government there, and the gaining over Tissaphernes to the Athenian friendship.

Phrynickus, now convinced that the return of Alcibiades would be brought on the carpet, and the Athenians assuredly grant it; apprehensive, farther, that, from the opposition he had given it at their consultations, he should then be exposed to his resentments, as one who had endeavored to stop it, had recourse to the following project: he sent to Astyochus, admiral-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians, who yet continued in the station of Miletus, a secret hint by letter, that 'Alcibiades is ruining their affairs, by endeavoring to gain over Tissaphernes to the Athenians;' and, after giving him a clear explanation of other matters, he pleaded the candor of Astyochus in his own excuse, if he desired in this manner to ruin his mortal foe, though with some prejudice to the welfare of his country. But Astyochus had given up all thoughts of putting Alcibiades to death, especially as now he

never came within his reach; yet, on this occasion, making a visit to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, he communicated to them the advices sent him from Samos, and became himself an informer. He was accused by report, not only on this but many other occasions, to have made court to Tissaphernes, for his own private lucre; and, for the same reason, when the pay was not fully rendered before, he suffered it much more pliantly than in duty he ought to have done. Alcibiades sent away immediate notice to the managing party at Samos, that the treachery of Phrynicus was detected by his own letter, and insisted on it that he be put to death. Phrynicus, terribly alarmed and pushed to the very brink of destruction by such a discovery, sent again to Astyochus, blaming his indiscretion on the former occasion in not keeping his secret, and assuring him that now he was ready to deliver up to his fury the whole force of the Athenians at Samos, (distinctly reciting to him the particulars by which, as Samos was unfortified, the whole scheme might be accomplished,) and that undoubtedly he ought not to be censured, if, when his unrelenting foes had reduced him to such extremity of danger, he chose to do this, or even more than this, rather than be destroyed by their rancor. But this proposal also Astyochus communicated to Alcibiades.

Phrynicus, perceiving in time that Astyochus betrayed him, and that notice each moment was only not arrived from Alcibiades about the contents of his last, anticipated the discovery, and became himself informer to the army, that the enemy had resolved, as Samos was unfortified, and the whole of their fleet not securely stationed within the harbor, to endeavor a surprise: of this he had gained the most certain informations; and therefore Samos ought necessarily to

be put into a posture of defence with the utmost expedition, and proper guards in every respect be appointed. He himself commanded, and consequently was empowered to see this put in execution. All hands were instantly at work on the fortification; and Samos, though otherwise intended soon to be, was by this piece of artifice immediately secured: and, no long time after, came letters from Alcibiades, importing that the army was betrayed by Phrynicus, and in pursuance of it the enemy was coming to surprise them. Their opinion of the good faith of Alcibiades was not in the least established by this: it was argued that, as he was privy to the plans of the enemy, from a principle of enmity he had fastened on Phrynicus the charge of being their accomplice. By the last notification, therefore, he was so far from hurting him, that he only confirmed his evidence.

Yet, subsequent to this, Alcibiades continued to make use of all his address and persuasion with Tissaphernes to gain him over to the Athenians, who in fact stood most in terror of the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger fleet at hand than the Athenians; but was inwardly inclined, were it any how feasible, to comply with his suggestions; especially as, ever since the jar at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes, he had been exasperated against the Peloponnesians; for that jar had already happened at the time of their expedition to Rhodes; and the suggestion of Alcibiades, formerly mentioned, that the views of the Lacedæmonians were to see the cities free, was yet more verified by the behavior of Lichas, who had affirmed, that it was an article never to be suffered in treaty, that the king should have those cities of which either himself or his ancestors had at any time been possessed. And in truth Alcibiades,

as one who had important concerns at stake, continued with much zeal and assiduity to ingratiate himself with Tissaphernes.

The Athenian deputies, with Pisander at their head, who were sent from Samos, had no sooner reached Athens than they obtained an audience from the people ; where, after touching in a summary manner on many other advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, that, ‘ by recalling Alcibiades, and making an alteration in the democratical form of government, they might gain the friendship of the king and a superiority over the Peloponnesians.’ Large was the number of those who would not hear the proposal against the democracy. The enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in their clamors, that ‘ shameful it would be if so enormous a transgressor of the laws were recalled ; one, to whose crimes, in point of the mysteries, the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces¹ had borne solemn attestation, the consequence of which was his exile ; nay, had farther denounced a curse on those who should restore him.’ Pisander, interposing to put a stop to this violent opposition and these tragical outrages, addressed himself apart to each of these opponents, and asked them singly, ‘ whether any hope they had left of saving their country, now that the Peloponnesians had as many ships on the sea as they

¹ These were sacerdotal families at Athens, descended from Eumolpus and Ceryx. The former of them instituted the Eleusinian mysteries ; and it was the grand privilege of his descendants to preside at and regulate those sacred rites. Who Ceryx was, and what the particular privileges of his descendants, any farther than that, according to Suidas, they were ‘ holy and venerable,’ is not agreed. All of them were commanded to pronounce the solemn curse on Alcibiades when he was outlawed. Yet one priestess, as Plutarch relates, Theano, the daughter of Menon, refused to obey, alleging, that ‘ it was her duty to bless, and not to curse.’

had themselves, but a larger number of confederate states, besides supplies of money from the king and Tissaphernes, whilst themselves were quite exhausted, unless somebody could persuade the king to declare in their favor?' And when those to whom the demand was put replied in the negative, he proceeded to make them this plain declaration: 'And yet this turn in your favor can never take place, unless we temper our form of government with greater moderation, and intrust the administration in the hands of the few, that the king may have room to place confidence in us; for we are at present to consult about the very being of the state, and not to litigate the forms of its administration. The sequel may again enable us to return to the primitive form, if we find it expedient; and we shall recover Alcibiades, the only man alive who is able to accomplish the point.'

The people in fact, on the first mention of an oligarchy, were stung to the heart: yet, afterwards convinced by Pisander that no other resource was left, dispirited by fear, and encouraged at the same time by a distant hope that another change might in the sequel be brought about, they yielded up the point to the necessity of the state. Accordingly they passed a decree, that 'Pisander and the ten joined with him in the deputation should pass the sea, and negotiate the affair with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, in the method judged by them most conducive to the public service.' At the same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge of mal-administration against Phrynicus, they discharged him and his colleague Skironidas from their commands, and sent away Diomedon and Leon to take on them the command of the fleet. The article, with which Pisander charged Phrynicus, was the betraying of Iasus and Amorges. The truth is, he

thought him by no means a proper person to be let into a share of their intrigues with Alcibiades.

And thus Pisander, after visiting in order all the several juntas of the accomplices, already formed in the city with the view to thrust themselves into the seats of judicature and the great offices of state; and exhorting them severally to act with unanimity, and by general concurrence to labor the demolition of the popular government; and after adjusting all previous measures to guard the best against dilatory proceedings, repassed the sea to Tissaphernes, accompanied by his ten associates in the deputation.

In the same winter, Leon and Diomedon, being arrived at their post, at the head of the Athenian fleet, made an expedition against Rhodes; and there they found the ships of the Peloponnesians hauled ashore. They made a descent on the coast; and after defeating in battle such of the Rhodians as made head against them, they stood away for Chalce, and for the future carried on the war more from thence than from Cos; for in that station they were better enabled to watch the motions of the Peloponnesian fleet.

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas, a Lacedæmonian, despatched by Pædaritus from Chios, with advice, that ‘the works of the Athenians were almost perfected; and, unless with the whole of their shipping they come over to relieve them, all is lost at Chios.’ A resolution accordingly was taken to endeavor their relief; but, in the mean time, Pædaritus, at the head of his body of auxiliaries and the Chians, with all the force he could assemble together, sallied out against the rampart which the Athenians had raised round their ships, demolished a part of it, and made himself master of those vessels which were hauled ashore. The Athenians ran from all quarters

to their defence ; and, having first engaged and put to flight the Chians, the rest of the forces under Pædaritus were also defeated. Pædaritus was killed, as were numbers also of the Chians, and many weapons were taken : and after this the Chians were blocked up by sea and land more closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged amongst them.

The Athenian deputation, headed by Pisander, having reached Tissaphernes, entered into conference about terms of accommodation. Alcibiades now—as the conduct of Tissaphernes was still dubious and wavering, since he stood in great awe of the Peloponnesians, and adhered to that rule of policy he had learned from him, ‘to war both sides out,’—Alcibiades now had recourse to another piece of refinement, causing Tissaphernes to insist on such exorbitant terms that no accommodation could ensue. Tissaphernes, truly, seems to me to have proceeded in this manner from his own voluntary motives, because fear was predominant in him : but in Alcibiades it was purely art : since, as he found the other would not agree on any terms whatever, he affected to strike the conceit into the Athenians that it really was in his power to manage him at pleasure, and that he was already wrought to their purpose, and willing to come to terms, whereas the Athenians would not offer enough : for Alcibiades himself made such extravagant demands, (since, though Tissaphernes assisted at the conference, the other managed it,) that, though the Athenians had yielded to the far greater part, yet the breaking off the treaty would be thrown at their doors. It was insisted, besides other demands, that ‘ all Ionia should be given up ;’ and what is more, ‘ all the islands on the Ionian coast ;’ and other points. The Athenians seeming to acquiesce in these, at length, on the third

meeting, lest the smallness of his own influence should be plainly detected, he demanded leave ‘for the king to build a fleet, and to sail along the Athenian coasts, wherever, and with whatever force he pleased.’ Here all accommodation was over: the Athenians, concluding these points insuperable, and that they were abused by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation, and returned to Samos.

In the same winter, immediately after breaking off the conference, Tissaphernes repaired to Caunus, with intention to bring the Peloponnesians again to Miletus, and to form other compacts with them, the best he should be able, to supply them farther with pay, and by all means to avoid an open rupture. He was in fact apprehensive that, should so large a fleet be deprived of subsistence, or necessitated to engage with the Athenians, should suffer a defeat, or should the mariners quit their vessels, the Athenians then would carry their point without thanks to him; but his greatest fear was this, lest for the sake of subsistence they should ravage the continent. On all these considerations, and the prudential motives arising from each, co-operating with his principal maxim of balancing the Grecians against one another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, paid them their arrears of subsistence, and made the following treaty, the third of the kind, with them:

‘ In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas presiding in the college of ephori at Lacedæmon, articles are signed, in the plain of Maeander, between the Lacedæmonians and confederates on one side; and Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnacus, on the other; concerning the affairs of the king and those of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

‘ The whole of the king’s dominions situate in Asia belongs to the king ; and all his own dominions let the king govern as to him seems meet.

‘ The Lacedæmonians and confederates are not to enter the dominions of the king to commit any act of hostility whatever : nor he those of the contracting parties for any act of hostility whatever.

‘ And, in case any of the Lacedæmonians or confederates enter in a hostile manner the dominions of the king, the Lacedæmonians and confederates are bound to restrain them : and, in case any subjects of the king act in a hostile manner against the Lacedæmonians and confederates, be the king also bound to restrain them.

‘ Tissaphernes shall pay subsistence to the ships now on the station, according to the rates agreed on, till the king’s fleet come up.

‘ But the Lacedæmonians and confederates, so soon as the king’s fleet shall be come up, shall have it in their own option to maintain, if they please, their own fleet ; or, in case they choose to take subsistence from Tissaphernes, he is bound to supply them. Yet the Lacedæmonians and confederates, at the expiration of the war, shall repay to Tissaphernes what sums they may thus receive from him.

‘ When the king’s fleet comes up, let the ships of the Lacedæmonians, and those of the confederates, and those of the king, carry on the war in concert, by the joint counsels of Tissaphernes and of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

‘ And, whenever a peace with the Athenians is thought advisable, it shall be concluded by the joint consent of both parties.’

The treaty was made and ratified in these terms : and, after this, Tissaphernes employed himself with

diligence to bring up the Phoenician fleet, as has been mentioned, and duly to perform all the branches whatever of his engagements : at least he was willing to convince the Peloponnesians, by the measures he took, that he was heartily in earnest.

In the close of this winter the Boeotians got possession of Oropus by treachery, though an Athenian garrison was in it.. The business was effected by the management of a party of Eretrians, and those Oropians who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa : for, as this town was situated over-against Eretria, it was impossible but, whilst in Athenian hands, it must terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, the Eretrians repaired to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians to come over to Eubœa ; but their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios, now sadly distressed. Putting off therefore from Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they stood away to sea ; and, having gained the height of Triopium, they descried the Athenian squadron out at sea in a course from Chalœ : yet, neither making any motion to bear down on the other, one fleet pursued their course to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They were now convinced that, without fighting at sea, they could not possibly relieve Chios.

Here this winter ended ; and the tweentieth year of this war expired, the history of which Thucydides has compiled.

YEAR XXI.—In the ensuing summer, on the first commencement of the spring, Dercylidas, a Spartan, at the head of an army not considerable for numbers, was sent over-land to Hellespont to effect the revolt of Abydos : they are a colony of the Milesians. The Chians also, whilst Astyochus was perplexed about

the method of relieving them, were necessitated, by the intolerable closeness of the blockade, to hazard engagement at sea. It happened, whilst Astyochus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon, a Spartan, who came over with Antisthenes, though merely as a passenger, had arrived at Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after the death of Pædaritus, with twelve sail of shipping draughted from the squadron at Miletus: of these, five were Thurian, four Syracusan, one belonged to Anæa, another was Milesian, and one was Leon's own. On this, the Chians having sallied out with all their force, and carried a strong post from the enemy, and at the same time their fleet, consisting of six-and-thirty sail, launching forth against the thirty-two Athenians, an engagement followed; and, after a battle hotly maintained on both sides, the Chians and allies, who had not the worst of the dispute, sheered off again into harbor; for by this time it began to grow dark.

Instantly on this, Dercylidas having completed his march from Miletus, Abydos in Hellespont revolted to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus; and two days after Lampsacus did the same.

But intelligence of this having reached Strombichides at Chios, and he, with four-and-twenty sail of Athenians, including the transports which carried the heavy-armed, stretching thither with all possible expedition, the Lampsacenes sallied out to repulse him. He defeated them in battle; and, having at a shout made himself master of Lampsacus, which was quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and slaves for pillage to his men; and, after re-establishing such as were free in their old habitations, proceeded against Abydos: but, finding them deaf to all schemes of accommodation, and himself unable to reduce them by force, crossing over to the spot opposite to Abydos, he

Garrisoned Sestus, a city in the Chersonesus, which had formerly belonged to the Medes, and put it in a condition to guard the Hellespont.

During this interval of time the Chians had very much enlarged their room at sea; and those stationed at Miletus, and even Astyochus, on receiving the particulars of the late engagement, and advice that Strombichides was drawn off with so many ships, began to be in high spirits. Astyochus, accordingly, arriving at Chios with only two ships, carried off along with him what shipping was there, and with the whole force was now at sea, in order to make an attempt on Samos: but when the enemy there, because mutually embroiled in jealousies, came not out against him, he returned again to the station of Miletus: for, about this time, or rather before, the democracy was overthrown at Athens.

The deputation, at the head of which was Pisander, were no sooner returned to Samos from Tissaphernes than they found their schemes had gained a stronger footing in the army; and that the Samians had been encouraging the men of power amongst the Athenians to join their efforts with them for the erection of an oligarchy, though a party was very busy in opposing them, with a view to quash the projected alteration. The Athenians, farther, at Samos, had in private conferences come to a resolution ‘to think no longer of Alcibiades, since he showed himself so averse to join them, and in fact was by no means a proper person to have a share in an oligarchical administration: but, merely from a principle of self-preservation, as now they were environed with dangers, they should take all possible care that the project should not drop in the execution. That, farther, they should prosecute the war with vigor, and contribute largely towards it

from their own private purses, and answer every other exigence of service ; since, no longer for others, but their own sakes, they must continue the struggle.' Determined therefore to proceed in this manner, they despatched Pisander and half the former deputation once more to Athens, to manage the execution of the project there : to whom, farther, instructions were given, at whatever places in their dependency they should touch on the voyage, to set up the oligarchy. The other half they sent severally about to other of the dependent states. Diotrephea also, who was now at Chios, but appointed to take on him the command of the Thracian provinces, they ordered away immediately to his post.

Diotrephe, on his arrival at Thasus, dissolved the popular government ; and, in the second month at most after this, the Thasians fortified their city, as men who no longer cared for an aristocracy under Athenian influence, but were in daily expectation of receiving liberty from the Lacedæmonians : for a number of their countrymen, driven out by the Athenians, were now refuged among the Peloponnesians. These were laboring the point with their correspondents in Thasus, to bring off their shipping, and declare a revolt. The present alteration therefore fell out exactly to their own wish : their state was restored to its ancient form without any trouble ; and the people, who alone were able to disconcert them, were divested of their power. In Thasus, therefore, the event took an opposite turn to what those Athenians who labored the oligarchy had at heart ; and, in my judgment, the case was the same with many other of their dependent states : for, having now their eyes open to their own welfare, and being exempted from the dread of suffering for what others did, they ran into a scheme of a total inde-

pendence, which they preferred before the precarious situation of being well governed by the Athenians.

Pisander and his colleagues, in the course of their voyage, observed their instructions, and dissolved the popular governments in the cities where they touched. From some of these they also procured parties of heavy-armed to aid them in the grand project, and so landed at Athens. Here they found affairs in great forwardness, through the activity of their accomplices: for some of the younger sort having combined together in a plot against Androcles, who had the greatest sway amongst the people, and had also been deeply concerned in banishing Alcibiades, they secretly despatched him. On him, for a double reason, because of his influence with the people, and with the thought that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose recall was now expected, and through his interest the friendship of Tissaphernes, they chose first to wreak their fury. Of some others also, whose tractability they doubted, they had rid themselves by the same practices. A specious harangue had, farther, been dressed up for the purpose, that ‘none ought to receive the public money but such as served the state in war with their persons; that affairs of state ought not to be communicated to more than five thousand, and those to be men who were best qualified, by their estates and personal bravery, to serve the public.’

This with the majority of the city had a fair outside, since such as should concur in the change bade fairest for a share in the administration. Yet still the assembly of the people and the council of the bean¹ continued their meetings; but then they only passed such decrees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, of this

¹ The senate.

number were all who spoke, and who had previously considered together what should be said on every occasion : no other person presumed at any time to oppose their motions, through dread of a cabal which they saw was large ; or, did any one venture to open his mouth, by some dexterous contrivance he was certainly put to death. Who were the agents in these murders, no inquiry at all ; and of who were suspected, no kind of justification. The people, on the contrary, looked on with stupid gaze, and such a fit of consternation as to think it clear gain not yet to have suffered violence, even though they held their tongues ; imagining, besides, that the conspiracy had spread much farther than it really had, they were quite dispirited. To discover any certainty of their numbers they were quite unable, because of the great extent of the city and their ignorance how far their neighbors might be concerned. On the same account it was also impossible for him, who deeply resented his condition, to bemoan himself in the hearing of another, or to participate counsels for reciprocal defence : he must either have opened his mind to one whom he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom he durst not confide : for all the popular party regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in some measure involved in the present machinations. Some in fact were concerned who could never have been suspected of oligarchical principles ; and these men gave rise to the great diffidence which spread amongst the many, and drew after it the highest security to the schemes of the few, as it kept alive that mutual distrust which reigned among the people.

Pisander therefore and his associates, arriving at this very juncture, gave the finishing stroke without delay. In the first place, having called the assembly of the

people, they moved for a decree, ‘That a committee of ten should be elected with full discretionary power. This committee of ten should draw up the form of a decree, to be reported to the people on a day prefixed, in what manner the state may be best administered.’ In the next place, when that day came, they summoned an assembly of the people at Colonus: this is a temple of Neptune, without the city, and distant from it about ten stadia.¹ And here the committee reported no other proposal than this; ‘that it be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatever opinion he himself thought proper.’ They then enacted heavy penalties against any man who hereafter should accuse the speaker of a breach of law, or should bring him into any trouble whatever.

This being done, it was now, without the least reserve or ambiguity, moved, that ‘no magistrate whatsoever should continue in his post on the old establishment, nor receive a public salary; but that five presidents² be chosen, who should choose one hundred persons, and each of these hundred should name three persons for associates: that these persons should enter into the senate, be invested absolutely with the administration, and should farther be empowered to convene the five thousand whenever they should deem it proper.’

Pisander was the person who made this proposal, and who also in other respects showed himself openly one of the most zealous to pull down the democracy. But he who contrived the whole of the plan, and by what steps the affair should be thus carried into execution, was Antipho, a man who in personal merit was second to no Athenian then alive, and the greatest

¹ One English mile.

² Proedri.

genius of his time to devise with sagacity, and ingeniously to express what he had once devised. At the assemblies of the people, or any public debate, he never assisted; if he could possibly decline it; since the multitude was jealous of the great reputation he had gained: yet, in the courts of judicature or appeals to the people, he was the only person who was able effectually to serve those clients who could get him for their patron. And this same Antiphon, when in process of time the government of the four hundred was quite demolished, and severely prosecuted by the people, was judged to have defended their conduct, and pleaded in a cause where his own life was at stake, the best of any person that down to this time was ever heard to speak.

Phrynicus also was another who singularly distinguished himself in his zeal for the oligarchy. He dreaded Alcibiades, as conscious that he was privy to the whole of the correspondence he had carried on with Astyochus. He proceeded thus, on the supposition that Alcibiades would never be restored by an oligarchical government: and then he was a man in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, the greatest confidence might reasonably be placed.

Theramenes, farther, the son of Agnon, a man who both in speaking and acting made no ordinary figure, had a principal share in the dissolution of the popular government: no wonder, therefore, as the business was managed by so many and so able agents, that, spite of every obstacle, it was brought to effect. Grievous indeed it was to the Athenian people to submit to the loss of their liberty a century after the expulsion of their tyrants; during which period they had not only been independent, but accustomed, for above half that space, to give law to others.

To return. When, in the assembly of the people, not a soul was heard to oppose the motion, it passed into a law, and the assembly was adjourned. They afterwards introduced the four hundred into the senate, in the following manner:—

The whole body of the citizens were daily under arms, either on the walls or in the field, to bridle the excursions of the enemy from Decelea. Therefore on the day appointed they suffered such as were not in the secret to repair to their posts as usual; but, to those in the plot, it had been privately notified, ‘by no means to repair to their posts, but to lag behind at a distance; and in case any one should strive to oppose what was now to be agitated, they should take up arms and quell all opposition.’ Those to whom these orders were previously imparted were the Andrians and Teians; three hundred of the Carystians, and other persons now established in Ægina, whom the Athenians had sent thither by way of colony, but were now invited to repair to Athens with their arms to support the scheme. When these dispositions were formed, the four hundred (each carrying a concealed dagger, and guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of Greece, whose hands they had employed when assassination was the point) broke in on the counsellors of the bean,¹ who were this moment sitting in the senate-house, and called out to them to quit the place and take their salaries.² Accordingly they had ready for them the full arrears due to them, which they paid to each as he went out of the house. In this manner the senate, without giving the least opposition, removed themselves tamely from their office; and the rest of the

¹ The senate of five hundred.

² The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a drachma, or seven-pence three farthings a day.

citizens made no effort to check such proceedings, and refrained from even the least tumult.

The four hundred having thus gained possession of the senate-house, proceeded immediately to ballot for a set of presidents¹ from amongst their own body; and made use of all the solemn invocations of the deities and the sacrifices with which the presiding magistrates execute their office. By their subsequent proceedings they introduced considerable alterations in the popular form of government; excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they refrained from recalling exiles: but in all other respects they ruled with all possible severity. Some persons, whose removal was deemed convenient, though few in number, they got assassinated; some they threw into prison, and some they banished. To Agis, also, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was still at Decelea, they despatched a deputation; notifying their readiness to accommodate all disputes; and that with greater confidence he might proceed to make up matters with them than with a democracy, which was not to be trusted.

Agis, full of the imagination that the city would not quietly submit to these changes, and that the people would not thus tamely part with their ancient liberty; or, should they now behold his numerous army approaching, that public combustions might ensue amongst them; unable to persuade himself that at the present juncture they could possibly be kept from tumults,—Agis, I say, returned no proposal of terms to the deputation which came to him from the four hundred. But having sent for a numerous reinforcement from Peloponnesus, he advanced soon after, with the garrison of Decelea and the fresh reinforcements, up to

¹ Prytanes.

The very walls of Athens. He took this step on the presumption that ‘thus, either thrown into utter confusion, they might be mastered whenever he gave the word, or even at the first sight of his approach, through the great confusion which in all probability must follow within and without: since, to make himself master of their long walls, as there could not be hands at leisure for their defence, he could not fail.

But when on his nearer approach the Athenians within were thrown into no stir or bustle at all; when even they caused their cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, light-armed, and archers, to sally out into the field, who made a slaughter of such as were too far advanced, and became masters of their arms and dead bodies;—finding then he had proceeded on wrong presumptions, he again drew off his army. After this, he himself, with the former garrison, continued in the post of Decelea: but the late reinforcement, after some continuance in the country, was sent back to Peloponnesus.

Yet, subsequent to this, the four hundred persisted in sending deputies to Agis with as much eagerness as ever; and, he now receiving them in a better manner, with encouragements to proceed, they even sent an embassy to Lacedæmon to propose a treaty; being of all things desirous to obtain an accommodation.

They also sent to Samos a deputation of ten, in order to satisfy the army, and give them ample assurance that ‘the oligarchy was not set up for the prejudice either of the state or any individuals, but as the only expedient left to preserve the whole community: that the number of those who now had the management was five thousand, and not barely four hundred: and yet on no occasion whatever had the Athenians, partly through employment in their armies abroad or other

foreign avocations, ever met together, to consult ~~the~~ affairs of state, in numbers so large as five thousand.' Having instructed them to insert some other alleviating pleas, they sent them away on the first instant of the change they had made: apprehensive of what actually came to pass, that the bulk of their seamen would never quietly submit to an oligarchical government, and an opposition beginning there might overturn all that had hitherto been done.

For at Samos some stirs had already arisen about the oligarchy, and that which is now to be recited happened exactly at the time that the four hundred seized the administration at Athens.

The party which at this juncture was subsisting at Samos against the nobility, and was of the popular side, having now altered their schemes, and followed the suggestions of Pisander ever since his return from Athens, and gained the concurrence of Athenians at Samos, combined together by oath to the number of about three hundred, and resolved to fall on their antagonists as factious on the side of the people. Accordingly, they murdered one Hyperbolus,¹ an Athe-

¹ This was the person whom the ostracism made in some measure famous, and who made the ostracism quite infamous. Plutarch has repeated the story thrice. The following extract is taken from the life of Nicias:

'When the opposition was very hot at Athens between Alcibiades and Nicias, and the day for ostracising was drawing on (which at certain intervals the people of Athens were used to enforce, and send away into a ten years' exile some one citizen suspected of designs against their liberty, or odious for being too illustrious or rich), each of these grand competitors was under grievous apprehensions; and with reason too, that it might be his own lot to be exiled on this occasion. Alcibiades was hated for his way of life, and for his bold and enterprising genius. Nicias was envied on account of his wealth; his way of living was neither sociable nor popular; as he avoided a crowd, and herded with a few inti-

mian, a scurvy fellow, and banished by the ostracism, not from a dread of his influence or weight, but for the profligacy of his life, and his being a public disgrace to his country. In this they were countenanced by Chæminus, one of the commanders, and some of the Athenians associated with them, to whom they

mates, he gave great distaste ; besides, as he had often opposed the caprices of the people, and constrained them to pursue their real interest, he was deep in their displeasure. In short, the contest ran high between the young and military men on one side, and the old pacific Athenians on the other, whilst each were endeavoring to throw the ostracism on the hated object. But,

Parties ran high, and scoundrels got renown.

Such dissensions in the community gave scope to knaves and incendiaries. There was one Hyperbolus, of Perithadæ, very assuming, without the least reason to be so : however, by dint of impudence, working himself into power, and the disgrace of his country so soon as he had made himself conspicuous in it. On this occasion Hyperbolus could have no suspicion of becoming himself the butt of an ostracism ; he had a much better title to the gallows. Presuming, on the contrary, that when either of these great men were exiled, he himself could easily make head against the other, he manifested great pleasure at the contest, and irritated the fury of the people against them both. Nicias and Alcibiades, perceiving his roguish intent, conferred privately together ; and getting their several factions to unite, secured one another, and threw the votes on Hyperbolus. Such a turn at first gave the Athenians much pleasure and diversion ; yet soon after they were highly chagrined by reflecting that making such a scoundrel the object of it was shaming the ostracism for ever. There was dignity even in punishments : the ostracism was of such a nature as to suit a Thucydides, an Aristides, and men of such exalted characters. It was clear honor to Hyperbolus ; and gave him room to boast that, though a scoundrel, he had been distinguished like the greatest and best Athenians ; as Plato, the comic poet, says of him :

He always acted worthy of himself,
But quite unworthy of such high reproof ;
The shell was ne'er design'd to honor scoundrels.

In a word, no person was ever banished by the ostracism after Hyperbolus ; it was he who closed the list.'

gave this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of the same nature they committed by instructions from them, and had it in agitation to multiply their blows; but those marked out for destruction getting wind of their design, communicated the whole to Leon and Diomedon, who thought of an oligarchy with high regret, because their credit was high with the people: to Thrasybulus¹ also and Thrasyllus, the former a captain of a trireme, and the latter of a band of heavy-armed; and to such others as were judged most likely to stem the fury of the conspirators. These they conjured not to look calmly on till their destruction should be completed, and Samos rent away from the Athenians, by which alone till now their empire had been preserved and supported.' Listening therefore to these representations, they privately exhorted every single soldier not to suffer such proceedings; and more earnestly than others the Paralian; since all that

¹ Thrasybulus, whose name now first occurs, acts a very high-spirited and noble part in the close of this history. 'If virtue could be weighed merely by itself, without any regard to outward circumstance, I should not hesitate,' says Cornelius Nepos, 'to prefer him before all the great men in Greece; but I aver that not one of them ever surpassed him in integrity, in resolution, in grandeur of soul, and true patriotism. Yet, I know not how it is, though no one excelled him in real merit, many have outstripped him in point of fame. In the Peloponnesian war, the part of it which now remains, Thrasybulus did many things without Alcibiades; Alcibiades did nothing without Thrasybulus; and yet the other, through a happiness peculiar to himself, reaped the glory and benefit of all.' So far this elegant Roman writer. The reader will soon see some of Thrasybulus' exploits, separately from, and in concert with Alcibiades: but the glory of his life was ridding Athens some years after of thirty tyrants at a blow; for which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, the most honorable recompence his grateful countrymen could bestow on him. He was ever a firm, intrepid, disinterested patriot; and lost his life at last in the service of his country.

sailed in that vessel were citizens of Athens; all free, and enemies determined, from time immemorial, to an oligarchy, even when it had no existence. Leon also and Diomedon never went out to sea without leaving them some ships for their guard; insomuch that, when the three hundred made their attempt, as all these united in their obstruction, but most heartily of all the Parilians, the popular party at Samos was rescued from destruction. Thirty of those three hundred they even slaughtered, and three of the most factious amongst the survivors they doomed to banishment. Then, having published an indemnity for the rest, they continued to support the democracy at Samos.

But the Samians and soldiery despatched the *Paralus* with all expedition to Athens, having on board her Chæreas, the son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had borne a considerable share in the last turn of affairs, charged with a notification of these last transactions; for yet it was not known at Samos that the four hundred had seized the administration. No sooner therefore were they come to their moorings than the four hundred caused two or three of the crew of the *Paralus* to be dragged away to prison; the residue they turned over from that vessel into another ship of war, and ordered them away as a guard-ship for the station of Eubœa. But Chæreas, sensible in what train affairs were going, had the good fortune to make his escape; and, returning again to Samos, related to the soldiery all that had been done in Athens, exaggerating every point with abundant severity: ‘That every citizen was now kept in awe with whips and scourges, and that even their own wives and children daily felt the insolence of those tyrants; nay, they have it now in agitation, that if any on duty at Samos shall presume to oppose their plea-

sure, immediately to arrest and imprison the whole of their kindred ; and, in case the former will not submit, to put the latter to death.' On many other points he also expatiated, all aggravated with falsehoods.

His audience, in the first instant of their passion, were fully bent on the destruction of all those who had appeared most active for an oligarchy, and, in short, of all who had any hand in its promotion ; but being stopped by the interposition of others more moderate, and listening to the remonstrance, that they ought not to accelerate the ruin of their country, now that a fleet of the enemy lay almost ranged against them for battle, they desisted. And afterwards those who had openly avowed the design of restoring the democratical form at Samos, namely, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, (for these had the principal agency in this new revolution,) caused every soldier to swear the most solemn oaths, more especially such as were for an oligarchy, that 'they would submit to no form but the democracy, and would act in this cause with general unanimity ; and, farther, would zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians ; that eternal enemies they would remain to the four hundred, and would enter into no treaty of accommodation with them.' All the Samians, farther, that were old enough to bear arms, took the same oaths ; and henceforth the army communicated all their affairs to the Samians, and gave them an insight into all the dangers which might attend the sequel ; convinced that otherwise no safe resource remained for either ; but if the four hundred or the enemy at Miletus proved too hard for them, their ruin was unavoidable.

Terrible were the present embroilments of the times, while those at Samos were striving to re-establish the

democracy at Athens, and those at Athens to force an oligarchical form on the army. The soldiers, farther, immediately summoned a general assembly, in which they deposed their former commanders, and all such captains of triremes as fell under their suspicions, and then chose others to fill up the vacancies, both captains of triremes and land commanders, amongst whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The last rose up in the assembly, and encouraged them by every topic of persuasion; particularly, that ‘they had not the least reason to be dispirited, though Athens itself had revolted from them; for this was merely the secession of a minority from men whose numbers were greater, and who were better furnished for every exigence, because the whole navy of Athens was their own, by which they could compel dependent states to pay in their former contingents of tribute as fully as if they sailed on such an errand from Athens itself. Even yet they were masters of a city at Samos, a city despicable in no respects, but which once in a former war had well nigh wrested the empire of the sea from the Athenians. The seat of war, in regard to their public enemies, would continue the same as it was before; nay, by being masters of the fleet, they were better enabled to procure all the needful supplies than their opponents who were now at Athens. It was purely owing to their own peculiar situation at Samos that the others had hitherto been masters of the entrance into the Piræus; and they soon should be highly distressed if they refused to restore them their ancient polity, since these at Samos could more easily bar them the use of the sea than be barred up by them. What assistance Athens had hitherto given them against the enemy was but trifling, and of no real importance. Nothing could be lost from that quarter; which was

no longer able to supply them with money, since with that they had been supplied by the army; nor to send them any valuable instructions, for the sake of which alone the troops abroad were submissive to the orders of the state at home. Nay, in some points those at Athens had most egregiously offended, since they had overturned the laws of their country, which those here had preserved, and were exerting their efforts to compel others to the observance of them; and therefore, in every method of valuation, the men who here provided well for the public welfare, were in no respect worse patriots than the men at Athens. Even Alcibiades, should they grant him an indemnity and a safe return, would readily procure them the king's alliance; and, what had the greatest weight, should they miscarry in every branch of their present designs, many places of refuge lay always open to men possessed of so considerable a fleet, in which they might find fresh cities and another country.'

After such occurrences in the assembly convened by the soldiery, and the conclusion of their mutual exhortations, they continued their preparations for war with unremitting diligence. But the deputation of ten, sent from the four hundred to Samos, being informed of these proceedings when they were advanced in their voyage so far as Delos, thought proper to proceed no farther.

About this very time, the Peloponnesians on board the fleet stationed at Miletus clamored loudly among themselves, that they were betrayed by Astyochus and Tissaphernes; as the former had already refused to engage, when themselves were hearty and in fine condition, and the fleet of the Athenians was small; nor would do so even now, when the latter were reported to be embroiled with intestine seditions, and their own

ships were daily impairing; but, under pretext of a Phoenician fleet to be brought up by Tissaphernes, an aid merely nominal, and which would never join them, he was ruining all by dilatory measures. And as for Tissaphernes, it was never his intention to bring up that fleet; but he was plainly undermining the strength of theirs, by not supplying them constantly and fully with their pay. The time, therefore, they insisted, ought no longer to be thus idly wasted, but an engagement hazarded at once. Yet in such clamors those deepest concerned were the Syracusans.

The confederates and Astyochus himself being affected with these clamors, and having declared in a council of war for engaging the enemy forthwith, as they had received undoubted intelligence of the confusions at Samos; putting out to sea with the whole of their fleet, amounting to a hundred and twelve sail, and having ordered the Milesians to march thither over land, they stood away for Mycale. At Glaucae of Mycale the Athenians were now lying, with eighty-two ships of the Samian department: for in this quarter of Mycale Samos lies, but a small distance from the continent: but, when they saw the fleet of the Peloponnesians approaching, they retired to Samos, judging their own strength insufficient for an engagement with the foe which might prove decisive. Besides, as they had discovered the intention of those at Miletus to venture an engagement, they expected Strombichides from the Hellespont, who was to bring to their assistance the ships on the station of Chios which had gone up to Abydos; and a message had already been despatched to hasten him up. For these reasons they plied away to Samos. The Peloponnesians, arriving at Mycale, encamped on the shore along with the land forces of the Milesians and those sent in

by the bordering people. On the next day, when they were fully bent on standing directly against Samos, advice was brought them that Strombichides had come up with the ships from the Hellespont; on which they made the best of their way back again to Miletus. And now the Athenians, having gained an accession of strength, showed themselves immediately before Miletus, with a hundred and eight sail, desirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy. But, as nothing stirred out against them, they also returned to Samos.

In the same summer, immediately after the former movements, the Peloponnesians, who had waved coming out to an engagement, since with the whole of their strength they thought themselves by no means a match for their enemy, and were now reduced to great perplexities about the methods of procuring subsistence for so numerous a fleet, especially as Tissaphernes was so remiss in his payments, sent away to Pharnabazus (pursuant to the prior instructions from Peloponnesus) Clearchus the son of Ramphias, with a detachment of forty sail; for Pharnabazus had demanded such a force, and was ready to support the expenses of it; and it had been farther notified to them in form that Byzantium was ripe for a revolt. And thus this detachment of Peloponnesians, having run out far to sea to get clear of the Athenians during the course, met with very tempestuous weather. The bulk of them, it is true, with Clearchus, rode it out to Delos, and from thence returned again to Miletus. But Clearchus, setting out again, travelled over land to Hellespont, and took on him the command. Ten ships, however, of the detachment, under Elixus the Megarean, who was joined in the command, reached the Hellespont without damage, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos, informed of these

incidents, sent away a detachment to the Hellespont, to support and guard the adjacent cities: and a small engagement happened before Byzantium, between eight ships on a side.

Those who were in the management at Samos, and above all Thrasybulus, adhering still to the sentiments they had entertained ever since the last turn of affairs there, that Alcibiades must needs be recalled; the latter at last obtained, in full assembly, the concurrence of the soldiery. Accordingly, when they had voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, Thrasybulus repaired immediately to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades back with him to Samos; convinced their last resource depended on his being able to alienate Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians. Hereon, an assembly being called, Alcibiades at large expatiated on and deplored the malignity of his fate, in having been exiled from his country: and then, having amply run over every topic relating to the present posture of affairs, he raised their expectations high in regard to the future. He magnified, with a mighty parade of words, his own interest in Tissaphernes; from the view, not only to intimidate the patrons of the oligarchical government at Athens, and put a stop to their cabals, but also to render himself more respectable to these at Samos, and to raise up their confidence in him as high as possible: to give the enemy, farther, as many handles as he was able to calumniate Tissaphernes, and to lower all their present sanguinary expectations. These were the schemes of Alcibiades, when, with all imaginable ostentation, he gave the strongest assurances to his audience, that Tissaphernes had pledged his word to him, that, could he once firmly depend on the Athenians, they never should be distressed for want of supplies whilst he had

any thing left ; nay, though at last he should be forced to turn into ready cash the very bed he lay on ; and the Phœnician fleet, already come up to Aspendus, he would join with the Athenians, but never with the Peloponnesians : the only pledge of fidelity he required from the Athenians was, for Alcibiades to be recalled, and pass his word for their future conduct.

The army, delighted with these and many other soothing topics, proceeded immediately to associate him with the rest of the commanders, and implicitly trusted every thing to their management. Not a man was any longer to be found amongst them who would have parted with his present confidence of certain security, and revenge on the four hundred, for all the treasure in the universe. Nay, they were ready this very moment, on the strength of what Alcibiades had said, to slight the enemy now at hand, and steer directly for the Piræus. But, though numbers with vehemence recommended the step, he stopped their ardor by remonstrances, that they ought by no means to think of steering for the Piræus, and leave their nearer enemies on their backs. But, in relation to the operations of war, since he was elected a general, he said, he would first go and confer with Tissaphernes, and would then proceed to action. Accordingly, the assembly was no sooner dissolved than he immediately departed, that he might appear in all respects to be perfectly united with Tissaphernes ; desirous also to raise himself in his esteem, and give him a sensible proof that he was appointed a general ; and, by virtue of this, enabled either to do him service or to do him harm. It was the peculiar fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by the Athenians.

The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no sooner heard

of the recall of Alcibiades than, as before they suspected treachery in Tissaphernes, they now loudly vented invectives against him. What more inflamed them was, that, ever since the Athenians showed themselves before Miletus, and they had refused to put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphernes had slackened more than ever in his payments ; and thus, hated by them for that reason sufficiently before, he now became more odious on account of Alcibiades. The soldiery again, as on former occasions, ran together in parties, and enumerated their grievances. Nay, some of higher rank, persons of real importance, and not merely the private men, were full of remonstrances, that they had at no time received their full subsistence ; his payments had been always scanty, and even those had never been regular. In short, unless they were led directly against the enemy, or carried to some other station where they might be sure of subsistence, the crews would abandon their vessels. And the whole blame of all that befell ought to be charged on Astyochus, who for private lucre endured patiently the caprices of Tissaphernes. Employed as they were in thus enumerating grievances, a tumult actually broke out against Astyochus : for the mariners belonging to the Syracusan and Thurian vessels, by how much they enjoyed the greatest liberty of all others in the fleet, by so much the more heightened in confidence did they flock about him and demand their pay. On this Astyochus returned an answer too full of spirit, threatening hard that Dorian,¹ who seconded and encouraged the demands of his men, and even lifting up his staff and shaking it at him. This was no sooner perceived by the military crowd than, seamen as they

¹ Hermocrates.

were, with a loud uproar, they rushed at Astyochus to knock him down; but, aware of their design, he fled for refuge to an altar. He escaped indeed without any blows, and the fray ended without any harm committed.

The Milesians also made themselves masters, by surprise, of a fort erected by Tissaphernes at Miletus, and obliged the garrison left in it to evacuate the place. These things pleased the rest of the allies, and not least of all the Syracusans. Lichas, however, was by no means satisfied with these proceedings. He insisted the Milesians were obliged in duty to be submissive to Tissaphernes; and that all others who lived in the dominions of the king lay under the same obligation, and were bound to pay due regard to his just authority, till such time as the war was handsomely completed. This drew on him the resentment of the Milesians; and, because of these expressions, and some others of the same nature, when he afterwards died of a natural disease, they would not suffer him to be buried in a spot of ground which the Lacedæmonians who were amongst them had chosen for his interment.

Whilst affairs were thus sadly embroiled between the soldiery on one side, and Astyochus and Tissaphernes on the other, Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon, as successor to Astyochus in the chief command of the fleet. Accordingly he took the command on him, and Astyochus sailed away for home. But with him, as ambassador, Tissaphernes sent one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke both languages, to accuse the Milesians about the seizure of the fort, and also to make apologies for his conduct. He knew that the Milesians were already set out with an outcry, chiefly against him; and that Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed with proofs that Tis-

Tissaphernes, in concert with Alcibiades, baffled all the Peloponnesian schemes, and basely tampered with both the warring parties. But an enmity had always subsisted between these two about the payments of subsistence. And at length, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other Syracusans came to Miletus to take on them the command of the Syracusan vessels, (namely, Potamis, and Myscon, and Demarclus,) Tissaphernes vented his choler more bitterly than ever against Hermocrates, now an exile; and, amongst his other accusations of him, affirmed that he had demanded a sum of money, which, being refused him, he had ever since declared himself his enemy. Astyochus, therefore, and the Milesians, and Hermocrates, had now sailed for Lacedæmon.

By this time also Alcibiades had repassed from Tissaphernes to Samos: and from Delos the deputation sent from the four hundred on the late revolution, to soothe and gain the concurrence of those at Samos, arrived also while Alcibiades was there. On which, an assembly being called, they endeavored to open the cause. The soldiers at first refused to hear them, and roared aloud for the murder of those who had overthrown the popular government. At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, they gave them a hearing.

The deputies remonstrated that not for the ruin of Athens was this new change introduced, but purely for its preservation, in nowise to betray it into the hands of the enemy; because that might have been done effectually on the late approach of its enemy to the walls, since they were in power. Every single person amongst the five thousand was intended to have a regular share in the administration. Their friends and relations were not treated in an insolent manner, as Chær-

reas had maliciously suggested to them ; nay, were not in the least molested, but every where remained in the undisturbed possession of their property.

Though on these topics they amply enlarged, yet they were heard with no manner of complaisance, but with manifest indignation. Different methods of proceeding were recommended by different persons ; but the majority declared for sailing away at once for the Piraeus. On this occasion Alcibiades first showed himself a true patriot ; nay, as much a patriot as ever Athenian had been : for, when the Athenians at Samos were hurried furiously along to invade their own selves, the plain consequence of which was giving up at once Ionia and Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified their fury ; and, at a crisis when no other man living could have been able to restrain the multitude, he persuaded them to desist from this strange invasion ; and, by reprimanding those whose private resentments burst out most violently against the deputies, prevented mischief. At length, he himself dismissed them, with the following answer : ‘ That the administration in the hands of five thousand he had no intention to oppose : but he ordered them to give an immediate discharge to the four hundred, and to restore the council of five hundred to their prior state. If farther, from a principle of frugality, they had made retrenchments, in order that those who served in the armies of the state might be better subsisted, he praised them altogether. He then recommended to them a steady resistance, and by no means in any shape to give way to the enemy : for could the state once be secured from its public foes, a reconciliation amongst its members might easily be hoped for ; but, should either party be once destroyed, either this at Samos, or theirs at Athens, none would soon be left to be reconciled at all.’

There were present at this audience ambassadors from the Argives, who brought assurances of aid to the people of Athens at Samos. Alcibiades commended them for their zeal; and then exhorting them to hold themselves in readiness to come on a summons sent, he civilly dismissed them. These Argives came to Samos in company with the Paralians, who had been lately turned over by the four hundred into a vessel of war, to cruise round Eubœa, and to carry to Lacedæmon the ambassadors, Lespodias, Aristophon, and Melesius, sent thither from the four hundred. But, when advanced to the height of Argos, they put the ambassadors under arrest, as chief agents in pulling down the democracy, and delivered them up to the Argives. They had no business now at Athens, and so came from Argos to Samos, convoying the Argive ambassadors in the trireme which they had seized.

The same summer Tissaphernes, about that juncture of time in which the Peloponnesians were most furious against him for the other reasons, and the recall of Alcibiades, as having now pulled off the mask and declared for the Athenians, desirous, as in truth it appeared, to efface the bad impressions they had entertained of him, got ready to go to Aspendus to the Phœnician fleet, and prevailed with Lighas to bear him company. In regard to the Peloponnesians, he declared that he substituted his own lieutenant, Tamas, to pay them their subsistence whilst he himself should be absent. Various accounts are vented about this step; nor can it certainly be known with what view he repaired to Aspendus, or why, when there, he did not bring up the fleet. That a Phœnician fleet, consisting of one hundred and forty-seven sail was now come up to Aspendus, is allowed on all sides; but why they did not come forward is variously conjectured. Some

think he went out of sight merely to carry on his old scheme of wearing away the Peloponnesians; and, in consequence of this, Tamas paid in their subsistence which he was ordered to pay, not better, but even worse than Tissaphernes. Others say it was that, since he had brought the Phoenicians to Aspendus, he might save large sums by dismissing them there, as he never had sincerely designed to make use of their service. Others, again, attribute it to a desire to quiet the clamors against him at Lacedæmon, and to get himself represented there as one abounding in good faith, and who was actually gone to bring up a fleet fairly and honestly fitted out for service.

But, in my opinion, the true solution of the mystery is this: he would not bring them up, merely to wear out and to balance the strength of the Grecians, that, during his absence and this studied prolongation, the latter might be running into ruin; and, farther, for the sake of balancing, to join with neither party, for fear of making them too strong; for, had he once determined to join heartily in the war, the consequence was certain beyond a doubt. Had he brought them up to join the Lacedæmonians, he must in all probability have given them the victory, since already their naval strength was rather equal than inferior to that of their opponents. But, that their ruin alone was designed by him is plain from the excuse he made for not bringing up that fleet: he pretended they were fewer in number than the king had ordered to be assembled: yet if this were so, he might have ingratiated himself more abundantly with the king, if he made a great saving of money for his master, and with less expense had accomplished his service. To Aspendus, however, whatever was his view, Tissaphernes repaired, and joined the Phoenicians; nay, farther, at his own desire,

the Peloponnesians sent Philippus, a noble Lacedæmonian, with two triremes, to take charge of this fleet.

Alcibiades had no sooner received intelligence that Tissaphernes was at Aspendus, than, taking with him thirteen sail, he hastened thither after him, promising to those at Samos an assured and important piece of service; for, he would either bring the Phœnician fleet to the Athenians, or at least prevent their junction with the Peloponnesians. It is probable that, from a long acquaintance, he was privy to the whole intention of Tissaphernes never to bring up this fleet; and his project was now, to render Tissaphernes still more odious to the Peloponnesians, for the regard he showed to himself and the Athenians, that so he might at last be necessitated to strike in with the latter. He stood away therefore directly by Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course upwards.

The deputation sent from the four hundred being returned from Samos to Athens, reported the answer of Alcibiades: how ‘he encouraged them to hold out, and give way in no shape to the enemy; and that his confidence was great he should be able thoroughly to reconcile them with the army, and give them victory over the Peloponnesians.’ By this report they very much revived the spirits of many of those who had a share in the oligarchy, and yet would gladly extricate themselves from the business on assurances of indemnity. They had already begun to hold separate cabals, and show open discontent at the train of affairs. They were headed by some of principal authority, even in the present oligarchy, and who filled the great offices of state; namely, Theramenes,¹ the son of Agnon, and

¹ Theramenes was very expert at turning about and shifting
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Aristocrates, the son of Siccilius; and others who were most deeply concerned in the late transactions; and from a dread, as they gave out, of the army at Samos, and Alcibiades, had concurred in sending an embassy to Lacedæmon, lest by unseasonable dissents from the majority they might have done mischief to the public. Not that they hastened themselves even now to put an end to the oligarchical government, but to enforce the necessity of making use of the five thousand not merely in name but in act, and to render the polity more equal. This was, it must be owned, the political scheme which they all pretended: but, through private ambition the majority had given in to that course, by which an oligarchy, founded on the ruins of a democracy is ripe for subversion: for it was the daily claim of each single person concerned, not to be equal with the rest, but to be pre-eminently the first; whereas, when out of a democracy a preference is awarded, the distinction is the more easily brooked, as if it were the real consequence of superior worth. But what of a certainty elevated them most was the great influence of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own consciousness that this business of an oligarchy carried with it no prospect of

his party. He got by it the nickname of Cothurnus, or the Buskin: because the tragedians' buskin was made large enough for any foot to go into it. He was however a man of great abilities, and generally regarded as a lover of his country. His turns were dexterous, well-timed, and made with a view to public good. Cæsar, when making Cicero a compliment, likened him to Theramenes. He was deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with the Lacedæmonians after the taking of Athens by Lysander, when they demolished their long walls, opened their harbors, and gave up their shipping. He was afterwards nominally one of the thirty tyrants: for he soon began to oppose them; first with moderation, then with vehemence; which exasperated them so that they put him to death.

short or lasting continuance. A contention therefore ensued among them, which of them should show the greatest zeal for the people.

But such of the four hundred as made the greatest opposition to this new scheme, and were leaders of their party; namely, Phrynicus, who formerly, during his employment as general at Samos, had embroiled himself with Alcibiades; and Aristarchus, one of the most violent and also most inveterate opponents of the people; and Pisander, and Antipho, and others of the greatest influence amongst them: who formerly, on establishing themselves first in the government, and ever since the army at Samos had dissented from them in favor of the democracy, had bestirred themselves in sending embassies to Lacedæmon, in more firmly establishing the oligarchy, and erecting a new fortification on the spot, which is called Eetioneia:—these, I say, exerted themselves with much greater ardor than ever since the return of the deputies from Samos, as they plainly saw the inclinations of numbers; and some of their own body, on whose perseverance they had highly depended, were intirely changed. They even caused Antipho, and Phrynicus, and ten others, to set out with all expedition; so apprehensive were they of fresh opposition, both in Athens itself and from Samos; and charged them with instructions to strike up an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians on any tolerable terms they could possibly procure: they also carried on with redoubled diligence the new works at Eetioneia. These works were intended, as was given out by Theramenes and his party, not so much to keep out of the Piræus those from Samos, should they endeavor to attempt it, as to enable themselves, at their own discretion, to receive both the ships and land forces of the enemy; for Eetioneia is the mole of the

Piræus, and the entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. The new work was therefore joined in such a manner to that which guarded it before, on the side of the land, that a small party posted behind could command the entrance: for the extremities of it were continued down to the fort in the very mouth of the harbor, which was narrow; and both the old wall, which was built on the land side, and this new fortification within, reached down to the sea. They also enlarged and secured the great portico, which adjoined to the new work erected in the Piræus, and kept it entirely in their own custody. Here they obliged all the citizens to lodge what corn they already had, and all that should hereafter be imported; and here only to expose it to sale and to vend it.

These proceedings had for a long time drawn sharp insinuations from Theramenes; and, when the embassy returned from Lacedæmon without bringing to any manner of issue a general accommodation for the whole state, he averred, that 'by this new work the safety of the city was visibly endangered:' for from Peloponnesus, at this instant of time, at the request of the Eubœans, no less than forty-two sail of ships were on the coast of Laconia; some of which were Italian, from Tarentum and from Locri, and some Sicilian; and all were now bound for Eubœa. At the head of this equipment was Hegesandridas, a Spartan, the son of Hegesander. Theramenes maintained, that 'it was set out less for Eubœa than for those who were now fortifying at Eétioneïa; and, unless we stand on our guard, they will surprise and complete the ruin of Athens.' There was really something in the conduct of the men he accused to countenance this charge; nor was it merely the outcry of slander. Those who now composed the oligarchy were principally desirous to

preserve in their hands the whole appanage of the republic : if this were impracticable, to secure the shipping and walls, and subsist with independence : but, should they be unable to compass this, rather than fall the first victims to the democracy re-established, to let in the enemy ; and, resigning their shipping and fortifications, to make any terms whatever for the state, provided they could obtain security for their own persons. They accelerated therefore this new work ; which was so contrived as to have posterns, and sally-ports, and passages sufficient to let in the enemy ; and they proceeded with all imaginable dispatch, in order to out-strip prevention.

Hitherto indeed this charge against them had only been whispered with an air of secrecy amongst a few : but when Phrynicus, on his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, was treacherously stabbed by one of the patrol in the forum, at the hour of public resort, being got but a few steps from the house where the council was sitting, and dropped down dead on the spot ; when, farther, the assassin made his escape ; and a stranger from Argos, who assisted at the fact, being apprehended and tortured by the four hundred, discovered not the name of any one person who set them on, nor made any farther confession than that ‘ he knew large numbers met at the house of the officer who commanded the patrol, and at other places ;’—then, at length, as nothing could be made of this affair, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many either of the four hundred or of others as were combined with them, proceeded to act in a more open and resolute manner : for by this time the fleet had come round from Laconia ; and, riding before Epidaurus, had made ravages on Ægina. Theramenes therefore averred it improbable that, ‘ were they intended for Eubœa, they

would ever have put into Aegina, and then go again and lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent out at the express invitation of those whom he had always accused of traitorous designs ; and it was impossible to be passive any longer under such practices." In fine, after many speeches made to excite a tumult, and many suspicions disseminated abroad, they fell to work in earnest : for the heavy-armed posted in the Piræus to carry on the new works of Eetioneia, amongst whom Aristocrates himself was employed at the head of his own band, laid under an arrest Alexicles, who commanded there for the oligarchy, and was a most vehement adversary to the opposite party ; and, carrying him into a house, put him under confinement. To this action they were also emboldened by the concurrence of others, as well as by Hermon, who commanded the patrole assigned for Munychia ; and, what was of most importance, it was openly countenanced by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The news of it was immediately carried to the four hundred, who were this moment assembled together in council ; and all, excepting those dissatisfied with their measures, were ready to run to arms, and vented terrible threats against Tharamenes and his associates.

But he, apologising for himself, declared his readiness to take up arms along with them, and attend them to the rescue of Alexicles ; and, taking with him one of the generals who was in his secret, he hurried down to the Piræus. Aristarchus also ran down to assist ; as did, farther, the young men belonging to the cavalry of the state.

Great, in truth, was the tumult, and full of horror ; for those who were left in the upper city imagined that the Piræus was already seized ; and they in the Piræus each moment expected an assault from those in the

city. Not without difficulty could the men of years and experience step such as were wildly running up and down the streets, and rushing to arms. And Thucydides, the Pharsalian, public hoat of the state, who happened then to be at Athens, threw himself with lively zeal in the way of all who were flocking down; conjuring them earnestly not to finish the ruin of their country, when the enemy lay so near to strike the blow. But thus, at length, their fury abated, and the effusion of one another's blood was prevented.

As for Theramenes, he was no sooner got down to the Piraeus, than assuming authority (for he himself was at this time a general), he pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this piece of mutiny, at least so far as mere making a noise could do it; whilst Aristarchus and all the opposite faction were angry with them in earnest: but the bulk of the heavy-armed drew together in a body, and betrayed no sign of regret for what they had done. Nay, they demanded aloud from Theramenes, ‘if, in his judgment, these new works were raised with a good design, or would not better be demolished?’ His reply was this: that, ‘if they thought it expedient to demolish them, his opinion should concur with theirs.’ Hereon, at a signal given, the heavy-armed, and many others who belonged to the Piraeus, rushed on in a moment, and pulled down all the new fortification.

The watchword now published to the multitude was this:—‘ Whosoever would have the administration lodged in the five thousand instead of the four hundred, let him join in the work:’ for even still they judged it politic to veil their design under the name of the five thousand, and not to say downright, ‘ whosoever would have the democracy restored,’ lest possibly the former might have been actually in force, and a

person speaking to any one of them might spoil all by some inadvertent expressions : and, on the same account, the four hundred would neither have the five thousand declared, nor yet have it known that they had never been appointed. To admit so large a number into a share of the government, they judged was in fact a mere democracy ; but that leaving the matter in suspense would strike a dread of his neighbor into every Athenian.

The next morning the four hundred, though highly disordered in their politics, assembled however in council. But those in the Piraeus, after enlarging Alexicles, whom they had put under confinement, and completing the demolition of the new works, marched to the theatre of Bacchus in Munychia, and there, all armed as they were, held a formal assembly ; and then, in pursuance of what had been resolved, marched directly into the upper city, and posted themselves in the Anaceum. Here they were accosted by a select committee sent from the four hundred, who man to man reasoned calmly with them ; and, perceiving any to be tractable, plied them with persuasions to proceed in a gentle manner, and to restrain the fury of their associates ; giving them assurances, that ‘ the five thousand would be declared ; and from them, by regular succession, at the pleasure of the five thousand, the four hundred should be appointed ;’ conjuring them, in the mean time, ‘ not to forward, through impatience, the destruction of the state, nor give it up for a prey to the public enemy.’ The whole multitude of the heavy-armed, attentive to these arguments, on which many expatiated at large and pressed home on numbers, became more tractable than they were at first, and were most terribly alarmed at the mention of the total destruction of their polity. It was at last con-

cluded that, on a set day, an assembly should be held in the temple of Bacchus, to devise an accommodation.

But when this assembly, to be held in the temple of Bacchus, came on, and all parties were only not completely met, news came that ‘the two-and-forty sail and Hegesandridas were coasting along from Megara towards Salamis.’ Not one of the heavy-armed this moment but pronounced it true, what before was given out by Theramenes and his friends, that ‘to the new fortifications these ships are now bound;’ and it was judged that in the nick of time they had been levelled with the ground: but Hegesandridas, as perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only hovered about at Epidaurus or the adjacent coast. It is however probable that, on account of the present sedition among the Athenians, he lay for a time in this station, in hope to seize some fair opportunity to strike a blow.

Be this as it will, the Athenians no sooner heard the news than, to a man, they flocked down amain to the Piraeus; less alarmed at their own domestic war than at an invasion from a public enemy, no longer remote, but at their very ports. Some of them threw themselves on board what shipping were ready; others launched such as were aground; and others posted themselves on the walls and at the mouth of the harbor.

But the Peloponnesian fleet, having sailed by and doubled the cape of Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasine, and proceeded afterwards to Oropus. Hereon the Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, manning out their ships with what hands could be got on this sudden emergency, as in a city distracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave off the greatest danger that had ever threatened it, (for, as

Attica was occupied by the enemy, Euboea was now their all,) caused Thymocharis, a commander, to stand away with their fleet to Eretria. On their arrival there, and their junction with such as were already in Euboea, they amounted to six-and-thirty sail, and were immediately forced to engage ; for Hegesandridas, after the hour of repast, came out in line of battle from Oropus.

The distance of Oropus from the city of the Eretrians, across the sea, is about sixty stadia :¹ and therefore, on his approach, the Athenians ordered their men on board, imagining the soldiers to be ready at hand to obey their orders ; whereas they happened not yet to be returned from the market, whither they had gone to buy provisions : for, through the management of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the most remote quarters of the city ; with an intent that the enemy might attack the Athenians before they were all embarked, and oblige them in a hurrying and disorderly manner to begin the fight. Nay, a signal had even been held out to the enemy from Eretria towards Oropus, at what time they ought to come forward to the attack.

On so short a notice, the Athenians, having formed their line as well as they were able, and engaging the enemy before the harbor of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance for a time. At length, being compelled to sheer off, they were pursued to land ; and as many of them as ran for safety to the city of the Eretrians suffered the most cruel treatment, in being murdered by the hands of men whom they supposed their friends. Such, indeed, as could reach the fort

¹ About six English miles.

of Eretria, which was garrisoned by Athenians, were safe; as also the vessels which could make Chalcis.

But the Peloponnesians, after making prizes of two-and-twenty Athenian vessels, and either butchering or making prisoners all on board them, erected a trophy; and, no long time after, they caused all Eubœa to revolt, excepting Oreus, which an Athenian garrison secured, and then settled the state of that island at their own discretion.

When advice of what was done at Eubœa reached Athens, the greatest consternation ensued of all that had to this day been known. Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily, though great concern, in truth, it gave them, nor any other public disaster, caused so terrible an alarm amongst them; for, at a time when their army at Samos was in open revolt; when they had no longer either shipping in store or mariners to go on board; when they were distracted with intestine sedition, and ready each moment to tear one another to pieces; and on the neck of all these this great calamity supervened, in which they lost their fleet, and, what was of more consequence, Eubœa, which had better supplied their necessities than Attica itself, had they not ample reason now to fall into utter dejection? But what alarmed them most was the proximity of ruin, in case the enemy, flushed with their late success, should stand immediately into the Piræus, now utterly destitute of ships. Not a moment passed but they imagined they were only not in the very harbor; which, in truth, had they been a little more daring, they might easily have been. Nay, had they made this step and blocked up the city, they must infallibly have increased the seditions within it; must have necessitated the fleet to come over from Ionia, though averse to the oligarchy, in order to prevent the ruin

of their own relations and the total destruction of their country ; and, in the mean time, Hellespont, Ionia, the isles even up to Eubœa ; in a word, the whole empire of Athens, must have been their own. Yet, not in this instance only, but many others, the Lacedæmonians showed themselves most commodious enemies for the Athenians to encounter : for, as nothing differed more than their respective tempers, the one being active, the other slow ; enterprising these, but timorous those, especially in naval competitions, they gave them many advantages. The truth of this the Syracusans most plainly showed, who very nearly resembled the Athenians in disposition, and so warred against them with the highest spirit and success.

Terrified, however, at these tidings, the Athenians made a shift to man out twenty vessels, and convened an assembly of the people, on the first report of their loss, in the place which is called the Pnyx, and where generally that assembly was held. In this they put an end to the administration of the four hundred, and decreed the supreme power to be vested in the five thousand, which number to consist of all such citizens as were inrolled for the heavy armor ; and that no one should receive a salary for any public magistracy ; whoever offended in this point they declared a traitor. Other frequent assemblies were afterwards held, in which they appointed nomothetæ,¹ and filled up the other posts in the government. And now at least,

¹ The general course of appointing nomothetæ was by lot. Their number in the whole was a thousand and one. Their business was not, as the name seems to imply, to make new laws, since that belonged to the supreme power lodged in the people ; but to inspect such as were already made, to reconsider such as were thought to be, or were complained of as grievous, and regularly report such as ought to be continued, or ought to be repealed.

though for the first time, in my opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled their government aright. A moderation, finely tempered between the few and the many, was now enforced : and, from the low situation into which their affairs were now plunged, this enabled Athens to re-erect her head.

They decreed, farther, the recall of Alcibiades and his adherents ; and, despatching a deputation to him and the army at Samos, exhorted them to exert their utmost efforts for the public service.

In the first moments of this new revolution, Pisander and Alexicles, with their partisans, and in general all the great sticklers for the oligarchy, withdrew privately to Decelea. But Aristarchus, who was one of the generals of the state, took a different route from all the rest ; and, carrying off a party of archers, though rank barbarians, went off towards Oenoe : Oenoe was a fortress of the Athenians on the frontiers of Boeotia. But the Corinthians, on a provocation peculiar to themselves, having procured the concurrence of the Boeotians, held it now blocked up, because a party of their countrymen, drawing off from Decelea, had been put to the sword by a sally of the garrison from Oenoe. Aristarchus, therefore, having in a conference settled matters with the besiegers, deceived the garrison in Oenoe, by assuring them, that, as their countrymen in Athens had made up all their quarrels with the Lacedæmonians, they also were bound to deliver up this place to the Boeotians ; and that this was an express provision of the treaty. Giving credit therefore to him as in public command, and ignorant of all the late transactions because closely blocked up, they agreed with the enemy and evacuated the fortress. In this manner the Boeotians regained possession of

abandoned Oenoe : and thus the oligarchy and sedition were suppressed at Athens.

But, about the same space of time in the current summer, in regard to the Peloponnesians at Miletus ; when none of those who were substituted by Tissaphernes during his absence at Aspendus, made regular payments ; and nothing could be seen either of Tissaphernes or the Phoenician fleet ; and Philippus, who accompanied him, sent advice to Mindarus, the admiral-in-chief ; and Hippocrates, farther, a citizen in Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, advised him also, that this fleet would never join him, and in all respects they were shamefully abused by Tissaphernes ; as Pharnabazus had made them an invitation, and declared himself ready, if aided by the confederate fleet, to engage as strongly as Tissaphernes for the revolt of what cities yet remained in subjection to the Athenians ; Mindarus, hoping to find more punctuality in the latter, with notable conduct, and by a sudden signal to the fleet, that his motions might not be discovered at Samos, weighed from Miletus with seventy-three sail, and bent his course to the Hellespont. But, earlier this summer, sixteen ships had steered their course thither, and ravaged part of the Chersonesus. Mindarus met with tempestuous weather in his passage, which forced him to put into Icarus ; and, after staying there five or six days for want of weather to keep the sea, he arrived at Chios.

Thrasyllus, so soon as informed of the departure from Miletus, stood after him with five-and-fifty sail, making the best of his way lest the other should enter the Hellespont before he reached him. But, gaining intelligence that he was put into Chios, and concluding he designed to remain there, he fixed his scouts at

Lesbos and the opposite continent; that, if the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions might be descried. He himself repairing to Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and other necessaries to be prepared, that in case he should be forced to stay in these parts, he might make frequent cruises from Lesbos against Chios.

But, as Eressus in Lesbos had revolted, his design was farther to attempt its reduction, in case it were feasible: for some of the Methymnean exiles, and those not the most inconsiderable of the number, having brought over from Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were most firmly attached to their cause, and hired others from the continent, which increased their number to about three hundred; Anaxarchus, the Theban, in respect of consanguinity, being chosen their leader, assaulted first Methymne, and being repulsed in the attempt by the Athenian garrison which came up from Mitylene, and then driven quite off by a battle fought in the field, they retired across the mountain, and made Eressus revolt. Thrasyllus, therefore, steering with his fleet against Eressus, projected an assault. But Thrasybulus, with five ships from Samos, arrived there before him, on information received of the re-passage of the exiles; yet coming too late before Eressus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor before it. Two other ships, also, bound homeward from the Hellespont, came in, and the Methymnean. All the ships in the fleet amounted now to sixty-seven, from which they draughted an army for the operations of land, as fully bent, if possible, to take Eressus by a bold assault, with engines and all the arts of attack.

In the mean time, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after two whole days' employment in taking in provisions, and receiving from the Chians every

man on board three Chian tesseracosts,¹ on the third day with urgent dispatch launched out from Chios into the wide sea, that they might not be descried by the fleet before Eressus; and leaving Leshos on the left, stood over to the continent. There, putting into the harbor of Crateræi on the coast of Phœcea, and taking their noon repast, they proceeded along the coast of Cyme, and supped at Arginusæ of the continent, over-against Mitylene. From thence, at dead of night, they went forward along the shore; and, being arrived at Harmatus, which lies facing Methymne, and having eaten their dinner there, they passed with the utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reached Rhætium of the Heilespont before midnight: not but that some ships of the fleet got up no farther than to Sigæum and some other adjacent places on that coast.

The Athenians, who were lying with eighteen sail at Sestus, when the lights were waved by their own friends for signals, and they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sudden on the hostile coast, were well assured that the Peloponnesians were approaching. The same night, therefore, under favor of the dark, and with the utmost expedition, they crept along under the Chersonesus, and reached Eleus, desirous to put out to sea and avoid the enemy; and, for the sixteen ships at Abydos, they stole away unperceived of the Abydians, though notice had been sent them from their friends just arrived, to keep a good look-out, and not

¹ This, according to Spanheim, was a month's pay, since he explains it by forty-three Chian drachmas; but the words will not bear such a construction; a tesseracost was, it is most probable, a coin peculiar to the Chians; but of what value is not known, nor is it of any great importance.

suffer them to steal off. Yet morning no sooner appeared, than finding themselves in sight of the fleet under Mindarus, and that they were actually chased, they could not all get off. The greater part, indeed, fled safe to the continent and Lemnos; but four, that got last under sail, were overtaken by the enemy near Eleus; one also, that ran ashore at the temple of Protesilaus, they seized with all her hands; and two more, the crews of which escaped. One farther, but abandoned, they burnt at Imbrus.

This done, the ships from Abydos having joined them, and the whole fleet being now increased to four-score and six sail, they spent the rest of the day in investing Eleus: but, as it would not surrender, they drew off to Abydos.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their scouts, and never imagined that so large a number of hostile ships could pass along undescried, were very coolly carrying on their siege; but yet were no sooner informed of the enemy's motions, than, instantly quitting Eressus, they advanced with the utmost expedition to secure the Hellespont. They also picked up two ships of the Peloponnesians; which running out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit, fell in amongst them; and, coming up only one day after them, they anchored at Eleus, and reassembled from Imbrus the ships which had fled thither. Five whole days they spent here in getting every thing in readiness for a general engagement: and after this respite they came to an action in the following manner.

The Athenians, ranged in line of battle a-head, stood along shore towards Sestus. The Peloponnesians, aware of their design, stood out to sea from Abydos, to be ready to receive them: and, as both sides were determined to engage, they unfolded their lines to a

greater length; the Athenians, along the Chersonesus, reaching from Idacus to Arrhiane, in all sixty-eight sail; and the Peloponnesians, over-against them, from Abydos to Dardanus, being eighty-six. The line of the Peloponnesians was thus formed: the Syracusans had the right; and on the left was ranged Mindarus, and the ships most remarkable for being good sailors. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left, and Thrasybulus the right: the rest of the commanders were regularly posted according to their rank. The Peloponnesians, showing most eagerness to begin the engagement, endeavored with their left to overreach the right of the Athenians, in order to exclude them, if possible, from stretching out into the main sea, and by keeping them cramped up, to force their centre against the shore, which was not far distant. The Athenians, aware of the enemy's design to shut them up, plying up a-head, forced themselves an opening, and in velocity beat them all to nothing.

By these motions, the left of their line became extended beyond the cape called Cynos-sema. The consequence of which was exposing their centre, composed only of the weakest ships, and those ranged at too great a distance from one another; especially as in number of vessels they were quite inferior, and as the coast round the Cynos-sema was sharp, and in an acute angle ran out into the water, so that part of the line on one side was out of sight of the other. The Peloponnesians, therefore, charging the centre, drove at once the ships of the Athenians on the beach; and, being so far manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shore to pursue them: But neither those under Thrasybulus could assist the centre from the right, because of the multitude of ships that stood in to awe them; nor could those under Thrasyllus do it from the left, be-

cause the interposition of cape Cyno-sema hid from him the view of what had passed ; and at the same time the Syracusans and others, who, equal in strength, lay hard on him, prevented his moving. At length, the Peloponnesians, presuming the victory their own, broke their order to give different chase to single ships, and in too heedless a manner threw confusion on a part of their own line. And now those under Thrasybulus, finding the squadron opposed to them began to slacken, stopped all farther extension of their line a-head ; and, tacking on them, resolutely engaged, and put them to flight. Charging next the dispersed ships of the Peloponnesians, which composed the squadron that presumed itself victorious, they made havoc ; and, by striking them with a panic, routed the greater part without resistance. Now also the Syracusans were beginning to give way before the squadron under Thrasylus ; and, seeing others in open flight, were more easily tempted to follow their example. The defeat now being manifestly given, and the Peloponnesians flying away for shelter, first towards the river Pydius, and afterwards to Abydos, the Athenians made prize of only an inconsiderable number of shipping ; for the Hellespont, being narrow, afforded short retreats to the enemy. However, they gained a victory by sea, most opportune indeed in their present situation ; for hitherto, afraid of the naval strength of the Peloponnesians, because of the rebuffs they had lately received from it, and the calamitous event of the Sicilian expedition, from this moment they stopped all fruitless self-accusations or groundless exaggerations of the enemy's ability by sea. Some ships of the enemy in fact they took ; for instance, eight Chian, five Corinthian, two Ambraciots, two Boeotian ; but, of Leucadian, and Lacedaemonian, and Syracusan, and Pelles

mean, a single one of each: but then they suffered the loss of fifteen ships of their own.

After erecting a trophy on the cape of Cynos-sema, and picking up the wreck of the battle, and giving up, under truce, their dead to the enemy, they despatched a trireme to Athens, to notify the victory. On the arrival of this vessel, those at home, after hearing the news of this un hoped-for success, greatly resumed their spirits, which had been dejected by the recent misfortunes at Eubœa and the sad effects of their sedition, and hoped the state might again resume its power, if they cheerfully exerted their efforts in its behalf.

On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians, having diligently refitted their fleet at Sestus, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted; and, descrying eight ships from Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagium and Priapus, they crowded sail towards them; and having in battle on the shore defeated their crews, made prizes of them all. Repairing thence against Cyzicus, which was quite unfortified, they reduced it once more, and exacted large contributions from it.

But, during this interval, the Peloponnesians made a trip from Abydos to Eleusis, and brought off as many of their own ships which had been taken as were able to sail; the residue the Eleusians burnt. They also despatched Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to fetch up their fleet from thence.

About the same space of time, Alcibiades also, at the head of his squadron of thirteen sail, returned from Caunus and Phaselis into the harbor of Samos, reporting that by his management he had diverted the junction of the Phoenician fleet with the Peloponnesians, and made Tissaphernes a faster friend than ever to the

Athenians. After enlarging his squadron by the addition of nine more ships just manned, he levied large contributions on the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After these exploits, and putting the government of Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about autumn, to Samos.¹

From Aspendus also Tissaphernes rode back post-haste into Ionia, so soon as advised of the departure

¹ As the English reader is here to take his leave of Alcibiades, he may have the curiosity to know what became of him after. Every thing succeeded so well under him and his active colleagues, that the Lacedæmonians, having received several defeats both by land and sea, and lost two hundred ships, were again necessitated to sue for peace. After such great services, Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole city flocked down to the Piræus to meet him. All strove to get a sight of Alcibiades: they caressed him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There he harangued them for a time; then stopped and shed tears in abundance; then harangued them again. In short, they undid all they had ever done against him; and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at Athens. Yet, in subsequent commands, he happened not to be successful; a crime which his countrymen very seldom forgave. He became a second time an exile from Athens. His great abilities made him a continual terror both to foreign and domestic enemies. Yet now he persevered to serve his country, by caballing in their favor, and advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain: Lysander was soon made master of the Piræus and of Athens. Alcibiades retired into Phrygia, and was handsomely supported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus; who, however, was wrought on at last, by the joint solicitations of his enemies and the plea of its necessity for the service of the king, to undertake his destruction. The agents of Pharnabazus durst not attempt it in an open manner, but set fire to his house by night. By throwing in clothes to damp the flames he got out safe. The barbarians soon spied him; shot him to death with arrows and darts; then cut off his head, and carried it to Pharnabazus. I shall only add that he was but forty years old when he was thus destroyed.

of the Peloponnesian fleet from Miletus for the Hellespont.

But, as the Peloponnesians were now in the Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are of Aeolic descent), having procured from Abydos a party of heavy-armed, who marched across Mount Ida, received them into their city ; provoked to this step by the injurious conduct of Arsaces, a Persian, lieutenant to Tissaphernes. This man, pretending he had enemies, to cope with whom yet he never named, prevailed with the Delians settled in Adramyttium, because they had been obliged by the Athenians to quit Delos in the affair of the expiation, to attend him in this secret expedition with the flower of their strength ; and, leading them forward with all the show of friendship and alliance, watched the opportunity when they were busy at their meal, surrounded them with a body of his own soldiers, and shot them to death with darts. Fearing him, therefore, because of this instance of a cruel temper, lest some such act of violence he might execute also on them, as in other respects he had imposed some burdens on them which they could not bear, the Antandrians ejected his garrison out of their citadel. But Tissaphernes, perceiving how deeply the Peloponnesians were concerned in this affair, and esteeming himself sadly injured also at Miletus and Cnidus (since in those places too his garrisons had been ejected) ; and fearing they would proceed to other commissions of the same nature ; chagrined moreover that perhaps Pharnabazus, in less time and with less expense, having obtained their concurrence, should make a greater progress against the Athenians ;—he determined in person to repair to Hellespont, in order to expostulate with them about their late proceedings at Antander, and to

wipe off, as handsomely as he could, the aspersions thrown on his conduct in regard to the Phœnician fleet and other points. Arriving therefore first at Ephesus, he offered sacrifice to Diana * * * *.¹

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the twenty-first year of the war will be also completed.


¹ Here breaks off abruptly the History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides. The adjustment of time annexed seems plainly of another hand.


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
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